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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEEDS AND REALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Despite attempts at harmonization through treaty relations and
State participation in multilateral organizations, the international arena
is a composite of unsettled and unsettling structures. The volatility
of global politics and discordant national perceptions of legitimate
lawful conduct constitute a precarious, usually unsuitable, basis for
an international rule of law. Domestic concepts of legality rarely
serve as adequate instruments for molding the character of inter-
national relations.' The irreducible principle of national sovereignty
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I For example, efforts to articulate an agreed-upon definition of terrorism for
extradition purposes have been confounded by disparate ideologies and other
barriers that impede the elaboration of uniform standards. See TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORISM: CONVENTIONS AND COMMENTARY (R. Lillich ed. 1982), reviewed in 19
TEX. INT'L L.J. 250 (1984); J. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL
OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE. A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1982); Symposium
On International Terrorism, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 681 (1986); W. WAUGH, INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM: How NATIONS RESPOND To TERRORISTS (1982). See also
Baker, The Western European Legal Response to Terrorism, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L
L. 1 (1987).
See Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, reprinted
in 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971); Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
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makes the world community resistant to the adoption of universal
juridical standards2 and consecrates the fragmentation of national
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971); United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons
Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, G.A. Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 30), at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 68 AM. J. INT'L
L. 383 (1974); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for
signature, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
These conventions attempt to deal with the problem of excluding terroristic acts
from the purview of the political offense exception by listing specific offenses as
extraditable crimes not subject to any exception. For a discussion of these con-
ventions and problems posed by extradition and terrorist acts in the international
community, see INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (M.C. Bassiouni
ed. 1973); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986); M.C. BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1974); M.C.
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1987).
2 The problems that attend international judicial assistance and cooperation
illustrate the lack of cohesion and uniformity. For a discussion of this topic, see
generally, Kitchen, A Bibliography of Transnational Litigation in Socialist Coun-
tries: Discovery, Evidence, and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 21 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 383 (1986); Gaw, Bibliography: International Judicial Assistance, 18 INT'L
LAW. 555 (1984); Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural
Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745 (1986); O'Kane,
Obtaining Evidence Abroad, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 69 (1984); McKay,
Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational Litigation: A Selected Bib-
liography, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1217 (1984); Note, Judicial Assistance:
Obtaining Evidence in the United States, Under 28 U.S.C. §1782, for Use in a
Foreign or International Tribunal, 5 B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 175 (1982); Note,
Reexamining the American Response to Judicial Assistance Among Nations: Sugges-
tions for Improvement, 7 ASILS INT'L L.J. 41 (1983); Platto, Taking Evidence
Abroad for Use in Civil Cases in the United States-A Practical Guide,
16 INT'L LAW. 575 (1982); Ristau, Overview of International Judicial Assistance,
18 INT'L LAW. 525 (1984); Smith, Letters Rogatory - Compelling the Evidence of
Witnesses in Canada, 31 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 333 (1981); Sutherland, The Use
of the Letter of Request (or Letter Rogatory) for the Purpose of Obtaining Evidence
for Proceedings in England and Abroad, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 784 (1982); Von
Mehren, Discovery of Documentary and Other Evidence in a Foreign Country, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 896 (1983).
See also Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad ill Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S.
No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. For a comprehensive treatment of the Hague Evidence
Convention, see Note, Hague Evidence Convention: A Practical Guide to the
Convention, United States Case Law, Convention-Sponsored Review Commissions
(1978 and 1985), and Responses of Other Signatory Nations: With Digest of Cases
and Bibliography, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73 (1986).
The goal of the Hague Evidence Convention is to achieve transnational uniformity
in the critical areas of litigation, but disruptive political and juridical factors-
although they can be balanced in some circumstances-are ever-present and remain
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self-interest as the ultimate source of legality among nation-states.
The clash of sovereign interests amidst precarious political align-
ments, economic interdependencies, and geographical configurations
creates special dispute resolution needs. Temporizing imprecision,
diplomatic latitude, and the indeterminacy of equivocal dialogue are
better suited than adjudication or its analogues to deal with con-
frontations among the Titans. Finality, as practiced in the domestic
setting, is not the exclusive, or even the primary, objective of inter-
national dispute resolution. Legal adjudication is only one of the
many avenues by which to approach international conflict resolution.
Its principal role, in fact, is to act as an instrument of persuasion
rather than coercion. Unlike a domestic judicial tribunal, the World
Court3 is but a symbol of what binding legal adjudication might yield
in the determination of state-to-state conflicts. By its composition,
jurisdictional mandate, and authorizing foundation, the Court and
its pronouncements are merely part of a complex, essentially diplo-
matic calculus for resolving disputes. The legality of expropriations, 4
difficult to reconcile:
The Hague Evidence Convention was designed to permit cooperation
among legal systems that in many situations reflect fundamentally different
views about the role of courts in achieving justice and applying law. A
principal goal was to ease the burden on litigants in common-law countries
in procuring evidence located abroad. The Convention sought to establish
a system for transnational evidence-gathering which was acceptable to the
states parties and which would harmonize conflicting views about sov-
ereignty and jurisdiction reflected in differing systems of civil procedure
used by the members. The problems which the Convention addresses often
flow from fundamentally different assumptions about the role of courts
in the legal systems of many of its signatories.
Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery: Cooperation, Coercion and the Hague Evidence
Convention, 19 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239, 242 (1986) (footnote omitted).
' STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, done at San Francisco,
June 26, 1945, entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 BEVANS 1153 reprinted in 1976 Y.B. U.N. 1052.
4 See generally B. WESTON, R. FALK, & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 674-86 (1980). For a discussion of expropriations in state-to-
state relations and the role of the national courts, see Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (act of state doctrine held to prevent challenge
of Cuban expropriation decree), rev'g 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962). See also H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 691-728 (2d ed. 1976);
Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or Abstention?, 66 AM.
J. INT'L L. 82 (1972); Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic
Courts in the International Legal Order.: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1961); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power
of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964); Lowenfeld, Act
of State and Department of State: First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional
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boundaries and fisheries claims,5 acts of alleged political reprisal, 6
and the use of self-help devices7 cannot be separated from the political
interests of sovereign nations.
International conflicts also arise in more mixed circumstances, in-
volving both governmental and private interests. In addition to the
diplomatic espousal of claims by governments, the activity of global,
stateless enterprises8 can give rise to controversies between the host
and other countries, the private enterprise, and citizens of various
nations. The Bhopal9 disaster is a telling illustration of the complexity
of the dispute resolution problems that can arise in a public-private
transnational setting. The alleged commission in India of an industrial
toxic tort by a company with a worldwide corporate organization
complicated the most elemental issues of adjudication. 0 From a dis-
de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795 (1972). See generally Note, International Ar-
bitration and the Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 65 (1981).
5 See generally M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS:
A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1987); Burton, Freedom of
the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 1135 (1977); Nelson, The Emerging New Law of the Sea, 42 MOD. L.
REV. 42 (1979).
6 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3. See also Recent Development, International Adjudication: Embassy
Seizure-United States v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 748 (1980).
1 For example, in the Entebbe raid, Israel arguably resorted to self-help in
order to recover its nationals. For a discussion of the Entebbe raid, see Y. BEN-
PORAT, E. HABER & Z. SCHIFF, ENTEBBE RESCUE (1977); F. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 77-121 (1985); Y. RABIN, THE RABIN MEMOIRS 282-89
(1979).
8 See generally EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVEST-
MENT: MULTINATIONAL CODES AND CORPORATE CONDUCT (S. Rubin & G. Hufbauer
eds. 1984); Kronstein, The Nationality of International Enterprises, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 983 (1952); Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal
Restraints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1961). See also OECD
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 75 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 83 (1976); A. SAFARIAN, GOVERNMENTS AND MULTINATIONALS: POLICIES
IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1983); Note, Multinational Business Enterprises In
Lesser Developed Countries: The Role of the United States Legal System, 2 FLA.
INT'L L.J. 69 (1986).
9 See The Bhopal Tragedy: Social and Legal Issues, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 267
(1985).
,0 The incident gave rise to a question (among others) of jurisdiction to ad-
judicate: given its United States corporate headquarters, could Union Carbide be
sued before a New York court for the calamities that took place in India? See,
e.g., Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for an
International Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321 (1985). See also Maynard, A
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 4 THE COMPANY LAW. 103
[Vol. 18:143
1988] INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
pute resolution perspective, Bhopal teaches that transnational cor-
(1983); Note, United States-Based Multinational Corporations Should be Tried in
the United States for their Extraterritorial Toxic Torts, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 651 (1986); Tzouganatos, Private International Law as a Means to Control the
Multinational Enterprise, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 477 (1986).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens held sway. See In re Union Carbide
Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842, No.
21-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified on other grounds, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987):
This Court is firmly convinced that the Indian legal system is in a far
better position than the American courts to determine the cause of the
tragic event and thereby fix liability. Further, the Indian courts have
greater access to all the information needed to arrive at the amount of
the compensation to be awarded the victims.
The presence in India of the overwhelming majority of the witnesses and
evidence, both documentary and real, would by itself suggest that India
is the most convenient forum for this consolidated case. The additional
presence in India of all but the less than handful of claimants underscores
the convenience of holding trial in India.
The administrative burden of this immense litigation would unfairly tax
this or any American tribunal. The cost to American taxpayers of sup-
porting the litigation in the United States would be excessive. When
another, adequate and more convenient forum so clearly exists, there is
no reason to press the United States judiciary to the limits of its capacity.
No American interest in the outcome of this litigation outweighs the
interest of India in applying Indian law and Indian values to the task of
resolving this case.
Plaintiffs, including the Union of India, have argued that the courts of
India are not up to the task of conducting the Bhopal litigation. They
assert that the Indian judiciary has yet to reach full maturity due to the
restraints placed upon it by British colonial rulers who shaped the Indian
legal system to meet their own ends. Plaintiffs allege that the Indian
justice system has not yet cast off the burden of colonialism to meet the
emerging needs of a democratic people.
The Court thus finds itself faced with a paradox. In the Court's view,
to retain the litigation in this forum, as plaintiffs request, would be yet
another example of imperialism, another situation in which an established
sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a developing
nation. This court declines to play such a role. The Union of India is a
world power in 1986, and its courts have the proven capacity to mete
out fair and equal justice. To deprive the Indian judiciary of this op-
portunity to stand tall before the world and to pass judgment on behalf
of its own people would be to revive a history of subservience and
subjugation from which India has emerged. India and its people can and
must vindicate their claims before the independent and legitimate judiciary
created there since the Independence of 1947.
Therefore, the consolidated case is dismissed on the grounds of forum non
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porate activity harbors the potential for confounding the usual scope
conveniens ....
Id. at 866-67.
Subsequent judicial rulings in India demonstrated the adaptability of the Indian
legal system to the complex proportions of this type of litigation. See M.C. Mehta
v. Union of India, 1987 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1086.
Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society
and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the
country. As new situations arise the law has to be evolved in order to
meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain
static. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which
would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly
industrialized economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be
constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the
matter of that in any other foreign country. We no longer need the
crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive
light from whatever source it comes but we have to build up our own
jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because
the new law does not recognize the rule of strict and absolute liability in
cases of hazardous or dangerous liability or the rule as laid down in
Rylands v. Fletcher as is developed in England recognizes certain limi-
tations and responsibilities. We in India cannot hold our hands back and
I venture to evolve a new principle of liability which English courts have
not done. We have to develop our own law and if we find that it is
necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual
situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account
of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concomitant
to an industrial economy, there is no reason why we should hesitate to
evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done
in England. We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a
hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat
to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing
in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the
community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of
hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has
undertaken. The enterprises must be held to be under an obligation to
provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it
is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and
if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be
absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer
to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the
harm occurred without any negligence on its part.
Id. at 1088.
While this ruling accommodates the tort aspects of the litigation, the prospect
of unlimited liability could dissuade other foreign companies from investing in
India. This likely consequence has lead some Indian lawyers to speculate privately
that subsequent foreign investors will be exempted from such liability at the outset
of the transaction through negotiations with the government. In terms of law-
making, the Bhopal litigation and its doctrine are then akin to a "one-off"
contract-good only for this particular and highly publicized event.
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of national political agendas and the regulatory capability of national
legal processes. These hybrid public and private disputes can be as
resistant to the civilizing influence of traditional juridical solutions
and as paralyzing to world community interests as state-to-state po-
litical conflicts.
By its very nature, private international commercial activity also
engenders disputes of a transnational character. These disputes are
usually of a contractual variety and can involve both private parties
and states that engage in transnational business ventures. International
contracting arrangements present considerable risks. In particular,
once contractual relations are disrupted by dispute, commercial ac-
tivity in the world marketplace becomes vulnerable to the variegated
rulings of national courts-to the absence of a specifically transna-
tional, cohesive legal regulatory structure."
An effective dispute resolution framework, however, is vital to the
viability of these transactions. Where international politics demands
the recourse to a panoply of non-juridical remedies in the event of
conflict, international commercial ventures require a stable dispute
resolution framework, capable of achieving finality and founded upon
adjudicatory neutrality, expertise, and confidentiality. Given their
domestic orientation, national courts often lack the expertise to decide
international contract disputes knowledgeably. National court deter-
minations are usually not fashioned to respond to the unique contours
and dynamics of international business dealings. Domestic judges
typically are preoccupied with legalistic choice-of-law and jurisdic-
tional matters. Little, if any, consideration is ever given to whether
" See generally D. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2d ed.
1984); Transnational Litigation, 18 INT'L LAW. 522 (1984); von Mehren, Trans-
national Litigation In American Courts: An Overview of Problems and Issues, in
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
IN 1984 1 (J. Moss ed. 1985).
The character of the parties and the nature of the transactions are themselves
a source of difficulty. The differences between the parties, including those of
nationality, language, and culture, can breed distrust and misunderstanding. Com-
municating the essential details of a business transaction through the veil of
intermediaries can be both difficult and dangerous. The participation of lawyers
from a plurality of legal backgrounds adds another level of complexity to nego-
tiations and to the drafting of documents. International contracts are themselves
special legal creations, requiring provisions that respond to the unique risks that
attend transnational deals (e.g., controlling language, currency stabilization, gap-
filling, and force majeure clauses). See generally G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL
CONTRACTS, APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (A STUDY IN CONFLICT
AVOIDANCE) (multi-volume series).
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the would-be governing law provides a suitable decisional basis for
resolving private transnational conflicts.
Domestic fora, perhaps sensing that they lack the requisite systemic
or jurisdictional authority, ordinarily make little or no attempt to
discover a rule of law that corresponds to the nature of the dispute
submitted for resolution. Whatever uniformity exists is often achieved
in a decentralized, ad hoc, and indirect fashion. Simply stated, in a
given jurisdiction, national legal provisions serve provisionally in the
particular litigation as international rules of law. This sometimes leads
to situations in which domestic laws gain an extraterritorial reach.
While these laws may have considerable domestic currency, some
jurisdictional and procedural concepts-for example, long-arm juris-
diction, due process of law, and discovery-do not necessarily have
universal recognition or, even if they are recognized by most legal
systems, may be interpreted or applied differently in various countries.
Moreover, courts can be partial, even unwittingly, to the interests of
their nationals; in any event, they are likely to share their nationals'
perception of commercial practice and of the nature of contractual
breach. Finally, the public and confrontational character of court
proceedings can do considerable, perhaps irreparable, damage to the
parties' commercial status and relationships.
Given the magnitude of the uncertainty with domestic judicial
solutions, international merchants have looked to alternative means
for settling their disputes-to mechanisms and processes based upon
the self-empowering principle of party autonomy in contract. Rather
than leave the selection of an appropriate forum and governing law
to national court interpretation, commercial parties have provided
for either or both in their agreement. The use of choice-of-forum-
and-law clauses, 12 however, has a number of drawbacks. It assumes
that the contracting parties will be aware or be made aware of, and
want to address, these prospective problems and will be able to reach
agreement on suitable contract language. It also assumes that national
courts will give effect to such contractual provisions without modi-
fying, reinterpreting, or objecting to them. Also, perhaps most im-
portantly, these conflict-avoidance clauses can mitigate or resolve
only some of the problems that accompany national court adjudication
of transnational commercial disputes. They do not make courts any
12 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See also
Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses-A Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law,
8 INT'L LAW. 83 (1974).
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more sensitive to the particularities of these transactions or give them
any better basis to act as international commercial tribunals. Inexpert,
possibly biased domestic judicial fora, acting in public proceedings,
could continue to dominate the available remedial process.'3
Arbitral adjudication fulfills many of the dispute resolution needs
of international merchants. It represents their use of the party au-
tonomy principle to create an adjudicatory process that yields binding
results which reflect the realities of commercial practice. Although
arbitration is usually touted for its economical and expeditious char-
acter, its primary contribution to the adjudication of transnational
commercial disputes resides in its provision of neutrality, privacy,
and expertise in the rendition of rulings. In the context of the prag-
matic dictates of commerce, international commercial arbitration sym-
bolizes the full use of a self-empowering ethic in dispute resolution.
This article assesses the exemplary dispute resolution value and
law-making capability of the international commercial arbitration
process. By way of illustrative contrast, the discussion focuses initially
upon state efforts under the Warsaw Convention to create a viable
transnational regulatory framework dealing with the liability of air
carriers for damages resulting from air transportation. The problems
that attend the text and implementation of the Warsaw Convention
stand in marked contrast to the development of a universal consensus
surrounding the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention. The recep-
tion of the New York Convention and of arbitration generally in the
statutory and decisional law of various national jurisdictions acts as
11 In light of these continuing difficulties, parties to international contracts
could forego entirely the recourse to national judicial adjudication and rely upon
self-help techniques or third-party agencies to resolve their contract disputes. Either
at the contracting stage or when a dispute arises, they could agree to negotiate
their differences and arrive at a mutually acceptable consensus as to what should
be done. Agreeing that negotiated settlement is the sole remedy, however, may
lock the parties into a scheme of dispute resolution that is ultimately unwanted
or unwarranted. A binding provision for the exclusive remedy of negotiation could,
by its time and cost, imperil the viability of the transaction. In the midst of
conflict, unless the parties' representatives are particularly skilled, such a provision
may not result in an acceptable resolution. Moreover, the circumstances of a
dispute may make the process of negotiation of only limited value, addressing
minor conflicts or acting as a precursor to litigation that determines which aspects
of the dispute are intractable. Failing a negotiated accommodation of differences,
the parties could provide for recourse to non-adjudicatory, but third-party-assisted
alternatives, like conciliation or mediation. While such processes may be useful
in resolving some differences, more substantial conflicts often require a process
akin to judicial determinations, providing for adjudicated and binding results.
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a foundation for elaborating a viable legal regime of truly transna-
tional proportions. Under this regime, the concept of private inter-
national law ceases to function merely as a means of selecting a
governing domestic law and becomes a purveyor of organic substantive
rules. The activity of the United States Supreme Court in matters of
transnational litigation lent credence to the establishment of such a
regime. However, the Court's recent opinion in Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon appears not only to damage the integrity
of the domestic law on arbitration, but also to undermine the seg-
regation of domestic and international policy on arbitration-previ-
ously, a critical feature of U.S. decisional law on transnational
arbitration. The Court's adoption of a dangerously unrestricted con-
cept of arbitration in domestic matters and the use of precedent from
international cases to sustain that view undercuts the transnational
import of prior rulings on international arbitration.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The history of the Warsaw Convention 14 illustrates the potential
ineffectiveness of transnational law-making by convention. The Warsaw
14 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air [hereinafter Warsaw Convention] resulted from international con-
ferences held in Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929 and the work of the interim
Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Ariens (CITEJA). The CI-
TEJA resulted from the 1925 Paris Conference. The Warsaw Convention was
signed on October 12, 1929 and is contained in 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 (1934). Spain, Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Rumania were the first countries
to ratify the Convention; France, Poland, and Latvia later ratified it on November
15, 1932. Great Britain and Italy ratified it the next day. The Warsaw Convention
became effective on February 13, 1933. By the end of 1933, there were 12 high
contracting parties, including most European states. Today, the Convention has
more than one hundred signatories.
There are a number of secondary sources on the Convention. Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV.
497 (1967) [hereinafter Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn] contains a most comprehensive
discussion and analysis of the history of the Warsaw Convention from the 1929
Warsaw Conference until the Montreal Agreement of 1966. For a detailed account
of the Convention's provisions and the various amendments of it (especially the
1955 Hague amendments), see R. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER (1981) [hereinafter M.ANKIEWICZ]. See also 1 & 2 L.
KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW (1986).
On the Convention's conditions for liability, see, e.g., Comment, Saks: A
Clarification of the Warsaw Convention Passenger Liability Standards, 16 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 539 (1985); Johnson & Minch, The Warsaw Convention Before
the Supreme Court: Preserving the Integrity of the System, 52 J. AIR L. & COM.
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Convention, signed in 1929 and ratified by the United States in 1934,
93 (1986); Martin, Intentional or Reckless Misconduct: From London to Bangkok
and Back Again, 8 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 145 (1983); Note, Up In The Air Without
a Ticket: Interpretation and Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 6 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 332 (1983); Price, Article 25? The Warsaw Convention Meaning of 'Reck-
lessly', 8 AIR L. 171 (1983); Reukema, Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: An
Accident is Required for Recovery, 10 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 191 (1985); Stan-
culescu, Recovery for Mental Harm Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention:
An Interpretation of Lesion Corporelle, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339
(1985).
On the constitutional aspects of the Convention, see, e.g., Comment, Warsaw
Convention Liability Limitations: Constitutional Issues, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
896 (1984); Monts, Due Process, Equal Protection and the Right to Travel: Can
Article 22 of The Warsaw Convention Stand Up To These Constitutional Foes?,
49 J. AIR L. & COM. 907 (1984); Rowe, After Bali: Can the Warsaw Convention
Be Proven a Taking Under The Fifth Amendment?, 49 J. AIR L. & COM. 947
(1984).
On the limits of liability and the use of the gold standard under the Convention,
see, e.g., Achampong, U.S. Courts and the Warsaw Convention: TWA v. Franklin
Mint, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 329 (1986); Albert, Limitations on Air Carrier
Liability: an Inadvertent Return to Common Law Principles, 48 J. AIR L. & COM.
111 (1982); Barlow, Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention: In a State of Limbo,
8 AIR L. 2 (1983); Corrigan, Air Cargo-Liability Limitations of the Warsaw
Convention for Loss of Cargo are (Unenforceable) Enforceable in the United States
of America, 9 AIR L. 184 (1984); Note, Aviation: Liability Limitations for Wrongful
Death or Personal Injury - a Contemporary Analysis of the Warsaw System, 10
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 381 (1984); Danziger, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin
Mint: The Judiciary's Problematic Role in Treaty Interpretation, 17 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 323 (1985); Fisher, The Gold Issue: The Supreme Court Upholds
the Limitations on Liability Established by the Warsaw Convention, 28 TRIAL
LAW. GUIDE 471 (1984); Kean, Warsaw Convention: Limitation of Liability, J.
Bus. L. 77 (1984); Kreindler, Franklin Mint, 191 N.Y.L. J. 1 (1984); Larsen, New
Work in UNCITRAL on Stable, Inflation Proof Liability Limits, 48 J. AIR L. &
COM. 665 (1983); Leigh, Treaties - Warsaw Convention - Conversion of Liability
Limitations From Gold Standards to Dollars, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 320 (1983); Lyall,
Warsaw Relieved: Gold Reinstated-but ... Application of Warsaw Convention to
Air Transport to and From the United States, 30 J. L. Soc. SCOTLAND 102(3) (1985);
McGilchrist, Carriage by Air - Limitation of Liability Under the Warsaw Convention
- further developments in the U.S., LLOYDS MAR. & COM. L.Q. 308 (1983); Recent
Development, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 592 (1984); Note, Torts -
Liability Limitations Under the Warsaw Convention - The Cargo Liability Limits
of the Warsaw Convention Are Fully Enforceable At The Rate Of $9.07 Per
Pound, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 155 (1984); Recent Development, 11 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 651 (1984); Reukema, No New Deal on Liability for International
Flights, 18 INT'L LAW. 983 (1984); Sheinfeld, From Warsaw to Tenerife: A Chron-
ological Analysis of the Liability Limitations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw
Convention, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 653 (1980); Young, Court Upholds Warsaw
Convention Limits on Liability, 70 A.B.A. J. 109 (1984).
On the various amendments to the Warsaw Convention, see, e.g., Cohen, Mon-
treal Protocol: the most recent attempt to modify the Warsaw Convention, 8 AIR
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represents a multi-state attempt to establish an international rule of
law to regulate the liability of air carriers for the corporeal and
material damages that result from the risks of air travel and trans-
portation. 5 As the international air industry was becoming a reality
in the mid-1920's, government attention focused upon the need to
protect the nascent enterprise from the prospect of unlimited tort
liability. The apprehension was that a single aircraft disaster or a
series of such disasters could completely paralyze the industry's com-
mercial viability, depriving all nations of the benefits of the new
technology. 16
The Convention's objective was to create a uniform regime of
predictable legal rules-specifically, to limit prospective liability by
establishing ceilings on the amount of recoverable damages. 7 In
particular, the Convention's liability scheme applies "to all inter-
national carriage of persons, luggage, or goods performed by aircraft
L. 146 (1983); Dubac & Doctor, Legislative Developments Affecting the Aviation
Industry 1981-82, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 263 (1983); Fitzgerald, The Four Montreal
Protocols to Amend the Warsaw Convention Regime Governing International
Carriage by Air, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 273 (1976); Kreindler, Montreal Protocols:
Moment of Truth, 188 N.Y.L.J., at 1, col. 1 (Aug. 20, 1982); Kreindler, Montreal
Protocols Ready for Vote, 189 N.Y.L.J., at 1, col. 1 (March 7, 1983); Leich, The
Montreal Protocol to the Warsaw Convention on International Carriage By Air,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 412 (1982); Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City
to Further Amend the 1929 Warsaw Convention, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 519 (1972).
11 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 14, at 502. See also Matte, The
Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the U.S. Senate, 8 ANN. AIR & SPACE L.
151, 153 (1983) (describing in detail the movement of the United States toward
ratification). Briefly, after the State Department conveyed its approval to the
President, the Treaty was submitted to the Senate, which rendered its advice and
consent by voice vote on June 15, 1934. The United States deposited an instrument
of adherence on July 31, 1934, and the ratification was proclaimed 90 days later
by the President. It is significant-in view of the later dissatisfaction and contro-
versies-that the Senate consented to the treaty without debate, and that the
executive branch took no part in the treaty's negotiation and drafting. The United
States only sent an observer to the Warsaw Conference.
16 This point was emphasized at the Warsaw Conference and is referred to in a
number of works. See, e.g., Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 14, at 499. See
generally R. HORNER & D. LEGREZ, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
AERONAUTICAL LAW WARSAW MINUTEs 1929 (1975) [hereinafter WARSAW MNUTES].
11 This objective, often expressed at the Warsaw Conference, is noted by Sheinfeld,
From Warsaw to Tenerife: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limitations
Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, supra note 14, at 658, and by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982) (rev'd on other grounds). See also WARSAW MINuTEs, supra
note 16.
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for hire.""8 The Convention adopts a two-pronged approach to the
imposition of legal liability, reflecting an attempt to strike a somewhat
precarious balance between protecting the air industry (the Conven-
tion's foremost objective) and recognizing the consumer interest of
passengers.
First, the Convention provides for a presumptive, ostensibly non-
absolute, form of legal liability against air carriers. 19 A presumption
of liability arises against the carrier when a passenger suffers bodily
injury or death "if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking. ' 20 The presumption of
carrier liability appears to sound in negligence; however, it places a
higher than reasonable duty of care upon the air carriers, a standard
of conduct that is akin to the utmost care to which domestic common
carriers are held in common-law jurisdictions. 2 Air carriers can avail
,8 Warsaw Convention, art. 1(1). For determining the scope of the Convention, the
term "international carriage" in article 1(1) is defined in article 1(2) as,
any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the
place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there would
be a break in the transportation or a transhipment, are situated within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single
High Conitracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power,
even though that power is not a party to this Convention.
Transportation under an international postal convention is excluded by article 2 from
the Warsaw system.
G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1977) [hereinafter MILLER]
notes that under article 1(1) the terms of the parties' contract are crucial. MANKIEwIcz,
supra note 14, at 28, discusses the different countries' various interpretations of the
term "high contracting party" in article l(l). Transportation by several successive air
carriers may be covered by the Convention if it is deemed to be "one undivided
operation" under article 1(3). See MILLER, supra note 18, at 20-23.
,9 Articles 17 to 19 delineate the conditions for carrier liability under the Con-
vention. They are discussed in detail by MANKIEWICZ, supra note 14, at pt. IV;
MILLER, supra note 18, at chs. III, VI, VII, VIII, IX & XI.
20 Warsaw Convention, article 17. For a discussion of the courts' interpretation
of "accident" (an important requirement in article 17), see, e.g., Comment, Saks:
A Clarification of the Warsaw Convention Passenger Liability Standards, supra note
14, at 547; Reukema, Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: An Accident Is Required
For Recovery, supra note 14, at 191. Generally, "accident" is defined in Warshaw
v. Trans World Airlines 442 F.Supp. 400, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1977), as, "an untoward
event out of the ordinary triggered by some external event, in contrast to an occurrence
which may come about under conditions of normal operation because of inherent
weakness or disability."
21 See MANKIEWICZ, supra note 14, at 92. For a discussion of carrier liability at
common law, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 180-81 (4th ed.
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themselves of three defenses: They can rebut the presumption of
liability by establishing that (1) "all necessary measures" were taken
to avoid the damage; or (2) in the circumstances, such measures were
impossible to undertake; or (3) the passenger was contributorily neg-
ligent. 22 The provision for carrier exculpation through victim fault
supports the view that, despite its strict liability formulation, the
form of liability contemplated by the Convention is based upon
negligence.
1971). Generally, at common law, the carrier is under a high standard of care but is
not an insurer. Although liability is based on negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
can lessen the plaintiff's burden of proof. With regard to property damages, the carrier
is subject to a high duty of care, and is generally considered an insurer (with certain
exceptions). On the "conclusive presumption of negligence" which arises at common
law once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case for damaged goods, see Albert,
Limitations on Air Carrier Liability: An Inadvertent Return to Common Law Principles,
supra note 14, at 129. For a comparison of that presumption to res ipsa loquitur, see
Note, Aviation: Liability Limitations For Wrongful Death or Personal Injury - A
Contemporary Analysis Of The Warsaw System, BRooKLYN J. INT'L L. 381, at 395.
For a discussion of the minimal advantage of the Warsaw Convention over the
common-law system, see Davison & Solomon, Air Carrier Liability Under Deregulation,
49 J. AiR L. & COM. 31, 49-51 (1983).
1 For discussion of the rebuttal provisions (articles 20 and 21), see MNLANmwicz,
supra note 14, at 99-109. Under article 20(1),
The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or
them to take such measures.
The defense is available only after the cause of the accident or damage has been
established. For a discussion of the drafting history and the American courts' initial
construction of article 20(1), see MILLER, supra note 18, at 66, 161-62. There is a
trend toward requiring only that reasonable measures have been taken.
Article 20(2) establishes a defense, with regard to the "carriage of goods and
luggage"; it provides that the carrier is exonerated,
... if he proves that the damage was occasioned by negligent pilotage or
negligence in the handling of the aircraft or in navigation and that, in all
other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage.
The courts seem to be more stringent with regard to injury to the person than to
goods and baggage. See Davison & Solomon, Air Carrier Liability Under Deregu-
lation, supra note 21, at 42.
Article 21 contains the contributory negligence provision. Under it, the carrier can
be totally or partially exonerated by establishing that the injured victim caused or
contributed to its injury. Lex fori determines the extent of the carrier's exoneration
under article 21. The defense is not available if the carrier failed to observe required
traffic document provisions contained in articles 3 (in relation to the passenger
ticket), 4 (to the baggage check) and 8 (to the airway bill). The carrier's failure to
observe such requirements makes it subject to unlimited liability in articles 3(2),
4(4), or 9. Accord MANKIEWICZ, supra note 14, at 79-80.
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Second, the Convention contains limitation of liability provisions.23
These provisions are the means by which the Convention achieves
its protective objective in regard to carriers, and balances the weighing
of the liability scheme. In the event of death or injury to a passenger,
the carrier can be held liable only for a maximum amount of 125,000
francs (approximately $8,300)-provided, of course, that the event
takes place under the conditions specified in the Convention and
defenses are unavailing. 24 Similar liability provisions apply to damage
done to physical property (checked baggage, carry-on baggage, and
cargo) transported by air carriers. 25 The Convention sets maximum
carrier liability for checked baggage and cargo at 250 francs per
kilogram, and for carry-on articles at a global figure of 5,000 francs.
These limitation-of-liability provisions are inapplicable to the circum-
stances of a maloccurence when the carrier fails to give proper notice
of the Convention's applicability to the transportation in question,
or when the carrier causes damage through willful misconduct.2 6
23 Warsaw Convention, art. 22. Any provision fixing a limit lower than that
stipulated in article 22 is declared null and void by article 23. The limits in article
22 are stated in gold francs with a value corresponding to that of the 1929 French
franc. For a discussion of the conversion problems, see, e.g., MANKIEWICZ, supra
note 14, at 113-14.
2, Warsaw Convention, art. 22(1). Article 22(1) permits the carrier and passenger
to agree by special contract to a higher limit of liability. See M1AN.MwIcz, supra note
14, at 110-11.
25Warsaw Convention, art. 22(2) & (3). This limit may be exceeded if,
the consignor has made, at the time when the package was handed over to
the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a
supplementary sum if the case so requires.
In such circumstances, the limit becomes the declared sum unless the carrier proves
that sum exceeds "the actual value to the consignor at delivery". For discussion of
the provisions pertaining to the transportation of cargo and registered baggage, see
MANcwicz, supra note 14, at 111-13. The limit for carry-on articles is contained in
article 22(3).
1 Articles 3(2), 4(4), 9, and 25 state the conditions for unlimited liability, and are
discussed by MANr~EwIcz, supra note 14, at 67-87, 122-3; MILLER, supra note 18, at
chs. V & XI. Under article 3(2), unlimited liability applies "if the carrier accepts a
passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered." MAN&mwicz, supra note
14, at 72. Regarding baggage, liability becomes unlimited "if the carrier accepts luggage
without a luggage ticket having been delivered" or if the baggage check lacks the
required particulars contained in article 4(3)(d), (f), and (h), namely,
(d) the number of the passenger ticket;
(f) the number and weight of the packages;
(h) [a] statement that the carriage is subjected to the rules relating to liability
established by this Convention.
Article 9 provides for unlimited liability, "[i]f the carrier accepts goods without an
air consignment note having been made out, or if the air consignment note does not
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In terms of transnational law-making, the Convention's method-
ological aim is of particular interest. In addressing the issues of legal
doctrine likely to arise in a soon-to-be complex area of international
activity, the Convention endeavored to elaborate synthetic legal an-
swers to questions of transnational liability within a cohesive, unitary,
and comprehensive regulatory framework. In this sense, the Con-
vention's methodological scope was universal in character. While
maintaining a basic respect for the distinctiveness of national legal
systems, it attempted to overcome the potential diversity of legal
regimes by creating a viable transnational framework for dealing with
an activity essential to the organization of the world community. The
Convention's attempt to establish a uniform juridical approach to
the question of air carrier liability, however, eventually proved to be
an ill-fated venture. Rather than act as a juridical instrument re-
sponding to an emerging, or codifying an already existing, interna-
tional consensus, the Warsaw Convention attempted to generate such
a consensus.
The Convention's focused practical design-to protect air carriers
from potentially unlimited tort liability-rapidly became anachronis-
tic, eventually conflicting directly with the development of tort and
consumer protection law in most developed countries. 27 The provision
for carrier protection at the expense of the consumer interest and in
opposition to domestic liability regimes generated significant oppo-
sition and provoked both express and implied refusals to comply. 2
contain all the particulars set out in article 8(a) to (i) inclusive and (q)." See MANKmwIcz,
supra note 14, at 79. Under article 25, liability is unlimited if the damage is caused
by the willful misconduct (or default that the court hearing the case considers equivalent
to willful misconduct) of the carrier or his agent. When interpreting this provision,
courts are generally reluctant to find willful misconduct when air navigation rules are
violated. The ambiguous drafting history of article 25 has, however, caused problems
of interpretation.
27 See, e.g., De Vivo, The Warsaw Convention: Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell?,
49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 71, 139 (1983); Fisher, The Gold Issue: The Supreme Court
Upholds the Limitation on Liability Established by the Warsaw Convention, supra note
14, at 479; Note, Up In The Air Without A Ticket: Interpretation and Revision Of
The Warsaw Convention, supra note 14, at 342.
Fisher, supra note 14, at 481, emphasizes the inadequacy of the compensation available
under the Convention. This feature of the Convention is generally contrary to the
American tort law concern for compensation. The international credibility of the United
States commitment to the Convention is therefore maintained at a high cost.
21 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 14, discuss the hostility shown by the United
States shortly after it ratified the Convention. The hostility came to a head when the
United States deposited its notice of denunciation in 1966. Briefly, the ultimate threat
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The attempt to elaborate a framework for private law adjudication
among countries, in effect, fell short of the desired uniformity.
A number of technical problems of interpretation, ordinarily as-
sociated with legislation, also hindered the implementation of the
Convention. First, the Convention's scope of application is difficult
to ascertain. The text of the Convention is ambiguous as to what is
meant by "international carriage"; its general language has made the
concept subject to a number of varying definitions by national courts. 29
Second, it is not entirely clear what conditions must be satisfied in
order to trigger the Convention's liability regime. For example, na-
tional courts have yet to provide a uniform definition for the physical
operations envisaged by the phrase "operations of embarking or
disembarking".10 Moreover, questions exist concerning the exact
of withdrawal was prevented by the 1966 Montreal Agreement (see infra note 39 and
accompanying text). The hostility toward the Convention's liability system continues in
the United States and other countries. Express refusals to comply with the Convention
are seen in the lack of uniform ratification of the amendments. See infra note 39 and
accompanying text. Implied refusals to comply are evidenced by court decisions cir-
cumventing the liability limits through the courts' determinations of whether notice was
adequate or whether willful misconduct exists.
29 The determination of scope is crucial to the Convention's aim of creating a
uniform regime of predictable legal rules. The greater the scope left to national law
in determining liability, the less opportunity there is for achieving transnational uni-
formity. Generally, when establishing the Convention's scope, problems have been
encountered with the terms "international transportation" in article 1(1), and "the
operations of embarking or disembarking" in article 17.
In regard to the term "international carriage", the discussion in Stratis v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982) is relevant. There, the court focused on
whether the passenger (Stratis) "had reason to know his overall flight was international."
682 F.2d at 412. Stratis was a discharged Greek seaman being repatriated as required
by Greek and United States immigration law on a Delta flight from Baton Rouge to
New Orleans, Louisiana, on an Eastern Flight from New Orleans to New York, and
on an Olympic Airway's Flight from New York to Athens. He had only a domestic
ticket for his Delta and Eastern flights. The Eastern plane crashed on approach to
New York, and Stratis was injured. Olympic Airway's New York city office had
prepared pre-paid ticket advice-including notice of the Convention's application for
the international segment of Stratis' journey. This information had been communicated
by telephone to the Olympic Airway counter at the JFK international airport. The
ticket made for Stratis' international travel at that airport, however, had not been
issued or validly stamped. Nevertheless, the court of appeals (682 F.2d at 412) focused
on whether Stratis "had reason to know his overall flight was international", and
concluded, . . . a passenger such as Stratis must be presumed to know that his flight
is international in. nature and that the Convention limitations apply. Id.
See Note, Up In The Air Without a Ticket, supra note 14, at 352 (stating that
this holding opens the door for a searching and complex judicial inquiry).
- The concept is discussed by MAN auwicz, supra note 14, at 149-54. Day v. Trans
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meaning of the centrally important concept of adequate notice and
delivery. 1 The concept refers to the air carriers' obligation to notify
passengers of the Convention's applicability and its limitation of
liability provisions. According to the theory of the Convention, de-
livery of adequate notice allows the passengers to make informed
choices as to assumption of risk-to take out personal insurance
against the possibility of greater loss or injury.3 2 How is adequacy
to be defined in both typical and uncharacteristic circumstances?
What type of print will be deemed sufficient? Finally, debate exists
as to what is intended by the presumption of negligence as a rule
of liability and as to how that presumption might be rebutted in
reference to specific circumstances. 3
World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), advances a test that has been followed
and sometimes modified in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Evangelinos v. TWA, 550 F.2d
152 (3d Cir. 1977). Evangelinos has been subsequently distinguished. The Day test
focuses on the accident's location, the activity in which the injured person was engaged,
and the defendant airline's control of the injured person at the location of, and while
engaged in the activity occurring at the time of, the accident. The Day court, however,
noted the Warsaw delegates' concern for a flexible approach.
The Warsaw delegates' differing views on the meaning of this term are stated in
WARSAW Miumis, supra note 16. The divergence has led to differing judicial inter-
pretations. For instance, French courts in the past considered article 17 to encompass
"only operations which exposed the passenger to the risk of the air." MANKIwIcz,
supra note 14, at 149. Mankiewicz cites French cases holding that accidents on the
apron before embarkation and after disembarkation are covered. Id. Generally, American
and other courts have held that operations begin with the check-in, and cease once the
passenger has ushered or collected his registered luggage. Today, hijacking and sabotage
further complicate matters.
1, For a specification of what constitutes adequate notice and delivery for passenger
tickets, see article 3; for baggage checks, see article 4; and for airway bills, see article
8. MILLER, supra note 18, at 92-93, discerns a shift from formal compliance to considering
how the carrier complied. A central case on the requirements of adequate notice and
delivery is Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd 390
U.S. 455 (1968). Lisi held that the delivery requirement of article 3 is meant to provide
the passenger with sufficient notice to afford him a reasonable opportunity to protect
himself against the Convention's limitation of liability. 370 F.2d at 512. For cases
following Lisi, see Albert, Limitations on Air Carrier Liability, supra note 14, at 143
n.224. MANiEwIcz, supra note 14, at 73, points out that the courts following Lisi
"differ on the criteria of legibility, or otherwise, of the 'statements' in question." Lisi
has been subsequently distinguished in the Second Circuit. For criticism of the Lisi
rule, see MANKEEwicz, supra note 14, at 75-76. MLLER, supra note 18, at 98, observes
that what constitutes adequate notice and delivery varies according to whether one is
dealing with the passenger or his cargo or baggage. Limitations of liability as to cargo
are generally considered part of a commercial bargain not inequitably requiring res-
trictions, unlike liability limitations on passenger injury.
32 See, e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia, supra note 31, at 52.
1, See MANKIEWICZ, supra note 14, at 92; MILLER, supra note 18, at 64-69.
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
In addition to the usual problems of construction, the Warsaw
Convention is beset by difficulties that arise specifically from its
transnational character. The official text of the Convention is in
French; the Convention's basic structure, its wording and concepts,
are all embedded in an unmistakably civilian legal approach.3 4 Con-
fining the Convention to one legal tradition and language raises the
problem of appropriately translating the technical language of the
Convention, along with the civil-law tonality of its substance, for
use by domestic courts in common-law jurisdictions. The difficulty
of finding a suitable linguistic transposition of the French text of
the Convention exacerbates the difficulty of achieving a uniform
national court interpretation of the Convention's provisions.35 For
example, some national (primarily civil-law) courts hold that the basis
for liability under the Convention is a contractual one, while courts
in other jurisdictions (primarily common-law countries) maintain that
the liability contemplated by the Convention is essentially one that
sounds in tort.36 This type of fundamental disagreement imperils the
Convention's status as an instrument providing for a comprehensive
system of governing law.
The regulatory effectiveness of the Warsaw Convention is also
undermined by the continued efforts of some governments-most
notably the United States-to modify its content, especially its lim-
itation of liability provisions.17 The most critical obstacle to the
Convention's effective implementation is, in fact, national government
and court dissatisfaction with the ceilings on liability. Indeed, there
appears to be a mounting consensus, centering upon discontent with
maximum recovery amounts, that the Convention is no longer nec-
essary or useful. The airline industry, it is argued, has matured
14 On the civil law influence in the Convention, see MILLER, supra note 18, at 344-
45.
" Problems of translation occur both in countries where the Convention is self-
executing (as in Belgium, France, and the United States), and countries which requir
enactment of a statute or subordinate legislation to implement the Convention (as
in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). See MANKIEWICZ, supra'
note 14, at 17-20. Generally, the problems encountered result from the influence of
each country's judicial process, the ambiguity of the legislative history, the tendency
of common-law judges to rely on the common-law approach and, more generally,
of judges to rely upon municipal law as a point of reference, and on the different
classifications of legal issues in the various systems. MILLER, supra note 18, at 339-
49.
36 See, e.g., McGilchrist, Does the Warsaw Convention Govern Non-Contractual
Liability?, LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 685 (1983).
11 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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considerably since 1929. The evolution of the law of tort has taken
a direction that is at odds with the Convention's policy imperative.
Finally, the insurance industry is now sufficiently developed to enable
it to provide coverage for air carriers at affordable rates.38
Attempts have been made to modify the Convention and adapt it
to evolving juridical attitudes: since 1929, international meetings in
the Hague, Guadalajara, Guatemala, and Montreal have given rise
to amending documents. 9 The vicissitudes of international politics,
38 See supra note 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of discontent with
the maximum recovery amounts.
19 Hague Protocol [Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371]:
For commentary on the Hague Protocol, see MANKIEWiCZ, Hague Protocol to Amend
the Warsaw Convention, 5 AM. J. Comp. L. 78 (1956). By the summer of 1963,
thirty states had deposited instruments of ratification. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 14,
at 231-34. For the amendments made by the Hague Protocol to the Convention,
see id., at 199-229. These include a doubling of the liability limits, modification of
the notice requirement for tickets and baggage, a revised article 25 containing a
factual description to be proved for willful misconduct and unlimited liability, and
provision for legal fees. Problems, however, have been encountered with the Hague
Protocol-in particular with its inadequate liability limits (even with the lawyers'
fees provision). See MILLER, supra note 18, at 183. Moreover, the United States did
not ratify the Protocol, but only signed it on June 28, 1956.
Gaudalajara Convention [The Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air Performed by a Person Other Than the Contracting Carrier, 19611: [ICAO Doc.
8181] was signed at Guadalajara on September 18, 1961, and came into force on
May 1, 1964. See N. MATTE, TREATISE ON AiR-AERONAUTICAL LAW 444-54, Appendix
XII (1981). See also MANKIEWICZ, supra note 14, at 6-7. The Guadalajara Convention
does not affect or modify liability limits, but has importance for jurisdiction and
conflict of laws problems. It is mainly concerned with how the original and amended
Convention apply to both the contracting and actual carrier.
On November 15, 1965, the United States deposited its note of denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention. A working group was established to prepare for the February
Montreal Conference. As the time for denunciation grew nearer, various proposals
were made to pacify the United States. Finally, the Montreal Agreement was adopted
and denunciation avoided. See L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, supra note
14, at § 12. The Montreal Agreement became effective on May 16, 1966; it applies
to carriers going to, from, or via the United States. The Agreement increases the
personal injury and death liability limits to $75,000 (including legal fees) and to
$58,000 (excluding legal fees). It also provides for more detailed notice requirements
and the creation of absolute liability. The improvements made by the Montreal
Agreement are only of limited value and effectiveness. See id.
The Guatemala City Protocol [Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 1971, ICAO
Doc. 8932 (1971)]: The Guatemala Protocol essentially creates strict liability with
an unbreakable limit: 1,500,000 gold francs (approximately $100,000) for "the ag-
gregate of" personal injury and death claims "however founded"; 62,500 gold francs
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however, have prevented any of these texts from gaining universal
ratification. As a result, the current regime for the transnational
regulation of air carrier liability is in a state of chaos, with the United
States government and courts acting as the principal sources of dissent.
III. THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION
The history and current status of the Warsaw Convention contrast
markedly with the genesis, evolution, and contemporary stature of
the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention. 4° The latter reflects a
much more successful experiment in transnational law-making; it
(approximately $4,150) for each passenger's delay; 15,000 gold francs (approximately
$1,000) for destruction, loss, delay, or damage to registered baggage. Strict liability,
however, is not adopted for carriage of goods. For a comprehensive discussion of
the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971, see Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Gua-
temala City to Further Amend the 1929 Warsaw Convention, supra note 14.
The Montreal Protocols [ICAO Doc. 9145 (1975) (Protocol No. 1), ICAO Doc.
9146 (1975) (Protocol No. 2), ICAO Doc. 9147 (1975) (Protocol No. 3), ICAO Doc.
9148 (1975) (Protocol No. 4)]: For a comprehensive discussion of the Montreal
Protocols, see Fitzgerald, The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the Warsaw
Convention Regime Governing International Carriage by Air, supra note 14.
40 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3, codified in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970). For a comprehensive discussion
of the Convention and of the various documents pertaining to it, see A. VAN DEN
BERG, TIE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981), reviewed in 37
ARB. J. 61 [1982]; 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 243 [1983]; 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 527 [1984].
See also, Aksen, Application of the New York Convention by United States Courts,
4 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 341 (1979); Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 8 AM. J. Comp. L. 283 (1959); Mirabito, The United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four
Years, 5 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 471 (1975); Quigley, Accession by the United
States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961); Sanders, Consolidated Com-
mentary on Court Decisions on the New York Convention 1958, 4 Y.B. COM. ARB.
341 (1979) and 6 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 202 (1981); Springer, The United Nations Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral A wards, 3 INT'L
LAW. 320 (1969). For a comprehensive bibliography, see A. VAN DEN BERG, supra
at 440-50. See generally G. GAJA, NEW YORK CONVENTION (multi-volume series).
For a general discussion of international commercial arbitration, see Sanders,
Trends in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration, 145 REC. DES CouRs
(Hague Academy Lectures) 205 (1975); de Vries, International Commercial Arbitra-
tion: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982).
Accord Higgins, Brown & Roach, Pitfalls in International Commercial Arbitration,
35 Bus. LAW. 1035 (1980); Rhodes & Sloan, The Pitfalls of International Commercial
Arbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 19 (1984).
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symbolizes a productive attempt to achieve a viable transnational rule
of law through the unification of private law.
Like the Warsaw Convention, the New York Arbitration Conven-
tion was intended to act as a universal charter;4' its provisions were
meant to articulate a workable, agreed-upon juridical framework for
regulating national legal conduct in an area of international activity.
Unlike the Warsaw Convention, however, the New York Arbitration
Convention embodied the tenets of an already existing and still emerg-
ing international consensus. While the New York Convention un-
doubtedly contributed to expanding the recognition of the utility of
international commercial arbitration, the force of its essential au-
thority is based upon its codification of a previously established
international attitude toward arbitration. Also, rather than attempt
to regulate all aspects of the process, the New York Convention
focused directly upon two vital elements of arbitral procedure (the
validity of arbitration agreements and the enforcement of arbitral
awards), 42 leaving a more comprehensive regulatory scheme to be
implied from its express principles.
It is clear from the face of the New York Convention that its
express objective is to unify national law in regard to the enforcement
4, See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 40, at 1-10.
42 These two elements are the most critical factors in establishing the institutional
autonomy of arbitral adjudication. The history of arbitration law in various countries
illustrates that the former judicial hostility to arbitration was expressed primarily in
the form of challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements. See Carbonneau,
Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its Remedial and Substantive
Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 33, 39-56 (1984) [hereinafter
Arbitral Adjudication].
In England, for example, the courts deemed arbitration agreements to be against
public policy because they ousted the courts' jurisdiction and the guarantees of
judicial justice. As a result, a party, anticipating an unfavorable award, could revoke
its initial consent to arbitrate-claiming that the arbitration agreement was against
public policy. American courts integrated the basic English judicial attitude into
their case law, holding that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable through
specific performance and could be revoked by either party before an award was
rendered. Nineteenth century French decisional law concurred with these results; the
French courts held the arbitral clause (the agreement to arbitrate future disputes)
invalid under French domestic law. See id. at 39-40, n.12.
The history of the English supervision of the merits of arbitral awards illustrates
how the autonomy of the arbitral process could be effectively challenged on another
ground. See id. at 40. When the initial reference to arbitration could not be defeated,
the results of the process could be strictly reviewed by courts. An adjudicatory
process unable to provide binding determinations had little basis upon which to
found its legitimacy.
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of foreign arbitral awards and, more impliedly, to establish a trans-
national rule of law that favors the recourse to arbitral adjudication 3
For example, article 11(1) provides that the Contracting States shall
recognize an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. The purpose
of this article is to eradicate systemic hostility to arbitration-hostility
stemming from the view that arbitration amounts to a usurpation of
judicial authority to adjudicate disputes. Consequently, by adhering
to the Convention, Contracting States agree to recognize the arbitral
process as a legitimate means of resolving disputes.44 Under paragraph
3 of article II, a request to compel arbitration can be defeated only
by establishing that the arbitration agreement was null and void,
inoperative, or incapable of being performed. 45 Decisional interpre-
tations of the Convention demonstrate that these defenses were meant
to function as ordinary contract defenses to the enforcement of an
agreement. 46 Arbitration agreements, therefore, are valid contractual
arrangements and do not, per se, violate principles of public policy.
They symbolize party recourse to contractual prerogatives-a recourse
that can be defeated only by a deficiency in contractual intent,
capacity, or language. Accordingly, courts in the Contracting States
are under a legal imperative to enforce arbitration agreements, pro-
vided they meet the usual requirements of contractual validity.
The text of the Convention proposes a unified transnational rule
of law not only in regard to the validity of arbitration agreements,
but also concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 47 The
institutional autonomy and systemic viability of any non-judicial ad-
judicatory process are dependent upon both the legal system's rec-
ognition of the validity of agreements to enter into such processes
and its willingness to give binding effect to the determinations of
such parallel adjudicatory processes. The seven grounds in article V
under which national courts may review arbitral awards for purposes
of recognition and enforcement can be grouped into two broad cat-
egories. First, the procedural grounds for a denial of recognition and
enforcement refer to essential contractual and procedural due process
requirements. The parties must have had the contractual capacity to
enter into an arbitration agreement; they must have been afforded
41 See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 40, at 28-43, reviewed in 24 VA. J. INT'L
L. 527, 530-32 (1984).
- See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 40, at 121-232.
41 See. id. at 154-60.
4 See id.
41 See id. at 246-382.
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proper notice of the proceeding; the arbitrators must not have ex-
ceeded the jurisdictional authority conferred upon them by the agree-
ment; the composition and appointment of arbitrators must have been
in conformity with the provisions of the agreement; and the award
must have been binding in the jurisdiction in which it was rendered. 48
Second, national courts can deny recognition and enforcement to
a foreign arbitral award upon the basis of two broad public policy-
oriented grounds. 49 The dispute which the award settles must have
been arbitrable under the law of the requested jurisdiction; moreover,
recognition and enforcement of the award must not be contrary 'to
the requested jurisdiction's public policy. To some extent, the inar-
bitrability and public policy defenses to the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards overlap. As a general rule, disputes
relating to the status and capacity of persons are not submissible to
arbitration but rather fall exclusively within the ambit of the state's
jurisdictional competence. Accordingly, an award relating to an in-
arbitrable subject matter would also be, if recognized and enforced,
contrary to the public policy of the requested jurisdiction.
As with any other legislative document, the broad general language
of these fundamental and other provisions of the New York Con-
vention could be subject to forms of judicial construction in specific
cases that undermine the Convention's underlying intent. As noted
previously,50 in the case of the Warsaw Convention, some American
courts have rigorously interpreted the adequate notice requirement
to defeat the application of the Convention's limitation of liability
provisions. Similarly, national courts could have given a stringent
interpretation to the New York Convention's article II requirement
that arbitration agreements be in writing, thereby undoing agreements
reached through less formal, albeit commonplace, practices. Courts
could also have given wide effect to the article II contractual defenses
to the validity of arbitration agreements, finding a plethora of cir-
cumstances for invalidating agreements. Moreover, as to the grounds
for denying recognition and enforcement in article V, national courts
could have given a highly legalistic content to the due process re-
quirement or advanced an uncompromising view of their jurisdiction's
public policy.
48 See id. at 275-358.
49 See id. at 359-82.
So See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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Actual decisional law outcomes5" in signatory states reveal, however,
that the vast majority of national courts interpret the Convention
exclusively by reference to its underlying intent. The contrast with
the various national domestic cases relating to the Warsaw Convention
is marked, and evidences that the New York Convention has suc-
cessfully developed a transnational juridical framework relating to
arbitration-a framework characterized by the reference to emerging
international commercial realities and the dynamic interplay between
the content of an international instrument and the interpretive and
enforcement powers of national courts.5 2 The Convention's truly in-
ternational stature and law-making capacity are built upon two fac-
tors: its passive and largely symbolic function of codifying an existing
and emerging international consensus on arbitration, and its endorse-
ment by national legal processes which seek to affirm and integrate
the Convention's content and underlying intent, and thereby entrench
the transnational recognition of and support for arbitration. The
transnational law-making impact of the Convention is reflected, to
varying degrees, in the domestic arbitration law of a number of
jurisdictions.
IV. THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION
Compared with other countries, France was especially quick to
ratify the New York Convention. The longstanding French domestic
court support for international commercial arbitration53 probably con-
" See generally Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269 (1979);
Sanders, Consolidated Commentary on Court Decisions on the New York Convention
1958, supra note 40; van den Berg, Court Decisions On The New York Convention
1958, 11 Y.B. COM. ARB. 399 (1986).
12 But see A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 40, at 28-43. Accord 24 VA. J. INT'L
L. 527, 530-32 (1984).
51 The basic reference on French arbitration law is J. ROBERT, L'ARBITRAGE DROIT
INTERNE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt (5TH ED. 1983) (transposed into English as J.
ROBERT & T. CARBONNEAU, THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION [1983]). See also M.
BOISSESON, LE DROIT FRAN AIS DE L'ARBITRAGE (1983); J.L. DELVOLVt, ARBITRATION
IN FRANCE. FRENCH LAW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1982); B.
MOREAU & T. BERNARD, DROIT INTERNE ET DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE L'ARBITRAGE
(1985); 2 H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA, THE WORLD ARBITRATION REPORTER 1641 (1986)
[hereinafter H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA]; D6rains, National Reports: France, 6 Y.B.
Com. Arb. 1 (1981) and 7 Y.B. COM. ARB. 35 (1982); Seppala, French Domestic
Arbitration Law, 16 INT'L LAW. 749 (1982).
The following section of the text relies heavily upon several of my previous studies
on French arbitration law, in particular on Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 42.
19881
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
tributed significantly to the alacrity of the French espousal of the
Convention. At the time of the French ratification 4 in 1959, the
French law of arbitration, while progressing toward consolidation,
was in need of revision.5 In particular, French law was characterized
by outmoded provisions on domestic arbitration and an absence of
any statutory regulation pertaining to international arbitration, al-
though a body of judicial opinions attempted to remedy statutory
deficiencies and uphold the validity of arbitral dispute resolution.
Until 1980, the French law of arbitration consisted of articles 1005
through 1026 and article 1028 of the Code of Civil Procedure (orig-
inally promulgated in 1806 and subsequently modified in 1975) and
article 631 of the Code of Commerce. The Law of December 31,
1925 had modified article 631, legalizing the arbitral clause in certain
specified commercial cases. Since arbitration agreements were es-
pecially common in commercial cases, the amended content of article
631 eliminated much of the domestic judicial hostility toward arbi-
tration. Given their early enactment, the provisions in the Code of
Civil Procedure were ill-suited to the regulatory needs of modern
arbitration practice. They contained gaps and referred to antiquated
procedures that, in most cases, were supplemented or remedied by
judicially-created rules.5 7 Moreover, the domestic legislation did not
directly regulate international commercial arbitration. Despite the
judicial adaptation of these provisions in domestic arbitration liti-
gation, their application by analogy to international arbitration cases
could have impaired severely the viability of the international process.
Rather than use domestic law as a servile foundation for articulating
legal rules pertaining to international matters, the French courts
undertook to identify the special needs of international commercial
arbitration and fashion an accommodating decisional law.58
For a discussion of the French domestic court support for international commercial
arbitration, see Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court Doctrine on In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial Creativity,
55 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1980) [hereinafter French Court Doctrine].
, For a list of contracting states see 11 Y.B. COM. ARB. 395 (1986).
" See Carbonneau, The Reform Of The French Procedural Law On Arbitration:
An Analytical Commentary On The Decree of May 14, 1980, 4 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 273, 275-76 (1981) [hereinafter French Procedural Reform].
16 In particular, disputes regarding the obligations and dealings among business
persons, merchants, and bankers. C. COM. art. 631 (Dalloz 1979-80). See Law of
Dec. 31, 1925 [1926] SiREY Lois ANNOT. 57-58 (Fr.). See also P. HERZOG, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 513, n.169 (1967).
" See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 42, at 53-54.
38 See French Court Doctrine, supra note 53, at 6-16.
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For example, rather than merely transpose into international liti-
gation the domestic provision prohibiting the French State from
engaging in arbitration, 9 the courts held that the French State was
bound by arbitration agreements included in private international
contracts to which the State or its instrumentalities were parties. 60
Moreover, the courts confined considerably the reach of domestic
public policy imperatives in matters of international commercial ar-
bitration. In a number of significant rulings, the courts concluded
that, for purposes of international adjudication, French public policy
required only that arbitral proceedings guarantee the parties a fair
opportunity to be heard and to present their case. 61 Additionally,
unlike domestic awards, international or foreign arbitral awards did
not have to be accompanied by a reasoned opinion to be enforceable. 62
The courts further held that arbitral awards, unlike court judgments,
were subject only to a limited form of review for purposes of rec-
ognition and enforcement and that a valid arbitration agreement
constituted a waiver of the French rules of exorbitant jurisdiction. 63
These court opinions and others like them demonstrated that the
French courts had a keen perception of the systemic needs of inter-
national commercial arbitration, did not neglect opportunities to fos-
ter its growth, and afforded it a privileged status in the French legal
order.
Some years following its ratification of the New York Arbitration
Convention, France enacted twin legislative provisions regulating both
9 C. Crv. art. 2060 (Fr.). See Level, Compromis d'Arbitrage, in [1972] Ju~is-
CLASSEUR CIV. II arts. 2059-2061, at 4. See also French Court Doctrine, supra note
53, at 29, 6-7. The recently-enacted law No. 86-972 of August 19, 1986, however,
created a specific exception to article 2060, allowing the State and its entities to
enter into arbitration agreements in contracts with foreign companies. See New
French Law Authorizes Arbitration For Government Entities, 2 INT'L ARB. REP. 7
(Jan. 1987). See also Boisseson, Interrogations Et Doutes Sur Une Evolution Ltg-
islative: L'Article 9 De La Loi Du 19 aout 1986, [1987] REV. Attn. 3.
60 See Judgment of Apr. 10, 1957, Cours d'appel Ire, Paris, 85 J. DR. INT'L-
CLUNET 1002 (1958); Judgment of May 2, 1966, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., [1966] D.S.
Jur. 575; Judgment of May 5, 1959, Cours d'appel Ire, Aix-en-Provence, 87 J. DR.
INT'L -CLUNET 1077 (1960). See also Batiffol, Arbitration Clauses Concluded Between
French Government-Owned Enterprises and Foreign Private Parties, 7 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 32 (1968); French Court Doctrine, supra note 53, at 29-30.
61 See Judgment of May 18, 1971, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 99 J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET
62 (1972); Judgment of June 14, 1960, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 49 REV. CRIT. DR. INT'L
PR. 393 (1960); Judgment of June 30, 1976, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., [1977] REV. ARB.
135. See also French Court Doctrine, supra note 53, at 36-40.
61 See French Court Doctrine, supra note 53, at 37-38.
63 See id. at 20-23.
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the domestic and international arbitral processes. This legislation
reflects a formal statutory consolidation of the French law of arbi-
tration. The Decree of May 14, 1980 repealed the antiquated pro-
visions of the Code of Civil Procedure and replaced them with some
50 new articles. 64 The 1980 Decree restructured the body of applicable
law into a more coherent and intelligible whole. Its content responds
to a number of critical questions that were left unanswered by the
former legislation, most notably, whether arbitral tribunals could
themselves rule upon jurisdictional challenges and how great a role
court supervision should play in arbitral proceedings. The Decree
also implicitly confers a new legal status upon the arbitral clause and
reorganizes the recourse that can be had against arbitral awards.
As a general rule, the new legislative text remedied many of the
uncertainties that attended the application or interpretation of the
previous legislation. It gave clarity of direction to the regulation of
arbitration, and official systemic autonomy to the arbitral process.
It aligned the arbitral proceeding with court actions-for example,
giving arbitral awards res judicata effect once rendered. The principal
originality of the Decree lies in the relationship that it established
between the arbitral and judicial processes. Under the new French
law, the courts are perceived as a complement to the arbitral process,
providing the public force of law to a private contractual process
where such intervention is necessary to the successful implementation
of the process. The Decree's basic intent is unmistakable: it is designed
to promote arbitration as a viable alternative dispute resolution proc-
ess.
The legislation on domestic arbitration was followed by the Decree
of May 12, 1981, dealing with matters of international arbitration. 65
64 Decree No. 80-354 of May 14, 1980, [1980] J.O. 1238, reprinted in [1980]
D.S.L. 207. See Delvolv6, La rtforme du droit de l'arbitrage: l'intervention du juge,
[19801 R]Ev. ARB. 607; Loussouarn, La rtforme du droit de l'arbitrage: les voies de
recours, [1980] REv. ARB. 671; Robert, La legislation nouvelle sur l'arbitrage, [1980]
D.S. Chronique No. 25, at 189. See also French Procedural Reform, supra note 55
(the following commentary refers in the main to this previous analysis).
61 Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, [1981] J.O. 1398, reprinted in [1981]
D.S.L 222. See Audit, A National Codification of International Commercial Ar-
bitration: The French Decree of May 12, 1981, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 116 [Sixth Sokol Colloquium] (T. Carbonneau
ed. & contrib. 1984); Craig, Park & Paulsson, French Codification of a Legal
Framework for International Commercial Arbitration: The Decree of May 12, 1981,
13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 727 (1981); Delaume, International Arbitration under
French Law: The Decree of May 12, 1981, 37 ARB. J. 38 (1982); Goldman, La
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The 1981 Decree represents the first French legislative enactment on
international arbitration. The content of the Decree is in full accord
with the express provisions and underlying intent of the 1958 New
York Arbitration Convention; in fact, it is perhaps the most forceful
national statement upholding the Convention's transnational law-
making objective. For example, in article 1492, the 1981 Decree
espouses a comprehensive definition of the concept of international
arbitration, providing that an international arbitration is one that
"implicates the interests of international commerce". 66 The absence
of a choice-of-law reference to a nationality factor in establishing
the definition, combined with the exclusive reference to the economic
substance and impact of the transaction, impliedly recognizes a sphere
of lawful transnational activity that is not anchored in the domestic
statutory or decisional law base of any national legal system. 67
Furthering this "anational" design, the 1981 Decree contemplates
imposing only essential national law restraints upon the arbitral proc-
ess and gives predominant importance to the principle of party au-
tonomy. For instance, parties to an international arbitration agreement
may choose whatever procedural and substantive law they wish to
govern the arbitral proceeding. While the arbitral tribunal must render
its ruling in accordance with the rules of law, the parties can modify
the content of the rules they have designated as applicable. Tracking
the realities of international practice, the Decree further provides that
the tribunal must take commercial usages into account in its ruling.
Finally, the parties can authorize the arbitral tribunal to rule ex aequo
et bono, outside the boundaries of legal rules when a sense of equity
so dictates. 68 Thus, in the vital area of designating a law to govern
the merits and the procedure, the Decree, as it does in its other
Nouvelle R~glementation Fran~aise De L'Arbitrage International, in TiE ART OF
ARBITRATION 153 (J. Schultsz & A. van den Berg eds. 1982); for further sources,
see Audit, supra at 116-17 n.3. See also Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 42, at
77-79 (the following commentary refers in the main to this previous analysis).
66 Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, supra note 65, at art. 1492: "An inter-
national arbitration is one which implicates the interests of international commerce."
Id. Other European civil law jurisdictions, following the French example, have
recently enacted very modern and advanced statutes on arbitration, in particular
dealing with international commercial arbitration. See Budin, La nouvelle loi suisse
sur l'arbitrage international, [19881 REV. ARB. 51 (1988); Schultsz, Les nouvelles
dispositions de la lgislation nerlandaise en matire d'arbitrage, [19881 REV. ARB.
209 (1988). See also Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safegarding
Procedurial Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647 (1989).
67 See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 42, at 78-79.
618 See id. at 78.
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provisions, maintains the contractual principle of party autonomy
essentially unfettered.
The courts can intervene in the proceeding exclusively to assist the
process, and judicial assistance can be provided only in fairly limited
circumstances. For example, "when the arbitration takes place in
France" or is governed by French procedural law, the district court
in Paris can appoint arbitrators upon a party's request, "unless the
agreement provides to the contrary. The Decree does not contemplate
any other form of judicial assistance." If the agreement fails to
provide for applicable procedural or substantive law, for instance,
"the arbitral tribunal has the authority to make the determination."
Generally, "the proVision for limited judicial assistance attests to the
French legislation's intent to give full recognition to the special char-
acteristics of international commercial arbitration and provide re-
gulations for a process that is 'anational' " in character. 69
The Decree then sets forth a set of rules pertaining to the recognition
and enforcement of foreign and international arbitral awards. These
rules apply independently of the provisions of the New York Arbi-
tration Convention, either when a party designates them as applicable
or when the award falls outside the scope of the Convention. The
rules are basically identical to their counterparts in the Convention,
except that they are even less restrictive in nature. Recognition or
enforcement may be denied only for technical violations of the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdictional mandate and infringements of basic due proc-
ess rights. 70
The reception of the New York Arbitration Convention in the
French legal order and the French legal system's evolving response
to matters of domestic and international arbitration reveal that French
law not only supports but also fosters the transnational rule of law
that is embodied in the Convention. In addition, the French experience
illustrates the basic procedure by which the international legal order
can elaborate workable legal rules with authoritative content. The
law-making authority of such rules arises initially because they codify
and develop an existing (perhaps tacit) consensus among a majority
of nations. Progressively, they acquire more formal legitimating sources
(integration in an international convention, in national statutory and
decisional laws, and in the modus vivendi of the affected commu-
nities). This multiple domestic adhesion is necessary to establish the
69 See id. at 78-79.
70 See id. at 79.
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international scope of the legal rule. Once such domestic recognition
is achieved and consolidated, the internationally-recognized rule-
using the support gained from national legal processes-develops a
dynamism of its own and begins to operate in an independent fashion,
transcending the jurisdictional perimeters of national legal processes
and acquiring a truly transnational regulatory character. Having es-
tablished this foundation, they eventually superceded the bounds of
municipal law by their continued presence and development, and
acquire an autonomous transnational stature.
Not all countries, however, embraced the rule of the New York
Convention as quickly and as unqualifiedly as did France. Although
the Convention can boast of an overwhelming number of adherents,
its acceptance and impact were more gradual in other jurisdictions.
The reluctance was in evidence even among nations that, in theory,
should have been drawn to the essentially Western and Northern
underpinnings of the international commercial arbitration process.
V. THE ENGLISH LAW
Even in its contemporary form, the English position on arbitration
remains a less enthusiastic endorsement than its French counterpart.
The United Kingdom acceded to the New York Convention in 1975. 71
In all likelihood, the belated accession reflected considerable doubts
about the Convention's purpose and principle.
The development of the English law of arbitration 2 has been
impeded by the longstanding English tradition of supervising arbitral
awards through judicial review of the merits and, generally, the
persistence of judicial and legislative distrust of arbitration. 73 While
the ostensible purpose of the Arbitration Act of 1950 was to institute
11 The legislation implementing the Convention in England is The Arbitration Act
of 1975, 1975, ch. 8, reprinted in 4 G. GAJA, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 15.1
(1978-1980) and A. WALTON & M. VITORIA, RUSSELL ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION
494-503 (20th ed. 1982).
72 For general sources on the English law of arbitration, see E. LEE, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ARBITRATION LAW (1984); M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND (1982); A. WALTON & M. VITORIA, supra
note 71; Hunter, Arbitration Procedure in England.: Past, Present and Future, 1
ARB. INT'L 82 (1985); Jones, History of Commercial Arbitration in England and
the United States, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 127 (M. Domke ed. 1958);
Steyn, National Reports: England, 8 Y.B. COM. ARB. 3 (1983); Steyn, National
Reports: England, 1 INT'L HANDBOOK ON COM. ARB. England-I (1984); 2A H. SMIT
& V. PECHOTA, supra note 53, at 2701-62.
11 See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 42, at 40-42.
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a more liberal view of arbitration, recognizing it as a legitimate
alternative adjudicatory procedure, the Act nonetheless provided for
fairly extensive judicial intervention both in the arbitral proceeding
and in regard to the award. 74 The Act adopted the "stated case"
procedure, the principal mechanism for effecting judicial review of
the legal content of arbitral awards. 75 The statutory procedure for
review included both a "consultative case", applying to requests for
judicial guidance on legal questions made during the arbitral pro-
ceeding, and "alternative final awards", applying to the arbitrator's
statement of legal questions at the end of the proceeding.76
In effect, despite its stated intent, the Arbitration Act of 1950
embodied a continuing systemic distrust of arbitral adjudication,
relegating it essentially to a fact-finding function in the process of
adjudication. While an arbitral tribunal could effectively rule pursuant
to a binding agreement, it was required to apply legal rules in much
the same way a court of competent jurisdiction would have done.
The English concept of adjudicatory public policy seemed to require
determinations based upon "correct" legal reasoning and results.
Questions of law were to be referred to the High Court to guarantee
basic substantive uniformity between court rulings and arbitral awards.
Because the award, upon review, was tantamount to a judicial de-
termination, the parties' initial intent to refer the dispute to arbitration
was, in effect, defeated. The parties' contractual stipulation providing
for arbitration allowed them to gain only procedural flexibility in a
perhaps less costly and more expeditious proceeding. Therefore, prior
to 1979, the stated case procedure, which the parties could not waive
by contract, provided for mandatory judicial review and appeal of
arbitral proceedings on questions of law at either party's request and,
thus, negated some of the primary benefits of arbitration.
The Arbitration Act of 1979 redefined judicial supervision of ar-
bitral proceedings and awards in England and Wales. 77 The 1979 Act
71 Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27.
71 See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 42, at 42-44.
76 See Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The
English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 87, 92 (1980) [hereinafter
Park, Judicial Supervision].
7 Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42, reprinted in 5 Y.B. COM. ARB. 239-47 (1980).
The secondary references on the 1979 Arbitration Act include: Abromson, The
English Arbitration Act of 1979: A Symbiotic Relationship between the Courts and
Arbitration Tribunals, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 7 (1980); Berggren, Judicial
Implementation of the United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1979: Pioneer Shipping v.
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generally lessened the courts' supervisory authority. It repealed an
entire section of the 1950 Act and, subject to certain exceptions and
qualifications, abolished the common law jurisdiction of the High
Court to set aside an award for a manifest error of fact or law.
More significantly, the 1979 Act abolished the stated case procedure,
replacing it with "a more limited right of appeal to the High Court.
78
With respect to international arbitration, the Act authorized exclusion
agreements in non-domestic arbitrations, allowing the parties to limit
judicial intervention by eliminating some of the High Court's su-
pervisory powers. Under the Act, parties to an international or, more
precisely, a non-domestic contract, have the right to eliminate judicial
review of future disputes by inserting a stipulation into the principal
contract precluding the courts from hearing appeals, requiring rea-
soned awards, or providing interlocutory clarification of questions
of law. The exclusion agreement is applicable only to non-domestic
arbitrations and is void in so-called "special category" contracts
(involving shipping, insurance, and commodity contracts) that are
governed by English law. Finally, exclusion agreements cannot be
used to eliminate "the benefits of English lex loci arbitri", namely,
the judicial assistance of the arbitral proceeding.7 9
Chronologically, the liberalization of the English law on arbitration
follows relatively closely the English adherence to the New York
B.T.P. Tioxide ("The Nema"), 24 HARv. INT'L L.J. 103 (1983); Donaldson, Com-
mercial Arbitration 1979 and After, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW. 189 (1983); Lord Hacking,
The "Stated Case" Abolished: The United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1979, 14
INT'L LAW. 95 (1980); Lord Hacking, Where We Are Now: Trends and Developments
since the Arbitration Act [1979], 2 J. INT'L ARB. 7 (1985); Jarvin, London as a
Place for International Arbitration: Some Observations in Light of the Arbitration
Act 1979 and the Bank Mellat v. Helleniki Techniki case, 1 J. INT'L ARa. 59 (1984);
Kerr, The Arbitration Act 1979, 43 MOD. L. REV. 45 (1980); Park, Judicial Su-
pervision, supra note 76; Park, The Influence of National Legal Systems on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration: Recent Developments in English Arbitration Law,
in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra
note 65, at 80; Samuel, The 1979 Arbitration Act Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards on the Merits in England, 2 J. INT'L ARB. 53 (1985); Schmitthoff, The
United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1979, 5 Y.B. COM. ARB. 231 (1980); Shenton
& Toland, London as a Venue for International Arbitration: The Arbitration Act,
1979, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 643 (1980); Smerdresman, The Arbitration Act,
1979, 11 J. MAR. L. & COM. 319 (1980); Thomas, An Appraisal of the Arbitration
Act 1979, [1981] LLOYD'S MAR. & CoM. L.Q. 199.
11 See Park & Paulsson, The Binding Force of International Arbitral Awards, 23
VA. J. INT'L L. 253, 272-73 (1983). See also Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and
International Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 40-41 (1983).
19 See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 42, at 44-45, 62-64.
1988]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
Arbitration Convention. While the 1979 Act represents an attenuation
of judicial supervision, its content is not free of ambiguity or lingering
skepticism. The Act contains a rather narrow and formalistic defi-
nition of international arbitration, referring to such arbitrations as
"non-domestic" arbitrations. Rather than define the concept of in-
ternational arbitration (as does the French legislation) by reference
to the economic content and impact of the transaction, this standard
takes into account only the parties' nationalities and places of resi-
dence. While it is quite conceivable that parties residing in England
or of English nationality could enter into a contract that has all the
trappings of an international economic transaction, the 1979 Act
denies to such parties the benefit of entering into a prearbitration
exclusion agreement.
Moreover, the invalidity of exclusion agreements in "special cat-
egory" contracts, despite the evident international character of many
of these transactions even under the English definition, is a source
of serious concern. Presumably, these types of transactions constitute
a major part of the international business that goes through England.
Even when English law governs these agreements, one wonders why,
given their international commercial character, they should be singled
out for possible substantive judicial supervision. Surely the objective
of achieving uniform interpretation of English law is relevant only
in the setting of domestic adjudication. Once English legal rules are
applied outside the boundaries of the English legal system, they cease
to have their special relevance to the domestic English legal order
and assume an entirely different status. This provision for judicial
review diminishes severely the achievements of the other, more liberal
sections of the 1979 Act.
Unlike their French analogue, English legal developments pertaining
to arbitration lend only qualified support to the transnational rule
of law embodied in the provisions of the New York Arbitration
Convention. The view that arbitral proceedings and rulings should
conform to judicial standards still lingers in the domestic English
statutory framework and taints the legitimacy of the arbitral process.
"It is a view that continues to express fundamental distrust of the
arbitral process, refuses to recognize its coming-of-age, and ultimately
can rob international commerce of an effective and necessary dispute
resolution mechanism." 0
10 Id. at 64.
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Although a balance needs to be struck between the judicial and
arbitral processes and their competing needs and interests, primary
recognition should be given to the international consensus that sur-
rounds the private dispute resolution process. As the provisions of
the New York Arbitration Convention illustrate, court supervision
should be limited to the fundamental concerns of procedural fairness:
the need to thwart the abusive exercise of arbitral authority and to
protect the rights of third parties in the private proceeding between
the contracting parties. While the provisions of the 1979 Act attempt
to inaugurate a new age of arbitration in England, the success of
that effort ultimately depends upon how the English courts implement
and interpret the underlying conditions and restrictions of the new
legislation, and also what meaning they ascribe to the status and
content of the New York Convention.
Recent cases indicate that, as a result of the 1979 Act, the English
decisional law has shifted from its former insistence on legal certainty
to an emphasis upon promoting the finality of arbitral awards."1 The
prior attitude of allowing judicial review in virtually every case has
been eliminated. In comparative terms, however, there is still a fairly
large degree of judicial supervision in England. The purpose of the
1979 Act was not to create full arbitral autonomy, but rather to
redress the imbalance between the institutional independence of ar-
bitration and the would-be benefits derived from the legally accurate
application of English commercial law.
VI. THE REVISED CANADIAN LAW
Due in part to its juridical affinity with England, the position of
the Canadian legal system on arbitration was, until recently, char-
acterized by substantial misgivings about the legitimacy and utility
of arbitration as an adjudicatory mechanism.82 Canada's ratification
11 See Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B. (The "Antaios")
(No. 2), [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 235; B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd. v. Pioneer Shipping Ltd.
and Armada Marine S.A. (The "Nema"), [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 239 (H.L.). See
also Berggren, supra note 77; Thomas, The Antaios: The Nema Guidelines Recon-
sidered, [1985] J. Bus. L. 200.
82 For a discussion of the prior status of the Canadian law on arbitration, see
R. MCLAREN & E. PALMER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1982); Claxton, Commercial Arbitration under Canadian Law, 21 CAN. B. REV.
171 (1943); Guibault, Les lois qu~becoises de conciliation et d'arbitrage, 11 La Revue
Du Barreau [REV. BAR.] 221 (1951); Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubowski, Commercial Arbi-
tration in Canada, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 16 (1977); Nadelmann, Enforcement of Foreign
1988]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
in 1986 of the New York Arbitration Convention,83 accompanied by
the national and provincial adoption of the new UNCITRAL model
law on arbitration, 84 however, constituted a radical departure from
that longstanding skepticism. These events indicate that the Canadian
attitude toward arbitration is now substantially distanced from the
historical and, to some extent, even from the contemporary English
influence. Canada's willingness to participate in the overriding world
consensus on arbitration appears to be unconditional.
Canada's previous reserved, almost apathetic, posture on arbitration
arose from systemic, constitutional, and other factors. In terms of
geo-political organization,85 Canada is-like the United States-a fed-
eral system; it became a confederated union with the adoption of
the British North American Act of 1867. Canada is comprised of
thirteen jurisdictions: two territories, ten provinces, and the federal
government. With the exception of Quebec which is a civil-law ju-
risdiction, the provinces and territories adhere to the principles of
common-law juridical organization and procedures.16
Judgments in Canada, 38 CAN. B. REv. 68 (1960); Prrault, Clause compromissoire
et arbitrage, 5 La Revue du Barreau [REv. BAR.] 74 (1945); 2 H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA,
supra note 53, at 1143-1234; Verge, De la souverainetl dcisionelle de l'arbitre, 19
McGILL L.J. 543 (1973).
83 See An Act to Implement the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Bill C 107); Law on the United
Nations Convention Concerning Foreign Arbitral Awards (Can. Stat. 1986, C. 21)
(received Royal assent on June 17, 1986). In accordance with the federal government
accession, all of Canada's provinces and territories enacted legislation implementing
the Convention. See, e.g., Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, Bill 67, 1985 British Co-
lumbia, 33d Parl., 34 Eliz. II, B.C. Stat. 1986, c.14; An Act to Implement the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Bill 98, 1986 Ontario, 1st Sess. 33d Ont. Stat., 35 Eliz. II; An Act to
Implement the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards and to Adopt the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Bill
83, 1986 Nova Scotia, 2d Sess., 54th G.A.N.S., 35 Eliz. II, enacted N.S. Stat. 1986,
c.12; An Act to Amend the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure in Respect
of Arbitration, Bill 91, 1986 Quebec, 1st Sess. 3d Leg., enacted Que. Stat. 1986,
c.73. See also Alberta, Alta. Stat. 1986, c.1-66; Manitoba, Man. Acts. 1986, c.32;
New Brunswick, N.B. Acts. 1986, c.1-12.2; Prince Edward Island, P.E.I. Acts. 1986,
c.14; Newfoundland, Nfld. Stat. 1986, c.45; Northwest Territories, N.W.T. Ord.
1986(1), c.6. Saskatchewan and the Yukon Territory, which have adopted legislation
to give effect to the New York Convention, are in the process of considering legislation
to give effect to the UNCITRAL Model Law.
84 See An Act Relating to Commercial Arbitration, Bill C-108, 1986, 1st Sess.,
33d Parl. 33-34-35 Eliz. II, enacted Can. Stat., 1986, c.22.
83 See generally Canada, in U.S. STATE DEPT., CouNTRIEs OF THE WORLD 131
(1974).
See id.
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Prior to the 1986 ratification of the New York Convention, there
was no federal Canadian law of arbitration; each province and ter-
ritory had its own arbitration act.17 In the nine common -law provinces
and two territories, the statutory law on arbitration was based upon
the English concept of arbitration, dating back to the English Ar-
bitration Act of 1899. This provincial legislation was relatively uni-
form and its salient provisions basically fostered the autonomy of
arbitral adjudication-e.g., the provincial statutes recognized the va-
lidity, irrevocability, and enforceability of arbitration agreements and
their divesting impact upon judicial jurisdiction, they provided for
judicial assistance of the arbitral proceeding, and they generally al-
lowed for the enforceability of arbitral awards. The provincial statutes
on arbitration, however, also incorporated the English practice of
the stated case (also known as the special case) procedure."8 As noted
earlier,89 by requiring arbitrators to refer questions of law to the
courts, this procedure substantially undermined the incentive to have
17 See 2 H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA, supra note 53, at 1143, 1221. The provincial
legislation was quite uniform. Typically, the parties could agree to submit either an
existing or future dispute to arbitration. Such an agreement would have essentially
the same effect as if the recourse to arbitration had been ordered by a court. See
ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 25, § 4 (1970); ALTA. REV. STAT. ch. A-43, § 2 (1980); MAN.
REV. STAT. ch. A-120, § 5 (1970); B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 18, § 3 (1979); N.B. REV.
STAT. ch. A-10, § 5 (1973); NFLD. REV. STAT. ch. 187, § 178 (1970); N.W.T. REV.
ORD. ch. A-4, § 5 (1980); N.S. REV. STAT. ch. 12, § 2 (1967); P.E.I. REV. STAT.
ch. 12, § 4 (1974); SASK. STAT. ch. A-24, § 3 (1981).
Furthermore, the court could assist in the implementation of the arbitration
proceedings by staying court proceedings, nominating an arbitrator, or supervising
the incapacity of an arbitrator. See ALTA. REV. STAT. ch. A-43, §§ 3, 5, 11 (1980);
B.C. REv. STAT. ch. 18, §§ 5, 6, 13 (1979); MAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-120, § 7 (1970);
N.B. REV. STAT. ch. A-10, §§ 5, 7 (1973); NFLD. REV. STAT. ch. 187, §§ 179, 181
(1970); N.W.T. REV. ORD. ch. A-4, §§ 11, 12, 13 (1980); N.S. REV. STAT. ch. 12,
§§ 3, 6, 18 (1967); ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 25, §§ 7, 12 (1980); P.E.I. REV. STAT. ch.
A-14, §§ 6, 7 (1974); SASK. STAT. ch. A-25, §§ 5, 6, 10 (1981).
The enforcement of an award was obligatory; by leave of the court, an award
could be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect.
See Alberta § 12; British Columbia § 15; Manitoba § 24; New Brunswick § 18;
Newfoundland § 187; Northwest Territories § 26; Nova Scotia § 3; Ontario § 13;
Prince Edward Island § 13; Saskatchewan § 11. However, in four provinces, an
appeal of the award was envisaged. See Manitoba § 32(1); Ontario § 16; Prince
Edward Island § 21; Saskatchewan § 14.
88 See J. Brierley, International Trade Arbitration: The Canadian Viewpoint, in
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 826 (R. St.
John MacDonald, G. Morris, & D. Johnston eds. 1974) [hereinafter Brierley, The
Canadian Viewpoint].
88 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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recourse to arbitration, reducing arbitration to a form of adjudicatory
fact-finding.
Despite basic regulatory agreement among the common-law prov-
inces, the Quebec law on arbitration, 9° relying upon the French Code
of Civil Procedure as a model, deviated in some significant respects
from the statutes in the other provinces. For example, under Quebec
law, the agreement to arbitrate future disputes (the arbitral clause)
was still of questionable legal validity, notwithstanding modern leg-
islative reforms pertaining to arbitration. As a consequence, parties
to an arbitral clause could be required to execute a submission once
a dispute arose. Also, in conformity with French (pre-decree) pro-
visions on arbitration, the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure authorized
arbitrators to rule as amiables compositeurs-a form of equitable
jurisdictional authority that allows arbitrators to disregard the rules
of law in reaching a determination. With this French influence on
the Quebec provisions on arbitration, they could not logically contain
a procedure comparable to the special case proceeding that applied
in the common-law provinces. Unlike English practice, the civil law
concept of adjudicatory imperatives and arbitration did not require
arbitral tribunals to reach outcomes that necessarily were legally
correct. In somewhat contradictory fashion, however, the Quebec
code did mandate that arbitrators, regardless of whether they ruled
in equity or law, issue reasons with their awards. A feature of the
French domestic law on arbitration, the requirement of reasoned
awards had no equivalent in the provincial common-law legislation. 91
Accordingly, not only did the Quebec law on arbitration differ
from its counterpart in other provinces, but it was not entirely con-
sistent in articulating a basic position on arbitration. While ques-
tioning the validity of the arbitral clause and mandating reasoned
awards cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the process, the recognition
of a flexible jurisdictional authority for arbitrators sounding in equity
gave arbitration systemic autonomy. Finally, Quebec law (although
it did not permit a review on the merits) was generally unclear about
the role of judicial scrutiny in the enforcement of awards, did not
distinguish effectively between foreign (or international) and domestic
awards, and required judicial homologation of awards for purposes
of enforcement. 92
90 See C. PR. Crv. arts. 940-51, ch. 80 (1965), as amended ch. 63 (1970).
9, See QuE. REV. STAT. ch. 25 § 948 (1977).
92 See QUE. REV. STAT. ch. 25 § 950, 951 (1977).
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The provinces' general reliance upon rather antiquated statutory
models from parent legal systems and the classical dichotomy between
common-law and civil-law legal regulation (as it related to arbitration)
made the adoption of a uniform national Canadian law on arbitration,
basically required by the adoption of the New York Convention, 93
difficult. These difficulties were accompanied-and perhaps partly
generated-by apathetic responses to arbitration from both govern-
ment and business sectors. 94 The lack of interest gave little reason to
expect that the basic Canadian juridical concept of arbitration would
be revised and provincial differences reconciled.
Beginning with the Geneva Convention and Protocol, 95 Canada
failed to participate in four major multilateral conventions on ar-
bitration. 96 Moreover, domestic experimentation with arbitration had
resulted in failure. 97 For example, the Canadian-American Commercial
Arbitration Commission [CACAC] was created in 1943 to lay the
groundwork for Canadian-American business arbitration. Efforts un-
der the CACAC to establish a form of institutional arbitration were
unavailing. Moreover, the design of creating an arbitration program
between the Vancouver Board of Trade and the Japanese Commercial
Arbitration Association was never realized. These failed experiences,
the business community's lack of interest in and demand for arbi-
tration, and the seeming indifference of the federal government were
supplemented by the legal community's skepticism about whether
there was any need to deviate from traditional adjudicatory me-
chanisms and procedures, whether arbitrators could effectively dis-
pense adjudicatory functions, and, ultimately, whether courts would
enforce arbitral awards. 98
The cardinal difficulty confronting the elaboration of a uniform
Canadian national law on arbitration, however, resided in a much
larger systemic consideration that reinforced these other barriers. In
93 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
supra note 40, at art. II. See also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 40, at 123-25.
94 See Castel, Canada and International Arbitration, 36 ARB. J. 5, 6-10 (1981).
91 See BRIERLEY, The Canadian Viewpoint, supra note 88, at 834-35.
- These conventions are: The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923;
The Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927; the
1958 New York Arbitration Convention; and The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965.
97 See BRIERLEY, The Canadian Viewpoint, supra note 88, at 831-32. See also,
Morris, The Problem of Uniform Arbitration Legislation in Canada, 13 ARB. J.
103 (1958).
91 See BRIERLEY, The Canadian Viewpoint, supra note 88, at 833-34.
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systemic terms, the absence of a Canadian law on arbitration was
attributable to the dictates of Canadian federalism that made pro-
vincial agreement to a uniform law constitutionally indispensable yet
difficult of practical achievement.w The Canadian Constitution al-
locates power between the federal parliament and the provincial leg-
islatures. As in the United States, this doctrine of separation of
powers is fundamental to the Canadian concept of constitutional
federalism:
The vital core of a federal constitution is the division of legislative
powers between the central authority and the component states or
provinces. This division represents the compromise between the forces
which make a union and those which inhibit the formation of a
closer union. It marks the limits of what can be done by common
agreement and the extent to which the separate states must be
permitted to differ and work out their own destinies.'°°
The Constitution gives the federal parliament power over the reg-
ulation of trade and commerce, transportation and communication,
banking, currency, and customs; the provincial legislatures have au-
thority over other areas, like property and civil rights in the province,
the administration of justice, and procedure.10' According to this
enumeration and insofar as arbitration relates to interprovincial and
international commercial and trading activities, arbitration could be
deemed to be within the powers delegated to the federal parliament.
Unlike their American analogues, however, Canadian courts generally
have restricted the scope of the federal parliament's authority over
interprovincial commerce by defining the latter term narrowly. 0 2 As
a result, the accepted view in Canada is that the constitutional al-
location of powers implies that the regulation of arbitration is a
matter of contract and procedure, and therefore comes within the
legislative competence of the provinces.' 03 Arguments to the contrary
are likely to be unavailing:
9% See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 439-40 (2d ed. 1985). See also
BRIERLEY, The Canadian Viewpoint, supra note 88, at 834-35.
0 B. LASKINS, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (1951).
, See P. HOGG, supra note 99, at 29-30.
,02 See SMITH, THE COMMERCE POWER IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1963).
103 See P. Hocc, supra note 99, at 440 (citing Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Parson's, 7
App. Cas. 96 [1881]). "Since the Parsons Case, it has been accepted that, in general,
intraprovincial power, under 'property and civil rights in the province' (S 93 (13))
and the federal trade and commerce power is confined to (1) interprovincial or
international trade and commerce, and (2) 'general' trade and commerce." See id.
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The case for constitutional validity of a federal arbitration law under
the trade and commerce rubric could therefore only rest on the
proposition that the subject matter of arbitration transcends the
bounds of provincial competence; that, in other words, the arbi-
tration contract and award, and their enforcement, as adjuncts to
trade and commerce both interprovincial and international, consti-
tute regulation of trade and commerce rather than an invasion of
an exclusive provincial field. To rest the argument on this ground
is to affirm that the subject of commercial arbitration goes beyond
the subjects of contract and/or procedure and touches upon com-
merce, such that federal authority cah be seen to begin. This is a
mode of reasoning that is unlikely to be followed .... 104
Moreover, although the federal government has treaty-making power,
it would lack essential constitutional authority over the subject matter
of an international treaty on arbitration:
While the federal government is the sovereign authority constitu-
tionally empowered to participate in the creation of a treaty with
another state, and the only Canadian authority able to assume
international obligations thereunder, it does not thereupon acquire
the constitutional competence to execute that obligation if its subject
matter is a provincial matter. . . . The only obligation that the
Canadian federal authorities can assume and effectively discharge
under a multilateral or bilateral convention on arbitration is, there-
fore, that of bringing to the attention of the appropriate provincial
authorities that which is within their own competence with a view
to the several provinces implementing the real substance thereof.105
Lacking constitutional authority, the federal government's only
recourse-other than excluding Canada by default from participation
in international commercial arbitration and impairing Canadian in-
terests in international trade-was to undertake efforts to persuade
the provincial legislatures of the need for and benefits of Canadian
recognition of the New York Arbitration Convention. After the Eng-
lish accession in 1975, Canada was the only major Western country
not to have ratified the Convention, which by then had nearly fifty
adherents. 1°l Without a knowledge of the Canadian federalism issue
and its implications, it was difficult to understand why Canada, for
all these years, had failed to undertake action that would have been
-o BRmILEY, The Canadian Viewpoint, supra note 88, at 830.
,0, Id. at 835.
-o See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 40, at 410 (Annex B).
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in its best national self-interest. The English Arbitration Act of 1979,
despite its guarded acceptance of arbitration, may have had some
impact in coalescing forces at the various levels of Canadian gov-
ernment. Recent United States statutory and decisional law devel-
opments may also have had some bearing on the change of attitude. 0 7
Given the views of provincial autonomy in Canada and the intensity
of political debate, achieving a consensus among all provinces may
have been particularly arduous and painstaking, requiring years and
the appropriate circumstances to initiate and complete. Or, more
simply, the level of transnational acceptance of and developments in
arbitration law may have been, finally, too overwhelming to disregard
any longer. In any event, one or a combination of these factors
dictated a sudden and dramatic reversal of the Canadian law on
domestic and international arbitration.
On May 12, 1986, the Canadian government acceded to the New
York Arbitration Convention, and, subsequently, all the Canadian
provinces and territories enacted legislation implementing the Con-
vention.10 8 What is even more remarkable and attests to the dramatic
character of the reversal is that, along with the ratification of the
Convention, both the federal government and the provinces (with the
exception of Saskatchewan) adopted the UNCITRAL model law on
arbitration, making it, in effect, the Canadian national law on ar-
bitration. 1°9 The model law's provisions are designed to provide a
comprehensive regulatory framework for arbitration, one that reflects
a liberal and supportive attitude toward arbitration and that fosters
the uniform interpretation of the New York Convention.1t0 The model
07 See notes 114-264 infra and accompanying text. See also Holtzman, L'Arbitrage
et les Tribunaux: Des Associks Dans un Systme de Justice Internationale, [19781
REV. ARB. 253; Perlman & Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of Inter-
national Commercial Disputes, 17 INT'L LAW. 215, 255 (1983); Ribicoff, Alternatives
to Litigation: Their Application to International Business Disputes, 38 ARB. J. 3,
5 (1983).
108 See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
,01 See I. DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION UNDER THE UNCITRAL RULES:
A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS (1986). See also B6ckstiegel, The Relevance of National Ar-
bitration Law for Arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 223
(1984); Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law-Its Background, Salient Features
and Purposes, 1 ARB. INT'L 6 (1985); Hunter, International Commercial Arbitrations:
The UNCITRAL Model Law, 12 INT'L BUS. LAW. 189 (1984); McNerney & Esplugues,
International Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL Model Law, 9 B.C. INT'L
& Coa'. L. REv. 47 (1986).
110 See Herrmann, UNCITRAL's Work Towards a Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 4 PACE L. REV. 537, 546-47 (1984).
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law seeks to give arbitrating parties "maximum freedom to conduct
the arbitration in accordance with their stated expectation. '1""
According to a distinguished commentator, "[flor countries without
any settled and explicit law of arbitration, the adoption of the model
without adaptation should provide a valuable legislative 'package'
which will convert them into suitable venues for international arbi-
trations.""' 2 Nearly thirty years after the New York Convention was
first opened for signature, Canada not only had ratified the Con-
vention, but also transformed itself, nearly overnight, into a receptive
forum for arbitration.
A number of commentators" 3 have already singled out those na-
tional characteristics that recommend Canada as a venue for arbi-
tration. For instance, Canada's geographic proximity to the United
States might enable it to act as a forum for arbitrations between
United States business interests and those from other nations. Canada
is also mid-way between the East and the West. The ethnic diversity
of its minority population and its distinctive life-style, it is argued,
could make Canada a neutral forum for accommodating arbitrating
parties from opposing social, economic, and political backgrounds.
Also, Canada is not unfamiliar with international trade and com-
merce. Canada ranks among the top ten manufacturing countries of
the world and is also a world leader in the volume of foreign trade.
Finally, movement is under way to establish arbitration centers in
British Columbia and Quebec, and there is some talk about a possible
third Canadian arbitration center.114
" Lucio, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 313, 322 (1986).
"2 Kerr, Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law, 34 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 1, 16 (1985).
"I See Alvarez, La nouvelle lbgislation canadienne sur I'arbitrage commercial
international, [19861 REv. ARB. 529 (1986); Chaisson, Canada: No Man's Land No
More, 3 J. INT'L ARB. 67 (1986); Mendes, Canada: A New Forum to Develop the
Cultural Psychology of International Commercial Arbitration, 3 J. INT'L ARB. 71
(1986). See also Brierley, Une loi nouvelle pour le Quebec en matikre d'arbitrage,
47 REV. BAR. 259 (1987) (English language version in 13 CAN. Bus. L.J. 58 [1987-
88]). Chiasson & Lalonde, Recent Canadian Legislation On Arbitration, 2 ARB.
INT'L 370 (1986); Comment, Canadian-American Perspectives on the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3
CAN.-AM. L.J. 219 (1986).
"4 See PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 7 (1983); Canada, in U.S.
STATE DEPT., supra note 85, at 136. See also Telephone interviews with Professors
John Brierley (McGill University) and Leon Trakman (University of Dalhousie),
(May 5, 1987). See generally A Colloquy Alternative Dispute Resolution In Inter-
national Trade And Business, 40 ME. L. REV. 225-59 (1988).
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It is true that Canada's political, economic, and cultural distinc-
tiveness may allow it to become a major arbitration forum, especially
in regard to the Pacific Rim and developing countries. The more
permanent domestic consequences of the Canadian ratification, how-
ever, remain difficult to gauge. Federal and provincial courts have
yet to interpret the new statutory law;" 5 experience in other countries
demonstrates that the judicial response to enabling legislation on
arbitration is always of critical importance in evaluating that legis-
lation's long-term effectiveness. The general disposition of the legal
profession, still undetermined, will also be of significant importance.
There does appear to be a revitalization of the business community's
interest in arbitration; that interest may be rather fragile and short-
lived, however, and could be directed exclusively to matters of in-
ternational commercial arbitration where lucrative possibilities exist.
The export of arbitration services (to remedy trade imbalances and
invigorate sluggish national economies) has become an exceedingly
competitive international business, in which a number of countries
have a clear head-start.
The vital significance of the Canadian ratification lies elsewhere
than in conjecture about the practical ramifications of its adoption
of a developed statutory framework for arbitration. Canada's ac-
cession to the New York Convention not only represents a departure
from dependence upon European arbitral models, but it is also an
important indication of the continuing strength and development of
the transnational consensus on arbitration as an extra-judicial means
of resolving disputes. Given Canada's cultural and political diversity-
its affinity to both developing and developed countries-its ratification
of the New York Convention is a forceful symbol of the truly
comprehensive appeal of the Convention in the divisive pluralism of
the international community. The gradual reconsideration by Latin
American countries of their attitude toward arbitration," 6 the in-
', According to Professor Brierley, Navigation Sonamar v. Algoma Steamships
is the first reported decision under the new Canadian arbitration regime and "is a
promising indication of favourable judicial attitudes". See Brierley, Canadian Ac-
ceptance of International Commercial Arbitration, 40 ME. L. REv. 287, 302 n.39
(1988).
"6 For a discussion and analysis of the traditional Latin American attitude toward
arbitration, see Garro, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction of
Arbitral Tribunals in Latin America, 1 J. INT'L ARa. 293 (1984). See also Nattier,
International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: Enforcement of Arbitral
Agreements and Awards, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 397 (1986); Samtleben, Arbitration in
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creased participation of African countries in ICC arbitration," 7 the
ratification of the New York Convention by the People's Republic
of China ' 18 in 1987, conjoined with the Canadian action on arbitra-
tion, indicate that the provisions of the New York Convention are
approaching the ideal of universal adherence and have genuine law-
making authority.
The further consolidation of the New York Arbitration Convention
in national laws indicates that the recourse to arbitral adjudication
is firmly entrenched in the emerging transnational commercial process.
In fact, the recognition of arbitration as a legitimate adjudicatory
process is a de facto condition precedent to effective national par-
ticipation in international trade. Moreover, this recognition, along
with the development of advanced national arbitration laws, could
have an impact upon purely internal concerns. The growing familiarity
with and acceptance of arbitration as a viable and vital adjudicatory
process might make national legal systems generally more receptive
to the consideration and adoption of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. The experience with international commercial arbitration
could become a foundation upon which to begin the domestic trans-
formation of adjudicatory values and processes: devising a variety
of remedial frameworks that respond to the diversity and the actual
needs of disputes.
The American law of arbitration reveals precisely this sort of
interface between domestic processes and the international experience.
Also, the internal systemic aspects of the Canadian experience have
Brazil, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1986). For a discussion of the Inter-
American Arbitration Convention, see Current Development, The Inter-American
Convention On International Commercial Arbitration, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 982 (1981);
Note, International Commercial Arbitration: Domestic Recognition and Enforcement
of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 10
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 169 (1983); 5 PACE L. REV. 607 (1985); 196 N.Y.L.J.,
at 1, col. 1 (Nov. 18, 1986).
"I See W. CRAIG, W. PARK, & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE ARBITRATION 5 (1984); Paulsson, Arbitration Under the Rules of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 65, at 235, 255-60.
Is See China Becomes A Signatory To The New York Convention, 2 INT'L ARB.
REP. 158 (Mar. 1987); Shaoshan, A Brief Account of the New York Convention of
1958, CHINA PATS. & TRADEMARKS Q. 9 (Apr. 1987). See also DaQuan, Fully Utilize
(sic) The Methods of Mediation in Handling Foreign Economic and Trade Disputes,
CHINA PATS. & TRADEMARKS Q. 33 (Oct. 1986); Gushu, Settling Industrial Property
Disputes Through Non-Judicial Procedures, CHINA PATS. & TRADEMARKS Q. 24 (Jan.
1986); Yougan, Arbitration Cases Handled By The Foreign Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission, CCPIT, CHINA PATS. & TRADEMARKS Q. 101 (Jan. 1987).
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particular relevance to the United States law. While the specific
character of the federalism problem differs, Canada's struggle with
federalism questions associated with arbitration is germane to the
most recent United States Supreme Court decisions on arbitration.
In those cases, the Court-relying upon an expansive interpretation
of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, invoking the
Supremacy Clause, and emphasizing the congressional intent under-
lying the Federal Arbitration Act-appears to be engaged in a process
of federalizing the American law of arbitration. Given the disruptive
systemic consequences, a legislative approach, reflecting the Canadian
experience, might be a more feasible way to achieve the same ends.
VII. THE AMERICAN LAW OF ARBITRATION
In terms of its historical and contemporary development, the Amer-
ican law of arbitration"19 stands in an intermediary position between
its French and English counterparts. It also bears some, albeit dif-
ferent, affinity with its Canadian analogue. In keeping with the
patterns developed in the French and English systems, a sense of
commercial realism and legislative lobbying efforts brought about
landmark legislation that eventually undermined the judicial hostility
toward arbitration, undoing the perception that it amounted to a
contractual usurpation of judicial jurisdictional authority. 120 While
119 General references on the American law of arbitration are: F. KELLOR, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948); G. WILER, DotaE
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1984); Coulson, Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 51 ARB. 367 (1985);
Hoellering, Arbitration in the United States, 76 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 175 (1982);
Holtzmann, National Report: United States, 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 116 (1977), 9 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 60 (1984). See also Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative
Assessment of Its Remedial And Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19
TEX. INT'L L.J. 33, 45-53, 65-77 (1984) (this previous study provides some of the
background for the present discussion).
120 In an 1814 case, Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F.Cas. 1313 (C.C. Mass. 1845)
(No. 14,065), Mr. Justice Story characterized the American judicial perception of
arbitral adjudication in rather contradictory, albeit negative, terms:
Courts of equity do not refuse to interfere to compel a party specifically
to perform an agreement to refer to arbitration, because they wish to
discourage arbitrations, as against public policy. On the contrary, they have
and can have no just objection to these domestic forums, and will enforce,
and promptly interfere to enforce their awards when fairly and lawfully
made, without hesitation or question. But when they are asked to proceed
farther and to compel the parties to appoint arbitrators whose award shall
be final, they necessarily pause to consider, whether such tribunals possess
adequate means of giving redress, and whether they have a right to compel
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the attitude of the American legal system initially paralleled the
English reluctance to embrace arbitration wholeheartedly, contem-
porary American statutory and decisional law on arbitration are in
keeping with the unequivocal French acceptance of arbitral adjudi-
cation.
Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act 2 1 [FAA] is the land-
mark legislation which put an end to the era in which United States
courts were willing to entertain suits brought in violation of arbitration
agreements. According to the celebrated language of Article 2 of the
FAA, arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble". 122 The intention of the federal legislation manifestly was to
a reluctant party to submit to such a tribunal, and to close against him
the doors of the common courts of justice, provided by the government
to protect rights and to redress wrongs.
Id. at 1320-21. See also Note, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration
Agreements and Awards Not Subject to the New York Convention, 23 VA. J. INT'L
L. 75, 83 n.30 (1982).
-2 Ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86, (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
Present arbitration legislation retains the vast majority of the original language.
During the congressional debate on the Act in 1924, a proponent of the legislation
explained its underlying purpose and rationale in the following terms:
This bill is one prepared in answer to a great demand for the correction
of what seems to be an anachronism in our law, inherited from English
jurisprudence. Originally, agreements to arbitrate, the English courts refused
to enforce, jealous of their own power and because it would oust the
jurisdiction of the courts. That has come into our law with the common
law from England. This bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to
give an opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and
admiralty contracts - an agreement to arbitrate, when voluntarily placed in
the document by the parties to it. It does not involve any new principle
of law except to provide a simple method by which the parties may be
brought before the court in order to give enforcement to that which they
have already agreed to. It does not affect any contract that has not the
agreement in it to arbitrate, and only gives the opportunity after personal
service of asking the parties to come in and carry through, in good faith,
what they have agreed to do. It does nothing more than that. It creates
no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an
agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.
65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (Rep. Graham-Pa.).
See Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements
in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L. REV. 238 (1930-31); Note, Contracts-Effect of
the United States Arbitration Act, 25 GEO. L.J. 443 (1936-37); Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law And
Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925).
22 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 2, 43 Stat. 883-86 (current version
at 9 U.S.C. § 2 [1982]). See generally Heely, Introduction to the Federal Arbitration
Act, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 223 (1982); Overby, Arbitration of Disputes Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1137 (1986).
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promote arbitration as a viable alternative to the judicial resolution
of disputes. In its current form, the FAA retains substantially all of
its original language. In the federal decisional law spearheaded by
the United States Supreme Court, the FAA continues to act as the
legislative foundation for the judicial elaboration of a federal policy
strongly favoring the recourse to arbitral adjudication.
As with most modern statutes on arbitration, 123 the FAA recognizes
the contractual principle of party autonomy and freedom, the elements
that give arbitration its fundamentally consensual nature. The federal
statutory framework couples the party autonomy principle with ar-
bitral flexibility. Within the restrictions posed by basic public policy
requirements regarding adjudicatory justice, the parties to an arbi-
tration agreement can fashion the procedural rules to be applied in
the arbitral proceeding. Moreover, judicial jurisdictional authority is
meant to assist the implementation and functioning of the arbitral
process. Courts are the vehicles for compelling arbitration or ap-
pointing arbitrators when a contracting party refuses to comply with
the provisions of a valid agreement to arbitrate. The courts are under
a statutory obligation to respect and give effect to an arbitration
agreement's jurisdictional consequences. A valid arbitration agreement
demands staying court proceedings regarding a dispute validly sub-
mitted to arbitration. Finally, the FAA provides for limited judicial
supervision of awards. The grounds for setting aside an award center
upon basic concerns of procedural due process. 24
Prior to 1970, the United States, paralleling the English posture,
was not a party to any international agreement on arbitration. In
1970, subject to the double reservation that the Convention would
be applied on the basis of reciprocity and only to disputes arising
out of contractual or other relationships considered commercial under
United States law, the United States ratified the 1958 New York
Arbitration Convention. The ratification of the Convention led to
the enactment of the 1970 Arbitration Act, establishing a set of new
provisions for dealing with litigation arising under the Convention. 25
The provisions of the New York Convention apply in cases in
which an arbitration agreement or award arises out of a dispute in
which one or both parties are foreign nationals. 26 When both parties
121 See Carbonneau, supra note 119, at 46, 50, 54.
124 See id. at 45-46.
2 See id. at 66; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976).
,26 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
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are United States nationals, the Convention governs only those in-
stances in which the "relationship involves property located abroad,
envisages performance or enforcement, or has some other rational
relation with one or more foreign states."' ' Like the English Ar-
bitration Act of 1979, the American legislation defines international
arbitration by reference to the formalistic requirement of party na-
tionality. The governing definition in cases in which no party to the
transaction is a foreign national, however, reflects a far more realistic
standard than the English concept of "non-domestic" contracts. Like
the French and other recent civilian legislation, it focuses upon the
actual economic impact of the parties' commercial relationship to
determine whether the award is international and thereby subject to
the provisions of the Convention.
As in other jurisdictions, judicial implementation is critical to the
status of the Convention in the American legal system. Following
the rulings of the United States Supreme Court, the federal courts
have exhibited a favorable disposition toward arbitration in general
and toward international commercial arbitration in particular. A pe-
rusal of recent federal court cases, in fact, reveals that federal court
decisions systematically uphold the continued viability and autonomy
of the arbitral process.' 2 The gravamen of the opinions centers upon
127 Id.
-z See Atkins v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 819 F.2d 644, 649 (6th Cir.
1987); Bauhinia Corp. v. China Nat'l Mach. & Equip. Import & Export Corp., 819
F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Diaz Contracting, Inc., 817 F.2d 1047, 1054
(3d Cir. 1987); Hoffman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 806 F.2d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 1986);
Page v. Moseley, Halgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 293 (1st
Cir. 1986); Letizia v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir.
1986); Felkner v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 800 F.2d 1466, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986);
Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1986); John
F. Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 664 (3d Cir. 1986); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 719 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Price v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1162 (5th Cir. 1986); Explo, Inc. v. Southern
Natural Gas Co., 788 F.2d 1096, 1098 (5th Cir. 1986); Woodcrest Nursing Home
v. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Serv. Union, 788 F.2d 894,
897-98 (2d Cir. 1986); Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 1986); Valentin
v. United States Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 748, 750 (1st Cir. 1986); Rush v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1985); International Union of Elevator Constructors
v. National Elevator Indus., 772 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1985); Local 703, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Kennicott Bros., 771 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1985); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1984); City of Meridian
v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir. 1983); Liskey v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 717 F.2d 314, 319 (6th Cir. 1983); Kroog v. Mait, 712 F.2d 1148, 1151 (7th
Cir. 1983); Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir. 1983);
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furthering "the strong federal policy supporting arbitration", 19 a
phrase wrought and consecrated by the United States Supreme Court
in its decisional law regarding the FAA and the Convention.
The Court's opinions on arbitration can be roughly divided into
three major groupings: first, earlier rulings that deal with the domestic
law implications of arbitration, specifically the FAA's impact upon
federalism concerns; second, more recent domestic rulings that dem-
onstrate a reinforcement of the Court's favorable position toward
arbitration and of its willingness to curtail federalism considerations
to advance the process; and third, rulings that deal exclusively with
matters of international commercial arbitration. In these last rulings,
the Court defines the inter-relationship between national juridical
requirements and the international process. The content of these
decisions not only portends the creation of a general substantive
American law on transnational commerce and arbitration, but also
demonstrates the possible influence of such a law upon domestic
commerce and arbitration matters. The Court's most recent ruling
on arbitration, however, threatens to place this decisional law in a
state of profound disequilibrium.
A. Arbitration And Federalism
The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted during the era of Swift
v. Tyson. 30 The import of Swift was that federal courts hearing state
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Teamsters Freight Local Union No. 480, 705 F.2d 851,
856 n.7 (6th Cir. 1983); Federated Metals Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
648 F.2d 856, 859 (3d Cir. 1981); Midwest Window Systems v. Amcor Indus., Inc.,
630 F.2d 535, 536 (7th Cir. 1980); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union
No. 878 v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 716, 716-17 (8th Cir. 1980); Hall v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., No. CV 86-5520-ER (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1987); Com-
pania Chilena De Navegacion Interoceanica, S.A. v. Norton, Lilly & Co., 652 F.
Supp. 1512, 1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); General Motors Overseas Distribution Corp. v.
Kuwait Maritime Corp., No. 84 Civ. 5346 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Management Recruiters of Albany, Inc. v.
Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 750, 752 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Levine
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1391, 1397 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 640 F. Supp. 882, 884
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Lis Upholstery Decorators, Inc. v. Amalgamated Indus. Union
Local 768, No. 85 Civ. 0062, 106 Lab. Cas. (CCH) Para. 12,306 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
14, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Lewmar Creations, Inc.
v. Pretty Tops, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 3943 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1986) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file); T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Burmah Oil Tankers Ltd., No. 84 Civ.
7249 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file);
Sacks v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 377, 378, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
219 See sources cited supra note 128.
130 41 U.S. 1 (16 Pet.) (1842).
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law cases on a diversity basis were bound by state court opinions
only when the cases before them involved the construction of state
constitutions or statutes. Where the latter provisions were not in-
volved, the federal courts were free to devise their own rules of
decision independently of state court rulings. 3' Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins'3 2 overruled Swift v. Tyson, providing that "there is no
general federal common law,"'3 and that "Congress has no power
to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state,
whether they be local in their nature or general, whether they be
commercial law or a part of the law of torts."'13 4 In effect, Erie
reversed the prior doctrine, requiring federal courts, in cases of
diversity jurisdiction, to apply state law except when the controversy
was governed by the. U.S. Constitution or an Act of Congress. 3 '
Viewing the enactment of the FAA from the perspective of Erie, the
question became whether the federal law on arbitration-providing
,,, Id. at 18-19. In 1924, Congress apparently believed that, by making arbitration
agreements enforceable in federal courts, the Federal Arbitration Act merely settled
a "question of procedure" and did not create "substantive law". See Incorporation
of State Law Under The FAA, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1391, 1398 (1980) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 1924). Accordingly, if the FAA were merely
a procedural rule applying to cases in the federal court system, even the later Erie
prohibition would not bar its application. Although the underpinnings of the decision
are far from being absolutely clear, Erie is generally interpreted as prohibiting only
those federal rules of decision that affect stated-created substantive rights. See
Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law,
71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1316 (1985) (citing Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, at 78-79).
Cases since Erie, however, have held that the FAA creates substantive federal law;
the United States Supreme Court has nonetheless upheld its application in diversity
cases. See generally Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 61 (1985); Kochery, The Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie v. Tompkins, 39 CORNELL L.
Q. 74 (1953).
-32 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie was a diversity suit brought by a citizen of Pennsylvania
for damages he sustained allegedly as a result of the activities of a New York
railroad. The law of Pennsylvania favored the railroad, providing that the railroad
had no duty in regard to people walking along the right of way unless its negligence
was willful or wanton. The federal court in New York applied federal common law
and found for the plaintiff. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the Swift doctrine was unconstitutional because it allowed federal courts to make
law where the federal government had no constitutional authority to do so. See
generally Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974); Note,
Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United. States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of
Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L. J. 846 (1959).
" Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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for the enforceability of arbitration agreements-was merely a set of
procedural regulations or legislation that created substantive rights
and was therefore binding upon the federal courts in all cases. More
specifically, in a diversity of citizenship case involving purely state
interests, could the provisions of the FAA dislodge the application
of a less favorable or perhaps contrary (but otherwise controlling)
state statute or decisional law? Under Erie, the displacement of
applicable state law on arbitration could be seen as a preemptive
application of general federal common law. Although clearly pro-
tective of federalism principles, such an interpretation could have
fragmented any national consensus on arbitration and undermined
the FAA's clear mandate to make arbitration an autonomous and
viable alternative adjudicatory process. In this setting, another view
of the federalism issue, generated by the judicial implementation of
the FAA in diversity cases, could be advanced. Since Erie mandates
the application of state law in all diversity cases but those in which
the U.S. Constitution or federal legislation is controlling, the courts
could deem that the FAA was applicable as a federal enactment,
holding-in effect-that the FAA represents more than the enactment
of merely procedural regulations and that it actually creates sub-
stantive rights. According to a distinguished scholar in the area, "to
be consistent with Erie, a court creating federal common law need
only ground its authority to do so on some federal enactment other
than the diversity grant. '1 3 6
In this regard, the decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co.137 has landmark significance. Decided in 1967, Prima Paint
136 Field, The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 881, 888 (1986).
For other writings on the domestic federalism question, see, e.g., Symposium,
Federalism: Allocating Responsibility Between The Federal And State Courts, 19
GA. L. REV. 789 (1985); La Pierre, Political Accountability In The National Political
Process - The Alternative To Judicial Review Of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L.
REv. 577 (1985-86); Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision
Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YAuE L. J. 678 (1975-76); Scheiber, Federalism and
Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14
L. & Soc'Y REV. 663 (1980); Segreti, The Federal Preemption Question - A Federal
Question? An Analysis Of Federal Jurisdiction Over Supremacy Clause Issues, 33
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 653 (1984-85).
.37 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Prima Paint was preceded by Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), which involved an action for breach of an
employment contract brought before the federal district court on diversity of citi-
zenship. The district court denied respondent's motion to compel arbitration, ruling
that-under Erie-the arbitration clause in the contract was governed by Vermont
law which provided that agreements to arbitrate were revocable by either party prior
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establishes the separability doctrine as part of the developing deci-
sional law on arbitration.' 38 The separability doctrine holds that an
arbitration clause is unaffected by the nullity of the main contract.
For example, when the main contract is alleged to be invalid for
reasons of fraud, that allegation does not affect the validity of the
arbitration clause unless the fraud was also directed at that clause.
The agreement to arbitrate has a separate juridical existence from
the main contract. 13 9 Recourse can still be had to the arbitral process
to decide those disputes that flow from the invalidity of the main
contract. "[A]rbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are 'sep-
arable' from the contracts in which they are embedded, and ...
where no claim is made that fraud was directed to the arbitration
clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be held to encompass
arbitration of the claim that the contract was induced by fraud."'40
The significance of Prima Paint also resides in the Court's view
of the FAA's systemic stature. In Prima Paint, the Court underscored
the primary intent and ultimate objective of the federal legislation,
and expressed its judicial resolve to give full effect to both these
aspects of the act in relevant litigation. 41 The Court further stated
that the question in Prima Paint "was not whether Congress may
to the rendering of an award. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the district court ruling, holding that the FAA was inapplicable because the transaction
did not involve maritime or commercial matters. Although the Bernhardt Court held
that the FAA was substantive and not procedural for Erie purposes, it avoided
addressing the question of whether the FAA controlled in cases that came before
the federal courts exclusively on a diversity basis. See Hirshman, supra note 131,
at 1320.
"I Prima contended that Flood and Conklin had fraudulently represented that it
was solvent and therefore able to perform its contractual obligations. The contract
between the parties contained a broad arbitration clause. The district court granted
Flood and Conklin's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the claim of fraud
in the inducement was properly a question for the arbitrators, not the court. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Prima Paint's appeal, ruling that the
FAA created "national substantive law and governs even in the face of a contrary
state rule." The court of appeals cited Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed 364
U.S. 801 (1960) (holding that claims of fraudulent misrepresentation could be sub-
mitted to arbitration despite the requirements of New York state law; the FAA
creates a body of substantive federal law that encompasses all the legal issues
surrounding the arbitration clause; the FAA does not require any reference to state
rules of decision).
119 On the separability doctrine, see Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402. See also G.
WILNER, supra note 119, at § 8:01.
140 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402.
14 Id. at 404.
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fashion federal substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple
diversity cases, . . . but whether Congress may prescribe how federal
courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over
which Congress plainly has the power to legislate.' ' 42 In other words,
in the Court's view, Prima Paint did not involve the issue of federalism
and states' rights, but, rather, whether Congress could provide sub-
stantive directives to the federal courts in areas in which Congress
had specific legislative powers. The Court, in effect, answered the
federalism question while appearing to disregard it: Congress could
create federal law where it had legislative authority to act. Therefore,
in diversity cases in which questions arose concerning the validity of
the recourse to arbitration, the federal courts were under an obligation
to apply the relevant federal legislation in the area. The only limitation
upon the application of federal law in this area appeared to be that
the contracts in question containing arbitration clauses must affect
interstate commerce. The concept of interstate commerce, however,
could be construed very broadly.
In Prima Paint, the Court also articulated what was to become a
fundamental tenet of its evolving decisional law on arbitration: that
the FAA's purpose to provide for the enforceability of arbitration
agreements was manifest, and that objective-buttressed by the ref-
erence to contractual freedom-must be given effect whenever pos-
sible. In the Court's own language, "in so concluding, we not only
honor the plain meaning of the statute but also the unmistakably
clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure when se-
lected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to
,42 Id. at 405. In his dissent, Justice Black argued that the majority went beyond
the specific intent of the Act: to make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal
courts if they were valid and legally recognized under state law:
The court holds that the Act gives federal courts the right to fashion federal
law, inconsistent with state law, to determine whether an arbitration agree-
ment was made and what it means. Even if Congress intended to create
substantive rights by passage of the Act, I am wholly convinced that it did
not intend to create such a sweeping body of federal substantive law
completely to take away from the States their power to interpret contracts
made by their own citizens in their own territory.
Id. at 422.
Justice Black also contended that the effect of the separability doctrine was not
to place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts-the avowed
purpose of the FAA, but to afford them a privileged status beyond the ordinary
legal impact of contract provisions. Prima Paint's promise to arbitrate disputes,
according to Black, was inseparable from its other contractual promises. Id. at 424.
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delay and obstruction in the courts."' 4 Challenges to the validity of
arbitration agreements on the basis of state law provisions, therefore,
were seen essentially as a dilatory tactic, meant to defeat the effect
of the arbitration agreement and the manifest purpose of the federal
legislation. Despite some weaknesses in the Court's reasoning,' 44 it
was now clear that the Court had espoused a strong and unequivocal
position in regard to arbitration-a position that was not only sup-
portive, but also protective of the institution of arbitral adjudication.
This position continues to color, influence, and dictate the results in
subsequent litigation on arbitration. Recent cases interpreting the
FAA, in fact, have been decided in a similar and even stronger vein.
B. The New Trilogy
Described by analogy to landmark labor arbitration cases as "the
new arbitration trilogy,' 4 a series of recent cases reveals the strength
of the policy that underlies the Court's construction of the FAA.
The rulings in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr.
Corp.,' 46 Southland Corp. v. Keating,'47 and Dean Witter Reynolds
v. Byrd 48 make clear that the Court perceives a fundamental con-
gressional objective underlying the FAA that it will uphold despite
allegations that state law is controlling and requires a different result.
These cases further demonstrate that the FAA embodies a federal
rule of law of truly national dimension.
Moses Cone involved circumstances relating to a contractual dispute
between a hospital and a building contractor. 49 The hospital, located
in North Carolina, entered into a contract with an Alabama con-
struction company to build additions to its main building. The con-
tract provided that disputes would be decided by the architect and,
if the dispute were not decided within a specified time, it would then
be submitted to binding arbitration. When a dispute arose and went
unsettled beyond the specified time, the hospital filed an action against
the construction company and the architect in a North Carolina state
court. In its petition, the hospital sought a declaratory judgment that
there was no right to arbitrate. The defendant construction company
141 Id. at 404.
I" See Justice Black's dissent, id. at 424-25.
"4 See Hirshman, supra note 131.
-- 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
.41 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
.4- 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
,,9 Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 4-5.
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then filed an action in federal district court on the basis of diversity
of citizenship, seeking an order to compel arbitration under the
provisions of the FAA. 50
Upon motion of the hospital, the federal district court stayed the
federal court action pending resolution of the suit in state court. The
federal court reasoned that the two suits involved identical issues:
namely, the arbitrability of the claim under consideration. 5 , On
appeal, the federal appellate court reversed the ruling and issued
instructions to compel arbitration. 5 2 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate decision, grounding much of its reasoning in
a categorical statement of doctrine upholding the FAA. 53
Considering the possibility of fragmented proceedings in the res-
olution of this controversy, the court held that "the federal law
requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an
arbitration agreement."'15 4 Moreover, the Court was concerned that
the delay ordered by the trial court might defeat the underlying
purpose of the federal legislation: "stay would have frustrated the
statutory policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration
agreements."' 55 The intent of the legislation was to move the parties
to an arbitration agreement out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and as easily as possible. 5 6 Finally, the Court gave extensive
reach to the federal legislation on arbitration. "Section 2 is a con-
gressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural pol-
icies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body
150 Id. at 7.
I5' d. at 10.
152 See Mercury Construction Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 656 F.2d
933 (4th Cir. 1981).
"I Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 13-29.
I1 d. at 20. The first question presented to the Court was whether the district
court had properly stayed the federal action pending resolution of the parallel state
claim. Id. at 4, 13. In addressing this question, the Court relied on Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), holding that-
once federal jurisdiction is properly invoked-deference to parallel state court liti-
gation is proper only in exceptional circumstances. See id. at 813. The factors to
be considered in determining whether exceptional circumstances exist are: (1) the
inconvenience of the federal forum; (2) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal liti-
gation; and (3) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fora.
See Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 15. Applying these factors to the facts in Moses Cone,
the Court found no showing of exceptional circumstances to justify the district
court's stay. Id. at 19.
"I Id. at 22-23.
156 Id.
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of substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agree-
ment within the coverage of the act."' 57 In effect, the court's ruling
made the provisions of the FAA applicable in state courts provided
some sort of jurisdictional basis existed for applying federal law.
The Keating case was decided similarly, minimizing state statutory
law on arbitration and upholding the underlying policy of the federal
law. In Keating, 58 the issue centered upon the constitutionality of a
section of the California Franchise Investment Law which had been
interpreted to require exclusive judicial consideration of claims brought
under the statute. 5 9 Keating's claim, brought on behalf of Seven-
Eleven franchisees against Southland Corporation, the Seven-Eleven
franchiser, alleged, among other things, that Southland had breached
its fiduciary duty and violated the disclosure requirements of the
California Franchise Investment Law.16 Pursuant to a contract pro-
vision, Southland moved to compel arbitration of all claims, except
those based on the Franchise Investment Law. After a trial court
determination holding the non-waiver provisions of the Franchise
Investment Law valid,' 6' the California court of appeals held that,
if the Franchise Investment Law rendered arbitration agreements
unenforceable, it conflicted with the provisions of the FAA and was,
therefore, invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution. 62 The California Supreme Court interpreted the investment
law provision to require exclusive judicial consideration of claims
brought under the statute; it held that claims asserted under the
investment law were inarbitrable, and it further concluded that the
California statute did not contravene the federal legislation on ar-
bitration. 163
The United States Supreme Court determined that the federal leg-
islation created a duty not only upon the federal courts, but also
upon the state courts to apply the federal policy on arbitration
embodied in the FAA. "In enacting section 2 of the federal act,
I Id. at 24.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
,19 California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL), CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West
1977). See Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr.
360 (1982), modified 465 U.S. 1.
160 Keating, 465 U.S. at 4.
,6, Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 599, 645 P.2d 1192, 1200, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 368 (1982).
162 Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 493-94 (1980).
163 Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. Rptr. 584, 604, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203-04
(1982).
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Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew
the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
tion. " ' 64 Agreeing with the essential reasoning of the California ap-
pellate court opinion, the Court further held that, "in creating a
substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress
intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements. We hold that §31512 of the
California franchise investment law violated the supremacy clause." 165
In undermining the state regulatory authority in the area of ar-
bitration, the Court was especially concerned that state statutory
policies could impair "the basic purpose of the federal statute."'' 66
In effect, by inserting restrictions on dispute resolution alternatives
in other statutory frameworks, "states could wholly eviscerate the
congressional intent to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same
footing as other contracts."1 67 "We have rejected this analysis because
it is in conflict with the Arbitration Act and would permit states to
override the declared policy requiring enforcement of arbitration
agreements.' 168 The uniform application of the FAA would prevent
forum shopping and oblige state courts in jurisdictions with inhos-
pitable arbitration statutes to disregard their own law and apply the
federal law.
The Byrd opinion is the final segment of the decisional law triptych.
It reveals that the Court's position on the federal arbitration legislation
is not simply grounded in a concern for dispute resolution efficiency.
Rather, the court's reasoning is anchored in a perception of a fun-
damental congressional intent underlying the FAA.
Byrd involved a dispute between a customer and the Dean Witter
Reynolds securities brokerage firm. 169 Byrd filed a complaint against
Dean Witter Reynolds in a U.S. District Court, claiming jurisdiction
based on the existence of a federal question as well as diversity of
citizenship, and alleging violations of the U.S. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and of various state law provisions relating to securities
regulation. 70 The broker-dealer contract, however, contained an ar-
'6 Keating, 465 U.S. at 10.
165 Id. at 16.
166 Id. at 21.
167 Id. at 17 n.ll.
168 Id.
169 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
170 Id. at 1239.
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bitration agreement. Based upon that agreement, Dean Witter filed
a motion to sever the pendant state claims and compel arbitration,
staying arbitration pending the resolution of the federal court action.
Both at the federal trial 1 and appellate'72 levels, the motion to sever
the pendant state claims and compel arbitration was denied because
of the "intertwining" doctrine, 7 barring the arbitration of state law
claims that are factually inseparable from claims under the federal
securities act. According to the appellate court reasoning, the inter-
twining doctrine maintained the federal courts' "exclusive jurisdiction
over the federal securities claim," 174 by preventing the earlier arbitral
determination of the state claim to bind the federal proceeding through
collateral estoppel. Also, "by declining to compel arbitration, the
courts avoid bifurcated proceedings and perhaps redundant efforts
to litigate the same factual question twice." ' 7
Despite the persuasiveness of this reasoning, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the arbitration of
the pendant state claims should be compelled. 176 In a unanimous
opinion, the court stated that "the Act leaves no place for the exercise
of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district
courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as
to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.' 1 77 The Court
was explicit in emphasizing the underlying congressional intent ap-
parent in the federal legislation on arbitration, namely, "that the
purpose behind its [the act's] passage was to ensure judicial enforce-
ment of privately made agreements to arbitrate . . . We therefore
reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the FAA was to
provoke the expeditious resolution of claims.' 7
These decisions leave little doubt that the Court's recent decisional
law has effectively federalized the American law of arbitration. In
contradistinction with the Canadian experience, the national law on
arbitration in the United States was not achieved by the concurrent
171 Id.
172 Id. (726 F.2d 552 (1984)).
'73 Id. at 1240.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1241.
177 Id.
171 Id. at 1242. For a parallel development in another area of law where the
Court's decision arguably results in the federalization of the law of contractual
forum-selection clauses, see Steward Organization, Inc. v. RICOH Corp., 108 S.Ct.
2239 (1988).
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enactment of legislation at the federal and state levels of government.
Rather, over a period of years, the chief federal judicial organ pro-
gressively elaborated the full systemic implications of an earlier federal
enactment. Using a triple constitutional reference-a broad view of
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, a reference to the
Supremacy Clause, and invoking the congressional authority to enact
the FAA and the underlying intent of the legislation-the Court
concluded that state statutory provisions and court rulings must not
contravene the FAA's basic provisions. Moreover, given the circum-
stances in Keating, it seems that this position applies to cases that
involve either interstate or even more localized forms of commerce.
Not unexpectedly, these recent decisions generated a volume of
scholarly criticism, 1  decrying the rather evident infringement of state
legislative authority over local commercial matters. The Canadian
legislative approach certainly evinces greater respect for essential sys-
temic relationships in the federal process. Canada, however, did not
have an existing federal enactment. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court's action could be seen as a legitimate judicial extension
of the enabling legislation's original intent over time and changing
circumstances. No movement is under way to have the decisional law
overridden by congressional action. While the Canadian approach
can be seen as a perhaps less brutal exercise of power, both national
experiences attest to the perceived need in each system to have a
uniform national position on arbitration that is neither encumbered
nor weakened by internal dissenting variations.
In summary, domestic litigation demonstrates that the Court has
adopted a position supportive of the arbitral process' institutional
autonomy and systemic viability. The Court's decisional law empha-
sizes the judicial duty to recognize the validity of arbitration agree-
"' See Comment, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd: The Unraveling of the
Intertwining Doctrine, 62 DEN. U. L. REV. 789 (1985); Hirshman, supra note 131;
Note, Federal Preemption-Arbitration-Federal Arbitration Act Creates National
Substantive Law Applicable In Federal And State Courts And Supercedes Contrary
State Statutes, 54 Miss. L.J. 561 (1984); Note, Investor-Broker Arbitration Agree-
ments: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 20 U.S.F.L. REV. 101 (1985); Note,
Preemption of State Law Under The Federal Arbitration Act, 15 U. BALT. L. REV.
128 (1985); Note, Mixed Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Claims in Securities Litigation:
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 525 (1985); Recent
Development, The Federal Arbitration Act: A Threat to Injunctive Relief, 21 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 674 (1985). See generally McDermott, Significant Developments
In The United States Law Governing International Commercial Arbitration, 1 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 111 (1985-86).
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ments and their jurisdictional consequences. It appears clear that the
Court wants to give full effect to the federal legislation's underlying
purpose of eliminating judicial hostility toward arbitration. It is also
clear that the Court-while its interpretations are logical and grounded
in a plausible jurisdictional base-is supplying additional content to
the federal legislation and embellishing its original policy imperative.
A more qualified form of support, however, could undermine the
institutional autonomy and viability of arbitral adjudication. In order
to have a cohesive and coherent national policy regarding arbitration,
it may well be necessary to minimize state legislative authority in
local commercial matters and to compel compliance by both state
and federal courts with the FAA's express language.
C. International Arbitration Cases
The Court's forceful stance on arbitration also acts as the leitmotif
of its decisional law on international commercial arbitration. Here,
as well, the Court appears to give preeminence to the policy directive
it perceives underlying the governing federal legislation (in this in-
stance, the legislation being the 1970 Arbitration Act'80 which codifies
the provisions of the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention). Suc-
cinctly stated, the federalization of the American domestic law on
arbitration is accompanied by a similar (and related) federalization
of the American law on international commercial arbitration and,
more generally, on international business transactions.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,8' the leading case on international
commercial arbitration, involved allegations that Alberto-Culver, the
American purchaser of foreign trademarks, had been deceived by the
fraudulent misrepresentations of Scherk, the German seller, and that
Scherk's conduct violated the provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Several months after the initial sale, which was negotiated
over a period of time in various countries, Alberto-Culver purportedly
discovered that the trademarks it had purchased from Scherk were
substantially encumbered. The purchase contract contained express
warranties that title to the trademarks was unencumbered; the agree-
ment also contained an arbitration clause, providing for the arbitral
resolution of disputes arising under the contract. 8 2 The question
11o See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
18 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). See Arbitral Adjudication,
supra note 119, at 68-74.
"2 417 U.S. at 508.
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presented in litigation before the federal courts was whether the
substance of the 1934 Securities Act rendered the dispute inarbitrable,
thereby nullifying the contractual provision for recourse to arbitration.
Previously, in litigation involving purely domestic interests, the
Court had held that disputes allegedly involving violations of the
Securities Act of 1933 were inarbitrable. In Wilko v. Swan,' 83 an
investor lodged an action against a securities brokerage firm, claiming
that the firm had violated section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. The brokerage
contract contained a dispute resolution clause providing for the sub-
mission of disputes arising under the contract to arbitration. 84 Not-
withstanding its view that the FAA embodied a strong congressional
policy supporting arbitration, the Court deemed the arbitration agree-
ment in Wilko to be unenforceable. The Court reasoned that the
provision for arbitration countermanded the express policy of the
1933 Act prohibiting investors from waiving certain statutorily-es-
tablished rights, namely, the rights to bring suit in any federal or
state court, to select a forum from a wide choice of venue, to take
advantage of the nationwide service of process provision, and to
dispense with the amount in controversy requirement. 85 Moreover,
section 12(2) of the Act expressly gives investors a cause of action
to redress claims of misrepresentation against a seller of securities,
requiring the defendant to prove its lack of scienter.' 86
Therefore, despite a valid arbitration agreement, securities claims
arising under the 1933 Act could not be submitted to arbitration.
The Act's non-waiver of rights provisions, in effect, manifested a
congressional intent to create an exception to the FAA's validation
of arbitration agreements. The policy imperative underlying the 1933
Act exceptionally overrode its analogue in the FAA.
Despite the Wilko doctrine which the lower federal courts found
to be controlling in Scherk,' 87 the Court nonetheless ordered the parties
in Scherk to proceed with ICC arbitration as provided in the contract.
In the Court's assessment, the critical factor that served to distinguish
the cases was the "truly international"'' 8 character of the contract
in Scherk: "[T]he respondent's reliance on Wilko in this case ignores
the significant and, we find, crucial differences between the agreement
".3 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
114 Id. at 429.
" Id. at 432-35.
1 Id. at 428 n.1.
117 417 U.S. at 512.
" Id. at 515.
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involved in Wilko and the one signed by the parties here. Alberto-
Culver's contract to purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk
was a truly international agreement."' 8 9 Tracking the basic content
of section 202 of the 1970 Arbitration Act, the Court defined the
concept of a "truly international agreement" by reference to the
constituent elements of the transaction: elements-like the parties'
nationalities, where they conducted their principal business activities,
the companies' place of incorporation, and the use of different na-
tional fora to assemble the deal-which reflected the transnational
character of the venture.'90 The Court, however, gave principal import
to the transaction's economic content and impact: "Finally, and most
significantly, the subject matter of the contract concerned the sale
of business enterprises organized under the laws of and primarily
situated in European countries, whose activities were largely, if not
entirely, directed to European markets."' 19
The Court's reference to the economic impact of the transaction
aligned the American law on international commercial arbitration
with the "anational" tenor of the French Decree on international
arbitration, avoiding the mechanical formalism of the British statute.
Rather than half-heartedly concede the existence of the international
process and subordinate its operation whenever possible to national
legal strictures, the expansive reasoning in Scherk indicated that the
Court perceived the United States ratification of the New York Ar-
bitration Convention as part of a congressional pronouncement on
matters of international trade-a legislative policy that favored the
development of private international commerce. Impliedly, the New
York Convention and the 1970 Arbitration Act represented the United
States' adherence to a global consensus on international trade. In the
Court's assessment, the implementation of that policy justified and
required the judicial elaboration of rules minimizing national legal
obstacles to the performance of obligations under international con-
tracts.
Although the 1933 Securities Act (controlling in Wilko) and the
1934 Securities Act (at issue in Scherk) arguably contained similar
non-waiver provisions, 92 the juridical effect of inarbitrability pro-
visions in domestic statutes was substantially reduced, essentially elim-
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See Arbitral Adjudication, supra note 119, at 69.
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inated, in cases involving international contracts. The dislodging of
the contractual recourse to arbitration by the mandatory congressional
provision for judicial remedies was ineffective in the Scherk setting
because "[s]uch a[n] [international] contract involves considerations
and policies significantly different from those found controlling in
Wilko .. ."193 "The exception to the clear provisions of the Arbi-
tration Act carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to ... [Scherk]." 194
The "considerations and policies," sufficient to undermine the ap-
plication of otherwise mandatory domestic law, focused upon the
needs and integrity of international commerce and the participation
of United States business interests in the world marketplace:
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any
contract touching two or more countries, each with its own sub-
stantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision
specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated
and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such
a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement
might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of
the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an
international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these
purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jock-
eying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the
present case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if Scherk had
anticipated that Alberto-Culver would be able in this country to
enjoin resort to arbitration he might have sought an order in France
or some other country enjoining Alberto-Culver from proceeding
with its litigation in the United States. Whatever recognition the
courts of this country might ultimately have granted to the order
of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-
land would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and
trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter
into international commercial agreements. 195
In summary, arbitration-because of its adjudicatory neutrality,
expertise, and privacy-had become the foremost remedial means by
which to resolve disputes arising from international contracts. By
193 417 U.S. at 515.
194 Id. at 517.
'91 Id. at 516-17.
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ratifying the New York Convention, the universal charter of inter-
national arbitration, Congress had expressly endorsed the emerging
international stature of arbitration and implicitly recognized that the
world marketplace did business on transnational and not national
terms. Accordingly, in its decisional law, the Court felt obligated to
make the congressional endorsement a juridical reality. The Scherk-
Wilko nexus required the Court to balance, segregate, and prioritize
divergent policy dictates: (1) the domestic interest in having claims
of fraudulent misrepresentation in securities matters resolved by courts;
(2) the FAA's mandate to enforce arbitration agreements; (3) the
objective of furthering the interest of the world community and of
the United States in international trade; and (4) the need to avoid
compromising domestic legal imperatives, like the requirements of
securities legislation, in international litigation without some funda-
mental justification.
In domestic matters, Wilko achieved a balanced form of priori-
tization by resolving the conflict between the first and second policy
dictates in the form of an exception to the FAA that did not infringe
upon the core interests of the arbitration legislation. Scherk, however,
evidences an overriding prioritization of the policy interest favoring
international commerce, placing that objective squarely above the
other policy considerations. Scherk manifests the Court's intent to
eliminate any opportunity for parochial judicial construction or ex-
traterritorial judicial extension of domestic laws in the context of
international cases involving arbitration. In effect, the Court rec-
ognizes a sphere of international activity that, while subject to national
jurisdiction, must be regulated in keeping with its essentially auton-
omous transnational character. Scherk thereby allows the Court to
lay the foundation for the elaboration of a substantive American law
on private international commerce.' 96
The display of internationalism in Scherk stands in sharp contrast
with a previous and well-established federal decisional law upholding
the extraterritorial extension of United States antitrust laws., 97 Ini-
'96 For a discussion of the concept of private international law in its traditional
sense and new acceptation, see infra note 226 and accompanying text.
197 See generally J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD (2d ed. 1981); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
(3d ed. 1982); Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
145 (1975); Comment, Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction:
Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. REV. 213 (1982);
Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REV. 925 (1963);
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tially, the Court-with its decision in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co. 9 8-adopted the rule of strict territoriality, holding that the
regulatory reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act was confined to anti-
competitive commercial practices taking place within the United States.
In a series of subsequent casesl 99 that culminated in the United States
v. Aluminum Company of America2°° decision (Alcoa), the effect of
a more aggressive executive branch antitrust enforcement policy was
manifest. The rule of legislative territoriality was replaced by a more
expansive construction of the Sherman Act's jurisdictional scope.
That interpretation allowed the federal courts to assert jurisdiction
in antitrust cases in which would-be violations took place abroad,
provided that the conduct in question bore a substantial connection
with United States trade. In Alcoa, the controlling doctrine was
reformulated in terms of "intended effects": 20 1 commercial activity
pursued anywhere in the world by nationals of whatever country,
which the courts could interpret as exhibiting an intent to place
Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States
Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257 (1980); Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The
British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981);
Note, 'Forum Non Conveniens' and the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693 (1985); Samie, Extraterritorial Enforcement of
United States Antitrust Laws: The British Reaction, 16 INT'L LAW. 313 (1982);
Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States:
A View From Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
On extraterritoriality generally, see EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND
RESPONSES THERETO (C. Olmstead ed. 1984); Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at
a Crossroads: An Intersection between Public and Private International Law, 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982); Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion, 31 AM. J. Comp. L. 579 (1984); Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts,
or "There and Back Again," 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7 (1984).
'98 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
- See Kintner & Hallgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to
Foreign Trade and Commerce Variations on 'American Banana' Since 1909, 15 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REV. 343 (1973). See also Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917);
United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United
States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268 (1927).
z0 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
201 Id. at 442. See Ellis, Comment to Miller, Extraterritorial Effects of Trade
Regulations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1129 (1963); Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction
of the American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974); Zwarensteyn, The
Foreign Reach of the American Antitrust Laws, 3 AM. Bus. L.J. 163 (1965). See
also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 950 (1972); United
States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
restraints upon American trade, was within the scope of United States
antitrust jurisdiction.
More contemporary circuit court decisions in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America2 2 and Mannington Mills v.Congoleum Corp.23
have tempered the parochial bias of the Alcoa rule and its neglect
of considerations of international comity. While neither opinion re-
pudiates the statutory basis for asserting jurisdiction, the holding in
each case modifies the legal standard for triggering the application
of antitrust legislation. In effect, both courts abandoned the Alcoa
"intended effects" test and replaced it with a more moderate balance-
of-interests approach and a jurisdictional rule of reason.2 04 According
to these courts, the effects test was incomplete; in its provision for
the assertion of jurisdiction, it inadequately accounted for the interests
of other nations and for the actual relationship between the defendants
and the United States. Under the jurisdictional rule of reason, as-
suming that "some" actual or intended effect could be established,
the supposedly anti-competitive practices must be of sufficient mag-
nitude to justify-in light of considerations of international comity-
an assertion of domestic United States jurisdiction.2 05 The United
States' interest in enforcement must outweigh the interests of the
implicated foreign country. "When foreign nations are involved, it
is unwise to ignore the fact that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity,
and limitations of judicial power are considerations that should have
a bearing on the decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction."1206
Regardless of its current character, the decisional law on the ex-
traterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws has, in effect, been
reversed by the Court's ruling in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth.20 7 The long-awaited sequel to Scherk, Mitsubishi repre-
202 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
203 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
204 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612-13; Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
203 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614; Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
206 Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1296.
207 105 S.Ct. 3346 (1985). For commentary on the case, see Campbell & Vollmer,
International Arbitration, 7 Nat'l L.J., Aug. 19, 1985, at 24; Carbonneau, The
Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly of Mitsubishi,
19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265 (1986) [hereinafter Quixotic Internationalism];
Comment, International Arbitration-Commerce-Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims
Arising From International Commerce Disputes Recognized Under Federal Arbitra-
tion Act-Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 17 SETON HALL L.
REV. 448 (1987); Lipner, International Antitrust Laws: To Arbitrate or Not to
Arbitrate, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 395 (1985); Note, International
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sented an opportunity for the Court to refine the implications of the
international contract concept and place some restrictions on the wide
policy directive articulated in Scherk. Since Mitsubishi involved the
question whether antitrust claims were arbitrable when they arose in
the setting of an international contract, some commentators28 antic-
ipated that the case might represent an opportunity for the Court to
establish essential boundaries between national priorities and the self-
regulatory needs of international commerce. Like the public policy
exception, the inarbitrability defense2°9 is a well-recognized juridical
limitation on arbitration, preventing it from infringing upon core
systemic interests. The application of that defense in Mitsubishi, it
Arbitration And The Comity of Error: Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Ply-
mouth, Inc., 19 CONN. L. REv. 435 (1987); Recent Development, Arbitration:
Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims in International Tribunals, Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), 27 HARV. INT'L L.J.
(1986); Robert, Une date dans l'extension de l'arbitrage international: L'arret Mit-
subishi c/ Soler, [1986] REv. ARB. 173. See also Branson & Wallace, Choosing the
Substantive Law to Apply in International Commercial Arbitration, 27 VA. J. INT'L
L. 39, 50, 54, 57-64 (1986). See also Symposium, The Future Of Private International
Arbitration: Beyond Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 12 BROOKLYN
J. INT'L L. 579 (1986).
For related articles that refer to Mitsubishi, see, e.g., Allison, Arbitration Agree-
ments And Antitrust Claims: The Need For Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting
Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REv. 219 (1986); Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Dam-
ages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TuL. L. REV. 777 (1987); Comment,
Arbitrating Civil RICO And Implied Causes of Action Arising under Section 10(b)
Of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 455 (1987); Fletcher,
Privatizing Securities Disputes Through The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements,
71 MmN. L. REv. 393 (1987); Note, Arbitrability Of Claims Arising Under The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548 (1986); Note, Arbitrability
of Implied Rights of Action Under Section 10(b) Of The Securities Exchange Act,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 506 (1986).
208 See Quixotic Internationalism, supra note 206, at 274-77. For commentary on
the lower court determination of the case (723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983)), see Comment,
Mitsubishi: The Erosion of the New York Convention and International Arbitration,
1984 Wis. INT'L L.J. 151; Recent Development, Arbitration: Public Policy Exception
To Arbitration of Antitrust Issues, 25 HARv. INT'L L.J. 427 (1984); Recent Decision,
Arbitration: Transnational Antitrust Claims Are Nonarbitrable Under the Federal
Arbitration Act and Article I1(1) of the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 741 (1984).
209 For a discussion of the separability doctrine, see G. WILNER, supra note 119,
§§ 8:01-:02; A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 40 at 145-46, 156, 200, 372 (1983). See
also Bedell, Harrison & Grant, Arbitrability: Current Developments In The Inter-
pretation And Enforceability Of Arbitration Agreements, 13 J. CONTEm'. L. 1 (1987);
Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 2 CmAmozo L. REv. 481 (1981) (regarding the related public policy
defense).
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was argued, would not have lessened the viability of the arbitral
process.
Rather than restrict the Scherk doctrine, the Mitsubishi opinion
reinforced and amplified it. Holding that antitrust claims arising from
international contracts are arbitrable, 210 the Court avoided placing
meaningful yet moderate national restraints on international arbitral
adjudication. In effect, the Court impliedly affirmed the view that
Western national economies have effectively been internationalized
by world participation in international trade and that private trans-
national commerce functions by reference to its own, self-generated
rules. Mitsubishi thus echoed and expanded the gravamen in Scherk:
international trade is vital to the national interest, and the United
States cannot expect the world to do business on primarily American
terms. 2
11
D. A Perspective on the Federalization of American Arbitration
Law
The federalization of the American law of arbitration, both do-
mestic and international, reflects too great a level of judicial inno-
vation, and evidences too strong a doctrinal conviction, for the
companion development of these two areas to be explained as mere
happenstance. Ostensibly with tacit congressional approval, the Court
is adapting the FAA and the provisions of the 1970 Arbitration Act
to contemporary domestic and international commercial and adju-
dicatory realities. The Court attributes a privileged status to the
congressional objective of validating arbitration agreements and le-
gitimating arbitral adjudication in the hierarchy of protected values.
Nor can the motivation that underlies such unequivocal support for
a system of private, non-judicial justice-beginning with Prima Paint,
amplifying itself through the new trilogy and gaining forceful ex-
pression in the Scherk-Mitsubishi internationalist doctrine-be ade-
quately explained, as the Byrd Court opines, 21 2 merely by a mechanical
judicial allegiance to a congressional dictate. The Court's rulings on
arbitration embody concordant perceptions of the social role and
necessity of commerce and of the limited dispute resolution utility
of legal adjudication.
210 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
211 See Quixotic Internationalism, supra note 206, at 280-81.
212 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242-43 (1985).
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The decisional law on arbitration has survived the inevitable var-
iations in the Court's political configuration. It has been espoused
by liberal and conservative justices alike. 2 3 In the international cases,
exceptional dissenting positions were taken by members of the Court
as different as Justice Douglas (in Scherk)214 and Justice Stevens (in
Mitsubishi). 21 5 The steadfastness of the majority commitment to the
FAA's policy directive reveals, in effect, an institutionalization of a
federal policy on commerce, namely, that domestic commercial ac-
tivity is national in scope. The integrated national character of com-
merce should not be undercut by public law questions relating to
systemic organization and political authority. Because of its private
and self-regulatory character, commerce can escape public law con-
straints. To immix constitutional debates and the intricacy of legality
into commerce would paralyze the ability of merchants to function
effectively and thereby imperil the national economy. Political values
and the accompanying adjudicatory requirements have little relevance
in the ideology of the marketplace.
With the Burger Court, the policy implied from the FAA's pro-
visions merged with the concern about the litigation crisis and the
accessibility of justice. The prevalent view, advocated by the Chief
Justice, was that the severe burden placed upon the courts by the
volume of claims and protracted proceedings threatened to undermine
the administration of justice.21 6 The success of arbitration in labor
and commercial matters2 7 became the grounds upon which to advocate
23 Former Chief Justice Burger's departure, for example, has not modified the
Court's position on arbitration. See McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987).
214 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 529 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
Quixotic Internationalism, supra note 206, at 288-90.
213 Mitsubishi v. Soler, 105 S.Ct. at 3361 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Quixotic
Internationalism, supra note 206, at 288-90.
216 See Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger, ABA Midyear Meeting (Jan. 24,
1982), reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Chief Justice Burger's State of The
Judiciary Address, 109 N.J.L.J., at 1, col. 4 (Feb. 4, 1982); Time To Review Our
Reliance On Adversary System: Chief Justice Faults Lawyers For Frivolous Suits,
Discovery Abuse (Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger at A.B.A. Midyear
Meeting, Las Vegas, Feb. 1984), L.A. Daily J., at 4, col. 3 (Feb. 15, 1984).
217 See generally (on commercial arbitration) 1-5 J. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1979); G. WILNER, supra, note 119; de
Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National
Courts, 57 TuL. L. REV. 42 (1982); Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration, 61 COLUM.
L. REV. 846 (1961). On labor arbitration, see J. CORREGE, V. HUGHES, & M. STONE
(eds.), THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA (1976); F. ELKOURI & E.
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recourse to alternative means of dispute resolution in a variety of
other areas. While Byrd indicates that dispute resolution efficiency
was not the principal motivation for the federal decisional law on
arbitration, it is difficult to imagine that this concern did not inform
and bolster the Court's perception that arbitration was a legitimate
exercise in commercial self-regulation through self-determined adju-
dication.
Relatedly, the Court's unwavering support for commercial arbi-
tration also challenged consecrated legal adjudicatory values. Its safe-
guarding of a privately-initiated and controlled system of justice
suggested that juridical adjudicatory methods were to be reassessed
and adversarial convictions reconsidered. For example, the extensive
protections available to the individual against state action in regard
to fundamental political rights should not necessarily predominate in
the adjudication of private law claims. Here, considerations of costs
and expediency-also part of the ethic of fairness-should be weighed.
The procedural flexibility, expertise, and possible efficiency proffered
by arbitration responded to many of the elements of the dilemma
generated by a dispute resolution framework saturated with lawyerly
concerns and juridical procedures. Accordingly, the Court's institu-
tionalization of a national policy on commerce was grouped with a
growing awareness of the need to devise workable alternatives to
judicial adjudication. In private law matters, the latter objective, it
seemed, could be achieved by the promotion of self-determination in
dispute resolution and the recourse to a non-judicial and non-ad-
versarial adjudicatory ethic.
The values espoused and promoted by the Court in domestic ad-
judication were already at work in transnational commerce. There,
the different nationalities of contracting parties, the need for adju-
dicatory neutrality, expertise, and privacy, and the commercial ne-
cessity of maintaining viable business relationships despite disputes
made the recourse to arbitration or other alternatives a virtual ne-
cessity. Rather than articulate a restrained acceptance of the process,
the Court gave international arbitration an unqualified endorsement.
A central feature of that endorsement was the minimization of do-
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985); 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983); M. HILL & A. SINICROPI,
REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION (1981); S. KAGEL, ANATOMY OF A LABOR ARBITRATION
(1st ed. 1978); C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS (3d ed. 1972);
A. ZACK & R. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION (1983).
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mestic imperatives in transnational commercial cases. Again, the Court
relied on its pragmatic concern for the viability of commerce and its
sense that traditional forms of legal regulation and juridical proce-
dures were counterproductive in this setting. The internationalization
of commerce meant that the U.S. national interest could only be
served by participating in international trade on globally-accepted
terms. The extraterritorial extension of domestic laws, be they antitrust
regulations or jurisdictional concepts, could only hinder American
commercial interests. Moreover, the history of commercial self-
regulation 21 1 supported the exemption of international commerce from
national legal restrictions. Given the transnational support for ar-
bitration, international arbitrators could legitimately deal with claims
brought pursuant to legislation of United States or of other countries
which arose in the context of international commercial contracts. 21 9
In keeping with the domestic experience, the principle of self-
determination in international dispute resolution dislodged the ap-
plication of systemic concerns in order to establish a cohesive national
policy on commerce and to generate a body of law relating to a
parallel and autonomous adjudicatory framework. While arguably ill-
conceived, 220 the internationalist tenor of the rulings in Scherk and
Mitsubishi give additional juridical support to the concept of an
autonomous and "anational" international commercial arbitration
process, a process that is distancing itself from any reference to
municipal legal authority and operates free of all national legal pro-
visions but those that specifically regulate private international law
matters. 22' This stance coincides with recent developments concerning
other facets of international commerce (specifically, in the jurisdic-
tional area) where the Court has consistently refused to transpose
purely domestic legal standards (U.S. long-arm jurisdiction concepts)
into transnational litigation. 222
28 See Carbonneau & Firestone, Transnational Law-Making: Assessing the Impact
of the Vienna Convention and the Viability of Arbitral Adjudication, I EMORY J.
INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 51, 57-63 (1986) [hereinafter Transnational Law-Making].
29 See Lowenfeld, The Mitsubishi Case: Another View, 2 ARB. INT'L 178 (1986).
See also Smit, Mitsubishi: It Is Not What It Seems To Be, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 7 (1987).
220 See Quixotic Internationalism, supra note 206, at 296-98.
221 See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
222 See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92,
107 S.Ct. 1026 (1987). On this question, see generally Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction
Over Foreign-Country Corporate Defendants - Comments on Recent Case Law, 63
OR. L. REv. 431 (1984).
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The Court's sensitivity to issues of transnational commerce and its
general activism in that area lays the groundwork for the progressive
development of a substantive American law of private international
law. Replacing the reliance on choice-of-law principles and national
legal provisions, such a law would be comprised of substantive rules
that account for the sui generis features and needs of international
commercial cases. 223
The Court's internationalism, presumably inspired and authorized
by the 1970 Arbitration Act, raises a number of concerns. The
determination that antitrust claims are arbitrable in an international
contract setting leaves little room for the functioning of the inar-
bitrability defense (and the related public policy exception) contained
in the New York Arbitration Convention. 224 With some reluctance,
and in the hope that a more measured balancing of interests might
eventually be instituted, one could accept this development as a
necessary part of the Court's implied accession to the concept of
"anational" arbitration-although other aspects of the Mitsubishi
opinion seem to undermine that concept. 221 Additional criticism cen-
ters upon the concept of "anational" arbitration itself. There is a
lively academic debate regarding whether the international arbitration
process is truly separable from national legal processes. 226 The con-
223 See infra note 225 and accompanying text. For an assessment of the status of
such a law, see Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law,
40 ME. L. REV. 263, 279-83 (1988).
224 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
221 See Quixotic Internationalism, supra note 206, at 283-88.
226 The phrase "private international law" (favored by English and continental
writers) is often used interchangeably with the phrase "conflicts of law" (favored
by American writers). See M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1950).
Both phrases have been subject to criticism for their imprecision, but still survive,
each in its own right. A majority view holds that private international law or conflicts
of law is part of municipal law. Distinct bodies of conflicts rules exist in various
countries, and these rules may be as different from one another as other national
legal provisions. These rules draw their authority from municipal sources; the resulting
law is, therefore, municipal in character. A universalist trend-which views private
international law as an evolving body of transnational commercial law-opposes the
classical perspective. See E. LANGEN, TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 8-33 (1973);
Schmitthoff, International Business Law, A New Law Merchant, in 2 CURRENT LAW
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 129 (1961). The universalists argue that transnational law will
gradually overcome the fragmentation of municipal legal systems. Although it has
its source in municipal law, private international law-in the universalist perspective-
is properly international in character. In order to devise a properly transnational
law, municipal authorities need to engage in a comparative law synthesis that responds
to the transnational character of international commercial dealings. See C. SCHMIT-
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troversy is anchored in a positive law thesis that argues for the need
THOFF, COMMERCIAL LAW IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC CLIMATE 21 (1977).
According to the classical view, the primary function of private international law
or conflicts of law is to designate an appropriate municipal law to govern the
provisions of an international contract. Differing interpretations of the effect of
party choice exist in the various municipal systems. Some national laws hold that,
even when the parties have designated an applicable law, the municipal jurisdiction
must still invoke its choice of law rules to determine whether the agreement itself
is valid. Unlimited party autonomy in this regard would allow private individuals
to perform an essentially legal function. The more pervasive view is that express
party choice controls; absent party selection, the proper law of the contract is the
law of the country with which the contract has the closest connection. This view
assumes that a transaction which touches upon the legal order of several countries
will be more closely connected to one of them. The attempt to identify a contract's
"center of gravity" proceeds from the territorial doctrine of localization. See Rex
v. Int'l Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft, [19371 A.C.
500; Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia, [1951] A.C. 201; Amin Rasheed
Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co., 1983 v. 3 WLR 241 (1983). See also DICEY AND
MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (J. Morris ed. 10th ed. 1980); P. NORTH,
CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (10th ed. 1979).
The American view parallels its English analogue described above, although it
places less emphasis upon the role of party autonomy. See Craver, The Two "Local
Law" Theories, in CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS (1933-1983), 45-55 (1985). For
the most part, Anglo-American practice is firmly rooted in considerations of ter-
ritoriality. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed.
1986); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAWS (4th ed. 1986).
The universalist view argues that private international law has been transformed
from a choice of law system to a set of substantive rules that regulate transnational
dealings and activities. The transformations in the global community and the eco-
nomic interdependence of states have rendered the concept of territoriality obsolete.
Moreover, private international law-in its substantive sense-only gains its origins
in national legal systems; it is a regime of legal governance that transcends the
parochial boundaries of municipality. It regulates "delocalized" international con-
tracts and evidences the emergence of a new "lex mercatoria." See Kegel, The Crisis
of Conflicts of Laws, 112 REC. DES COURS 91 (1964-I). Although proponents of
the universalist view of private international law have advanced different justifications
for this "anational" law, they are all searching for an appropriate calculus by which
to explain the complexity of factors that have transformed international legal and
economic relationships. See W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1964). On the role of state contracts in this evolution, see Hyde,
Economic Development Agreements, 105 REC. DES COuRs 267 (1962-I); Lalive,
Contracts Between A State Or A State Agency And A Foreign Company - Theory
and Practice: Choice of Law in a New Arbitration Case, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
987 (1964); Schmitthoff, The Unification or Harmonisation of Law By Means of
Standard Contracts and General Conditions, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 551 (1968).
The universalist school further argues that neither municipal law nor international
law provides a sufficient juridical basis for transnational economic relationships
(particularly those between states and foreign corporations). Subjecting transnational
commercial parties to domestic legal requirements and the territorial authority of
municipal systems is both inappropriate and undesirable. A new legal order needs
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to ground legal regulation and processes in an authorizing national
sovereign source. Envisioning what might or ought to be, it is argued,
to be fashioned that takes new realities into account. According to Lord McNair,
"'t/he complexity of the modern world... compels the abandonment of any ...
facile dichotomy of law into national law and public international law." McNair,
The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1 (1957). See also Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law
of Commercial Transactions, in 2 THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIc LAW) 19 (N.
Horn & C. Schmitthoff eds. 1982). "This is the area in which a transnational law
of international trade has developed and can be further evolved. This law is essentially
founded on a parallelism of action in the various national legal systems, in an area
in which . . . the sovereign national state is not essentially interested." Id. at 21.
These views have been subjected to considerable criticism, primarily because the
effects of contracts are transposed from the established and well-defined realm of
municipal law to allegedly vague general principles of law or other, equally indefinite,
systems whose substantive norms are inarticulate and whose sources are uncertain.
See Mann, The Proper Law of Contract Concluded by International Persons, 35
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 35 (1959) ("Lord McNair ... somewhat surprisingly considers
the general principles as affording, in certain cases, 'the choice of a legal system',
and, indeed, describes them as a 'system of law'. Yet it is hardly open to doubt
that, unless they are equiparated to public international law, the general principles
are not a legal system at all." Id. at 45); Mann, State Contracts and State Re-
sponsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1960); Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (P. Sanders ed.
1967) ("Although, where international aspects of some kind arise, it is not uncommon
and, on the whole, harmless to speak, somewhat colloquially, of the international
arbitration, the phrase is a misnomer. In the legal sense no international commercial
arbitration exists .... [Elvery arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to say,
subject to a specific system of national law .... Every right or power a private
person enjoys is inexorably conferred by or derived from a system of municipal
law." Id. at 159-60); Mann, England Rejects "Delocalised" Contracts and Arbi-
tration, 33 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 193 (1984); Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 21 (1983) ("The paradox
of a legal obligation independent of a legal order suggests Athena springing full-
blown from the head of Zeus: a binding commitment, free from any municipal law,
just appears." Id. at 26); Suratgar, Considerations Affecting Choice of Law Clauses
In Contracts Between Governments And Foreign Nations, 2 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 273
(1962) ("The major criticism of this [Lord McNair's] suggestion is that no such
legal system exists and that it could have no connection with any definable society,
and would not amount in positivist terms to a legal system at all." Id. at 311.).
But see Paulsson, Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration: When
and Why It Matters, 32 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 53 (1983) ("What this critique misses
is that the delocalized award is not thought to be independent of any legal order.
Rather, the point is that the delocalized award may be accepted by the legal order
of an enforcement jurisdiction although it ig independent from the legal order of
its country of origin." Id. at 56. See also Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award
Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358 (1981).
See generally Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUtL. L. REv. (1989) (forthcoming).
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cannot be mistaken for what is and must be. 227 Mirroring the English
attitude on international arbitration, proponents of this view hold
that the effort of international merchants to create their own adju-
dicatory system cannot be effective without the initial and continuing
approval of national legal systems. 228 The responsibility and authority
for creating legitimate legal norms lie exclusively within the province
of municipal sovereignty.
The experience with the twin American federalization of arbitration
law belies this interpretation of the development of international
commercial arbitration. The municipal endorsement of arbitration-
domestic or international-manifests a systemic willingness to accept
227 See Transnational Law-Making, supra note 217, at 53 n.10:
Municipal law can influence the arbitral process in a number of ways. First,
the procedural rules of the forum may determine the manner in which the
adjudication will be conducted. Second, substantive municipal law may
govern the resolution of the dispute. Third, the validity of the award under
various national laws may be relevant to the award's enforceability. Unless
the losing party acquiesces to the award, the prevailing party will lodge an
enforcement action before a national court. Finally, questions arise con-
cerning the relationship between the arbitral tribunal and the laws of the
arbitral forum: whether and to what extent forum law can or should
influence the course of arbitration solely because the tribunal is presiding
in the forum.
The English view of the degree to which national laws and policy can
or should influence the international arbitral process is marked by a strong
disdain for arbitral anationalism. English judges and commentators refer
disparagingly to a system of "floating" arbitration or arbitration "un-
bound." The traditional English view is that a system of procedural or
substantive law for the resolution of disputes can exist only by virtue of
sovereign authority. All adjudications conducted in England must be subject
to a certain extent to the English judicial system and procedural rules....
Mann's refusal to recognize international commercial arbitration as a
form of adjudication independent of municipal law and national sovereigns
reflects a strict Austinian view of the law. Essentially, Mann argues that
there can be no party autonomy, hence no institutional autonomy, if
autonomy is defined as independence from the strictures of national law
This attack upon the existing process is objectionable in a number of
respects. On the one hand, the refusal to recognize the evident realities of
international commercial activity and the necessity of having a dispute
resolution process that transcends parochial national concerns reveal the
sterility of the analysis. It begrudges the creative contributions of the
dynamic interplay between the law and economic forces merely because
they undo prior realities. On the other hand, the strident character of the
analysis clouds the real problem: how to strike a workable balance between
the transnational arbitral process and the integrity of vital national policy
interests . . ..
228 See supra note 225 and accompanying text (references to Mann).
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arbitration as a parallel adjudicatory process. It further evidences a
similar willingness to allow that mechanism to develop as a process
and to formulate its own rules and modus vivendi. The viability of
arbitration as an adjudicatory mechanism, in fact, depends upon its
independence from judicial supervision as to both the arbitral pro-
ceeding and the award. Initial systemic espousal, therefore, implies
an acceptance both of arbitration's legitimacy and of its independent
evolution (including the laxity of procedure, party and arbitrator
discretion, and flexible [even equitable] substantive rulings). Only
fundamental abuses, amounting to a clear denial of procedural justice,
warrant judicial correction.
The real issue of the law of international arbitration lies not in
whether the phenomenon of "anational" arbitration can be given an
adequate theoretical foundation nor in the United States Supreme
Court's participation in advancing that concept of the process. The
cohesion of international relations has always suffered from the con-
tinued and absolute assertion of sovereign municipal authority; ar-
bitration seems to have made significant inroads into minimizing the
negative operation of that principle-reducing the fluxity of available
remedies and helping to make the necessity of international commerce
a reality. What is of significant moment are the indirect domestic
consequences of the Mitsubishi ruling. The segregation of domestic
and international policy imperatives resulting from the elaboration
of a substantive private international law appears to be operative
only at the level of insulating international adjudication from domestic
law provisions. The rulings in the international cases, however, have
exhibited a tendency to seep back into the domestic legal order. The
Mitsubishi doctrine, for example, has generated considerable con-
fusion and division among lower federal courts as to whether purely
domestic issues, formerly deemed unquestionably to be matters of
public policy, are submissible to arbitration. In the aftermath of
Mitsubishi, courts-ruling in both domestic and international cases-
held that civil violations of RICO are submissible to arbitration,
reasoning that the RICO legislation was no more significant in terms
of the public interest than the Sherman Antitrust Act. 229 At least one
court has held that antitrust disputes arising from domestic contracts
are arbitrable. 2 0 Moreover, the Scherk-Mitsubishi doctrine has en-
couraged a significant minority of lower federal courts to question
229 See Quixotic Internationalism, supra note 206, at 290-96.
230 See id. at 293 n. 112.
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whether domestic securities fraud claims arising under either the 1933
or 1934 Securities Act are arbitrable. 23 1
231 See id. at 291 n.97. Since the Wilko decision barring arbitration in disputes
involving the 1933 Securities Act, federal courts had generally extended the Wilko
holding to claims arising under the 1934 Securities Act. These courts reasoned that,
given the similarity between the non-waiver provisions of the acts (15 U.S.C. § 77
(n) and 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (a)), the preclusion of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
should apply in both types of claims. The differences between the acts did not
override their basic similarities in this regard. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp.,
543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976); AFP Imaging Corp. v. Ross, 780 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.
1985); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1976); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Belke v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (lth Cir. 1982).
The Byrd and Mitsubishi decisions cast serious doubt on whether the Court would
follow the lead of the lower federal courts in this matter. See Comment, Section
10(b) And Rule lob-5 Federal Securities Law Claims: The Need For The Uniform
Disposition Of The Arbitration Issue, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 199 (1987); Comment,
The Case For Domestic Arbitration Of Federal Securities Claims: Is The Wilko
Doctrine Still Valid?, 16 S.W. UNrv. L. REV. 619 (1986); Note, The Preclusive Effect
Of Arbitral Determinations In Subsequent Federal Securities Litigation, 55 FORDHAM
L. REv. 655 (1987). Since Byrd and Mitsubishi, in fact, circuit courts have split on
the question of whether 1934 Act claims are subject to arbitration. Those courts
which had precedent on the issue maintained the correctness of their previous
decisions, i.e., nonarbitrability. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788
F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted 107 S.Ct. 60 (1986) [held that arbitration
agreements with respect to securities claims arising under the 1934 Act were unen-
forceable; the court did, however, state that common law fraud claims were arbi-
trable]. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986); Wolfe
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1986); Girard v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1986). In contradistinction, the two circuit
courts that were not constrained by precedent had determined that 1934 Act claims
were arbitrable. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 795 F.2d 1393
(8th Cir. 1986); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291
(1st Cir. 1986).
In keeping with the tenor of its established decisional law on arbitration, the
Court recently held that 1934 Securities Act claims could be submitted to arbitration.
See McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987). See also
infra text accompanying notes 234-263; Branson, The U.S. Supreme Court Casts a
Vote of Confidence for Arbitration: Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
2 INT'L ARB. REP. 355 (June 1987). As to the arbitrability of 1933 Securities Act
claims, see infra text accompanying note 266.
Expressly following the line of Supreme Court decisions from Zapata to Scherk
and ending with Mitsubishi, a federal court ruling in an international case recently
held that bankruptcy proceedings do not prevent the arbitration of a dispute between
the bankrupt company and one of its suppliers. Soci~t6 Nationale Algerienne v.
Distrigas Corp., 80 Bankr. 606 (D. Mass. 1987). In overturning an earlier opinion
by the Bankruptcy Court, the court reasoned that,
In weighing the strong public policy favoring international arbitration with
[Vol. 18:143
19881 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Obviously, the Court should clarify the domestic implications of
its decisional law on international commercial arbitration. It seems
that little benefit can be gained by reducing the scope of the inar-
bitrability defense in domestic law matters. The domestic process
places significant public law value on matters of economic regulation
and anti-racketeering legislation; arguably, conflicts arising from such
public law provisions should be resolved by tribunals invested with
the public trust and adjudicatory authority. Although the Court
attacked this rationale in Mitsubishi,23 2 commercial arbitrators should
have little credibility in addressing these regulatory issues, and such
disputes have a much wider significance in the domestic order than
ordinary contractual commercial controversies. 233
There is, however, an inexorable logic to the "emphatic federal
policy" favoring arbitration 234 that has already brought the afore-
any countervailing potential harm to bankruptcy policy upon the present
facts, this Court finds the scales weighted in favor of arbitration. As
discussed earlier, no major bankruptcy issues will be implicated in valuing
contract damages and the international arbitration panel requires no special
expertise to accomplish their task. While international arbitration will require
a temporary and limited incursion into the Bankruptcy Court's exclusive
jurisdictional bailiwick, no bankruptcy policies will suffer adverse impact.
Conversely, the very image of the United States in the international business
community stands to be tarnished. It is important and necessary for the
United States to hold its domiciliaries to their bargains and not allow them
to escape their commercial obligations by ducking into statutory safe har-
bors. Rather, our country should take special pains to project those qualities
of honesty and fairness which are essential parts of the traditional American
character and be perceived as a fair and equal player in the global mar-
ketplace, particularly in our commercial relations with the underdeveloped
world. Any additional time and expense required by the international ar-
bitration process-which is only speculative at this point- will be over-
shadowed in importance by the virtues of having the parties abide by their
commitments.
Id. at 613-14 (footnotes omitted).
See 2 INT'L Aia. REP. 226, 269 (Apr. 1987); Westbrook, The Coming Encounter:
International Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 67 MiNN. L. REv. 595 (1983). See also
Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding, inter
alia, that "as a matter of law . . . RICO claims arising in an international context
are arbitrable .... "). See 2 INT'L ARB. REP. 229, 241 (Apr. 1987).
Finally, the influence of the domestic and international decisional law on arbitration
is clearly in evidence in Bhatia v. Johnston, 818 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1987).
232 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3356-58.
233 See Quixotic Internationalism, supra note 206, at 275.
234 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3356-57. The strength of the federal policy favoring
arbitration has made its influence felt upon the controversial question of whether
arbitrators can award punitive damages. State courts are generally divided on the
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mentioned lower federal courts to render what were formerly un-
question-some see the arbitral mandate, once conferred, as basically unlimited,
while others believe that all arbitral powers should be expressly conferred by the
terms of reference that accompany the submission to arbitration. Yet a third group
of courts finds that the award of punitive damages by arbitrators is inappropriate
in all cases. These courts view punitive damages as a special and extraordinary
remedy linked to the law's exclusive hold on public policy matters.
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793 (1976), is the
controlling case in New York state. There, the court of appeals held that arbitrators
could not award punitive damages even if the parties had authorized them to do
so in their agreement because punitive damages are meant to punish parties and
deter negative social conduct, not compensate disappointed contractants. Fearing an
unwarranted intrusion upon public functions and state authority, the court held that,
Punitive damages is a sanction reserved to the State, a public policy of
such magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion to prevent its contravention.
Since enforcement of an award of punitive damages as a purely private
remedy would violate strong public policy, an arbitrator's award which
imposes punitive damages should be vacated. 353 N.E.2d at 794.
The position of the federal courts on the question of the arbitral award of punitive
damages is in striking contrast to the reasoning in Garrity and aligns itself with the
general tenor and logic of the second trilogy and Mitsubishi. In Willoughby Roofing
Co. & Supply v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), the court
found that the arbitrators had the authority to award punitive damages pursuant
to a broad arbitral clause (allowing the arbitrators to entertain "all claims, disputes,
and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this agreement . . . or
the breach thereof") and wide-ranging institutional rules ("The arbitrator may grant
any remedy or relief which is just and equitable and within the terms of the agreement
of the parties"). Id. at 355, 357. The court held, "[olnly in the presence of 'clear
and express exclusions' could it be said that the arbitrators lacked authority under
the contract to consider the plaintiff's claims for punitive damages." Id. at 358.
The holding reflects the view that the federal policy favoring arbitration (and its
institutional and juridical autonomy) requires allowing arbitrators to fashion the
remedies they deem appropriate in the particular case. See also Willis v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 569 F.Supp. 821 (M.D. N.C. 1983) ("This court agrees
that there is no public policy bar which prevents arbitrators from considering claims
for punitive damages."); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331
S.E.2d 726 (1985), cert. denied 315 N.C. 590, 341 S.E.2d 29 (1986) (state court
agrees that claims for punitive damages are arbitrable); Grissom v. Greener & Sumner
Constr., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709 (1984) [upholding arbitrability of punitive damages
where arbitration agreement expressly conferred authority on arbitrators to consider
exemplary damages; further, such awards did not violate public policy in contractual
disputes]; Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal App.3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Cal S. Ct.
1984) (upholding validity of punitive damage awards in medical malpractice arbi-
tration); Belko v. AVX Corp., 57 U.S.L.W. 2197 (Ca. App. 1988).
See generally Berg, Punitive Damages: Are They Properly Awarded in Arbitration?,
1 INT'L ARB. REP. 248 (1986);The Arbitrator's Power to Award Punitive Damages
in International Contract Actions, 19 N.Y.U. J. Irr'L L. & POL. 203 (1986); Note,
The Award of Punitive Damages as a Public Policy Question-Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc., 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 546 (1976); Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The
Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 272 (1978); Shell, The Power to
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thinkable rulings. The compromise of federalism interests in the trilogy
decisional law was itself a rather dramatic development, indicating
that even fundamental considerations of political organization may
fall in the face of the overriding policy of upholding arbitration
agreements. The absolute character of that policy may well impel the
Court to eliminate any juridical constraints upon the arbitral process
in domestic law matters but for the FAA grounds for the enforcement
of awards. The final result will be a fully uniform (and federalized)
American arbitration law with totally concordant domestic and in-
ternational branches-a law that, on the one hand, promotes the
contractual recourse to arbitration as the primary mechanism for
commercial dispute resolution and, on the other hand, advances a
philosophy of adjudication that emphasizes, at least in regard to
certain classes of disputes, the principle of autonomy and self-de-
termination.
In many respects, despite some gaps, problems in implementation,
and systemic conflicts, the contemporary development of arbitration
law in the United States indicates not only the breadth and success
of possible experimentation with alternatives, but also the limited
scope and design of the legal approach to dispute resolution. Rem-
edies, it seems, must comport with the nature of the disputes they
are meant to resolve; their acceptance and viability are the measure
Punish: Authority of Arbitrators to Award Multiple Damages and Attorneys' Fees,
72 MASS. L. REV. 26 (1987); Stipanowicti, Punitive Damages and Arbitration: Garrity
v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953 (1986).
There is a division of authority on this question in labor arbitration. See Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 534 F.Supp. 638
(D. Md. 1982) (disallowing punitive damages); Baltimore Regional Joint Bd. v.
Webster Clothes, Inc., 596 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that arbitrator's award
of punitive damages exceeded authority granted by collective bargaining agreement);
Sweeney v. Morganroth, 451 F.Supp. 367 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) (upholding an arbitral
award for "liquidated" damages, "recognizing the substantial leeway which must
be granted an arbitrator in fashioning remedies, especially in labor-related dis-
putes. . . ."); Local 369, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l Union of America,
AFL-CIO v. Cotton Baking Co., 514 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1975) (allowing award of
punitive damages as being within arbitrator's discretion). See also Westmoreland
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 550 F.Supp. 1044 (W.D. Va. 1982);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Aerospace Div. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 561 F.2d
521 (4th Cir. 1977); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F.Supp.
1104 (S.D. Tex 1972); School Comm. of New Bedford v. New Bedford Educators
Assoc., 9 Mass App. Ct. 793, 405 N.E. 2d 162 (1980); United States Fidelity &
Guar. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E. 2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel &
Assocs., Inc., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (1985). The author is indebted to Ms.
Margaret Sullivan for her research assistance in the writing of this footnote.
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of their usefulness; and a proper marriage of disputes with remedies
serves most, if not all, of the indispensable values-the right to be
heard by an impartial panel which renders a relatively expeditious
and fair determination.
E. McMahon: A Radical Postscript
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,235 decided in early
June 1987 and involving a claim for securities fraud and misrepre-
sentation under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, is the Court's most
recent pronouncement in the area of American domestic arbitration
law. The McMahon opinion further amplifies the already extensive
reach of the "emphatic federal policy" favoring arbitration. It dis-
poses of any residual doubts in domestic law surrounding the ar-
bitrability of Exchange Act and RICO claims. The ruling, however,
also alters certain well-settled principles of the developing American
law on arbitration. It substantially discredits the precedential value
of the Wilko decision, and eliminates the utility of the distinction-
initially propounded in Scherk-between the regulation of domestic
and international arbitration.
Both the end achieved and the means employed in the opinion
indicate that the Court will go to practically any length to uphold
arbitration agreements. McMahon makes abundantly clear that the
Court is impelled by an unbending objective: fostering the unfettered
recourse to arbitration. In effect, the Court's desire to eliminate all
vestiges of judicial hostility toward arbitration has given arbitration
a privileged position in the cosmology of protected judicial values.
Indeed, following McMahon, it is not at all implausible that the
consideration afforded to arbitration is not so different, in kind or
in degree, from the constitutional regard given to political speech,
racial equality, or other fundamental values and rights. The uncom-
promising tenor of the doctrine generates questions about the wisdom
of and motivation for the Court's stance.
Prior to McMahon, the related but separable rulings in Wilko and
Scherk logically gave rise to the question of whether claims arising
under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable in domestic
transactions. After Wilko, lower federal courts236-in cases involving
purely domestic contracts-had consistently held that these claims
were inarbitrable for reasons of the public policy interest in securities
231 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987).
236 See id. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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investor protection. The lower courts, it seems, took the core element
of the Scherk decision seriously, namely, that the internationalization
of trade and national economies demanded that international com-
mercial litigation be insulated from domestic juridical strictures (even
imperative ones). Therefore, arbitrability, as understood for purposes
of international contracting, differed quite substantially from arbitr-
ability as applied to domestic commercial transactions. In short,
although American merchants could not engage in international busi-
ness exclusively on their terms, domestic notions of legality should
still govern national commerce and commercial practices.
The Scherk reasoning represented a fair, open-minded, and prag-
matic accommodation of national and international interests. In the
relatively unfamiliar, specialized, and potentially politically conten-
tious area of international trade, the Court provided a neutral form
of leadership that allowed it to give proper scope to domestic reg-
ulatory policies and safeguard American interests in world trade. This
balancing of interests dictated the result in the case. Proffering do-
mestic legal protection to a sophisticated commercial enterprise al-
legedly defrauded by a foreign national was hardly worth compromising
American international business interests. The Court, therefore, gave
effect to the duly-consented-to arbitration agreement.
Mitsubishi,23 the later companion opinion, reinforced and con-
solidated the display of judicial internationalism in Scherk. There,
the Court held-despite persuasive domestic precedent to the con-
trary-that antitrust claims arising under an international contract
were arbitrable. While the tone of the opinion and segments of the
Court's reasoning generated misgivings, 238 the unmistakable impli-
cation of the reasoning was that the Court had established a clear
line of demarcation between matters international and domestic, that
regulatory policies-which pertained to the public interest at a national
level and which demanded adjudication through tribunals invested
with public authority-did not maintain their public policy status
once they were integrated into the transnational context.
Echoing Scherk, the Court in Mitsubishi reiterated the view that
the community of international merchants had established arbitration
as the remedial process for the resolution of international contract
claims. Interpreting domestic American regulatory provisions to block
the recourse to arbitration for certain types of international contract
237 See supra text accompanying note 206.
238 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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claims would imperil the viability of international commerce and
larger American economic and commercial interests. Despite the eq-
uities involved and its clear authority to refuse arbitration under the
public policy and inarbitrability provisions of the New York Arbi-
tration Convention, the Court in Mitsubishi chose to restrict the reach
of imperative domestic public policy requirements and to further its
support for what appeared to be an emerging general American policy
on private international law.
McMahon, however, now demonstrates that Scherk and Mitsubishi
are misunderstood if assessed as isolated international cases defining
a special policy on transnational commerce and international arbi-
tration. Following Scherk and contemporaneously with Mitsubishi,
the Court decided the "new trilogy" of domestic arbitration cases-
Moses Cone, Keating, and Byrd.239 These cases gave new impetus
and direction to the domestic law of arbitration. The "trilogy" cases
established the foundation for a full-fledged national policy on ar-
bitration. As a group, these cases stand for a variety of propositions
that minimize, and perhaps eliminate, any federalism constraints on
the policy underlying the FAA. According to these opinions, the
"emphatic federal policy" favoring arbitration demands a virtual
extinguishment of state authority in matters pertaining to arbitration.
The FAA is not merely a composite of procedural enactments that
apply only to federal courts, but rather the congressional enactment
of substantive rules in an area where Congress has constitutional
authority to act. 24 0
Moreover, the Supremacy Clause mandates that the provisions of
the FAA override contrary state legislative enactments; 241 ultimately,
the policy and content of the FAA are binding upon both federal
and state courts. 242 Even in those matters in which federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction, if related claims are submissible to ar-
bitration, arbitration has to be compelled and federal jurisdiction
stayed until the conclusion of the arbitral proceeding. 243 In effect,
the intertwining doctrine could not survive the dominance of the
FAA's policy and was eliminated in favor of the contractual recourse
to arbitration. Even duplicative proceedings and adjudicatory inef-
239 See supra text accompanying note 145.
240 See supra text accompanying notes 153 & 154 (Moses Cone).
241 See supra text accompanying notes 160-68 (Keating).
242 Id.
243 See supra text accompanying notes 169-78 (Byrd).
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ficiency did not dissuade the Court in these domestic cases from
upholding the congressional intent to legitimate the recourse to ar-
bitration.
McMahon reinforces the direction born of the "trilogy"; however,
it not only consolidates but also expands the Court's decisional law
on domestic and international arbitration. To achieve the objective
of declaring that both Exchange Act and RICO claims are arbitrable,
the Court engages in an uncharacteristic and disappointing display
of narrow, strained, and distortive construction of statutes and prior
decisional law. While the Court's aim of eliminating any restrictions
on arbitration is transparent, its methodology and doctrine are con-
fusing, unpersuasive, and ultimately unsound. Indeed, it is difficult
to understand why the Court is so determined to eradicate any and
all juridical restraints upon arbitration. Surely the imposition of some
minimal limitations arising out of core public policy concerns would
not threaten or undermine the autonomy of arbitral adjudication.
For instance, allowing consumers in the securities context to benefit
from statutory protections exclusively through judicial fora would
not preclude or restrict the recourse to arbitration in a commercial,
arms' length setting where the institution of arbitration developed
and continues to thrive. The Court's desire to give absolute effect
to the FAA's policy of upholding arbitration agreements is both
dogged and unnecessary to maintain the integrity of the arbitral
process.
The reasoning in McMahon suffers from several methodological
and conceptual deficiencies. As to the issue of the arbitrability of
Exchange Act claims (a question which divided the Court 5-4), the
majority opinion begins by incanting the now-consecrated view that
a claim based upon statutorily-conferred rights does not disrupt the
ordinarily "hospitable" inquiry into the question of arbitrability.
244
To defeat the implied presumption favoring the arbitrability of claims,
the statute that is the vehicle for creating the rights must contain,
in either its language or its legislative history, a congressional com-
mand mandating exclusive recourse to the courts for the vindication
of claims. Moreover, the burden is upon the party opposing arbi-
tration to establish the existence of such congressional intent. 245 Hav-
ing weighted the inquiry in favor of a finding of arbitrability, the
2 4 107 S.Ct. at 2337.
245 Id.
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majority opinion then engages in a series of strained constructions
to guarantee the result implied by its initial proposition.
At the outset, the Court advances a painfully technical interpre-
tation of the relevant provisions of the Exchange Act, arguing that
the non-waiver language of the Act applies exclusively to the sub-
stantive obligations under the legislation.246 Since the recourse to
arbitration merely represents the selection of a different forum and
remedial process, such an agreement-the Court would have us be-
lieve-has no impact upon the substantive statutory rights in question.
The non-waiver provision of the Act, therefore, does not apply to
arbitration agreements because that choice of remedy does not affect
the substantive guarantees of the Act. In reaching this determination,
the Court opines that arbitrators are capable of applying and inter-
preting the law. 247
The Court, however, attributes no significance whatever either to
the underlying purpose of the Exchange Act (to protect individual
investors from overreaching by securities industry professionals) or
to the intractable reality that arbitrators are likely to construe the
applicable law very differently from judges, especially in light of the
fact that the arbitral procedure in these circumstances is established
and directed by the securities industry. In effect, the Court chooses
to ignore the adhesionary character of the contract and the arbitration
agreement, neglecting the evident need for consumer protection gen-
erated by the facts. The Court exhibits similarly tendentious and
distortive reasoning in its attempt to align the result in McMahon
with the principles of prior decisional law on arbitration.
For example, the majority opinion interprets the Wilko decision
as barring the selection of a non-judicial forum where arbitration is
inadequate to protect the substantive statutory rights at issue.2 48 Scherk
is seen as providing that, where arbitration is deemed (presumably
by the courts) sufficient to protect the rights at issue, there is no bar
to a waiver of a judicial forum. 249 This construction of precedents
extends the doctrine, first articulated in Scherk and more forcefully
in Mitsubishi, that the existence of statutory rights does not preclude
the recourse to arbitration unless there is a legislative command that
mandates judicial disposition of alleged violations. According to the
246 Id. at 2338-39.
147 Id. at 2340-41.
248 Id. at 2338.
249 Id. at 2339.
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McMahon interpretation of Wilko and Scherk, statutory language
providing for the non-waiver of judicial remedies will be effective
only when arbitration, the alternative, is deemed to be an inadequate
remedial process for adjudicating statutory rights. Expressed more
forthrightly, the syllogistic logic25° yields the following new rule of
law: Express statutory language attributing exclusive jurisdiction to
the courts will defeat a private agreement to arbitrate only when the
courts determine that arbitration is an inadequate remedy to protect
the statutory rights in question. The Court's review of the relevant
precedent amounts to a reconstruction of the prior law.
In effect, Wilko stands for a very different proposition than the
one advanced by the Court. According to the express language of
Wilko, 25 as between two competing congressional policies-upholding
arbitration agreements under the FAA and protecting securities inves-
tors under the Exchange Act-the Wilko Court gave effect to the
latter in light of the express statutory language in the 1933 Act
providing for exclusive judicial remedies and relief. The Wilko Court
reasoned that, in such special circumstances, Congress had itself
decided to make an exception to its general policy under the FAA.
Moreover, Scherk is distinguishable from Wilko not because there
exists a meaningful difference in statutory language or objective
between the 1933 and 1934 Acts, but rather because the domestic
policy of securities investor protection has little relevance to multi-
national parties engaged in an international commercial venture. The
primary analytical factors that led in Scherk to a restriction of the
Wilko doctrine to domestic circumstances are the presence of an
international contract and the Court's willingness to elaborate special
rules for litigation resulting from transnational commercial activities.
McMahon ignores the special circumstances, express doctrinal con-
tent, and segregation of domestic and international considerations in
the prior decisional law. The McMahon Court has thus created new
law from the previously well-settled significance of these decisions.
It is not surprising that these reconstructed rules are more suitable
to developing an unlimited arbitrability doctrine.
The holding in Mitsubishi is similarly recast.252 A fair reading of
the Mitsubishi rule would represent it as stating that antitrust claims
are arbitrable in the context of international contracts. As in Scherk,
210 Id. at 2349 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
251 See supra text accompanying note 65.
252 107 S.Ct. at 2332.
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the triggering element of the opinion was the fact that the dispute
and the agreement to arbitrate surfaced in the context of an inter-
national commercial transaction. If American parties could frustrate
the recourse to arbitration by alleging violations of American antitrust
law, the stability of international commerce achieved with predictable
dispute resolution through arbitration would be undermined. Ac-
cording to McMahon,253 however, Mitsubishi now stands for the
proposition that the submission of statutory rights to arbitration does
not represent an abandonment or elimination of those rights. Arbitral
tribunals, like courts, are able to interpret and apply the governing
law. Resorting to the arbitral rather than judicial adjudication of
statutory claims merely represents a choice of dispute resolution
forum.
This transparent reassessment of Mitsubishi is again calculated to
support (aprbs la lettre) the Court's increasingly expansive arbitration
doctrine. It further appears that the objective of establishing a judicial
policy on matters of private international law, discernable in the
Scherk and Mitsubishi holdings as originally stated, has been engulfed
by and lost in the larger, more doctrinaire and unbending policy on
arbitration.
In particular, McMahon gives short shrift to Wilko. According to
the majority opinion,254 Wilko, rather than representing a statement
of the importance of the policy of protecting securities investors from
broker overreaching, instead symbolizes primarily a general distrust
of arbitration and of the ability of arbitral tribunals to achieve viable
adjudicatory results. While the Court makes a half-hearted attempt
to preserve Wilko's precedential value, 255 it effectively discredits its
reasoning and ultimate result-stating, for instance, that the Wilko
view of arbitration does not square with the more contemporary
judicial evaluation in Mitsubishi, Byrd, Keating, Moses Cone, or
Scherk.2 56 The present view is that arbitral tribunals can handle com-
plex disputes, that procedural flexibility in arbitration does not mean
that substantive rights will be compromised or eliminated, and that
arbitrators are able to apply the law (with the prospect of judicial
review at the enforcement stage standing as a safeguard against
arbitrator abuse or incompetence).2 17 Moreover, in regard to securities
2 Id. at 2340.
214 Id. at 2339-41.
23 Id. at 2341.
26 Id. at 2340.
257 Id.
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arbitration, the McMahon Court finds that the new oversight authority
of the SEC provides a guarantee against overreaching and unfair-
ness. 258 Accordingly, the Scherk holding (despite its reasoning per-
taining to international commerce) is extended to cover both domestic
and international claims arising under the Exchange Act and Wilko
is limited to claims (presumably both domestic and international)
arising under the Securities Act. 25 9
As to the issue of the arbitrability of RICO claims, 260 the Court
in McMahon is unanimous in its view that such claims can be sub-
mitted to arbitration. While the RICO legislation could readily be
seen as involving matters of public policy, there is no express language
in the statute or its legislative history to indicate a congressional
intent to preclude party selection of alternative, non-judicial remedies.
Accordingly, under the revamped reasoning in Mitsubishi, the Court
gleefully finds itself bound to conclude that RICO claims can be
adjudicated through arbitration. 26' The RICO statute does provide
for civil claims, and arbitrators are able to take jurisdiction over
such disputes. Apparently, arbitral (like judicial) jurisdiction extends
to the awarding of treble damages.
It is startling that the disposition of this question generated no
controversy among the members of the Court. Given the vehement
dissents262 that accompanied some of the major cases in this line of
decisional law, some expression of disagreement could logically have
been expected in light of the arguably vital public interests at stake.
Perhaps, the Court finds the RICO statute duplicative of other reg-
ulatory legislation and burdensome to administer in actual litigation.
In any event, the last vestiges of opposition within the Court to an
unthwarted arbitration policy appear to have been finally voiced in
Mitsubishi.263
Prior to McMahon, Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Mitsubishi
had assumed a critical significance in the development of American
arbitration law. Eloquent and persuasive, it made a cogent case for
a more measured decisional law grounded in the need for rational
restraints. It created the expectation that the Court's unwieldy vision
of arbitration might be kept in check by an assessment of the process
238 Id. at 2341.
259 Id. at 2340-41.
260 Id. at 2343-45.
26 Id. at 2344.
262 For instance, Justice Douglas in Scherk and Justice Stevens in Mitsubishi.
263 See Justice Steven's dissent in Mitsubishi.
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that was anchored in an intelligence of its history, reality, and design.
Justice Stevens' concurring and dissenting opinion in McMahon very
substantially disappoints that expectation. Agreeing that RICO claims
can be submitted to arbitration, Justice Stevens only takes exception
with the majority view that arbitration agreements should be enforced
with respect to 1934 Security Act claims: given the "longstanding
interpretation" upholding the Wilko bar in this area, "any mistake
the courts may have made in interpreting the statute is best remedied
by the legislative, not the judicial, branch." The brevity in tone and
content of the opinion strongly suggests that the Stevens' opposition
to the incongruities of the majority's doctrine on arbitration has
waned to acquiescence. His opposition to the concept of limitless
arbitration now gains expression in the empty formalism of judicial
restraint. 264
264 The Court's current stance on arbitration is lodged (so it seems at least) in
the general policy objective of improving the administration of justice by promoting
the recourse to arbitration. Its intent appears to be to have arbitral adjudication
act as a substitute for the judicial process, thereby reducing the volume of cases on
federal court dockets. In pursuing this policy objective, the Court has minimized
the importance of other, arguably equally-important juridical values-such as fed-
eralism concerns and regulatory policy. Moreover, the Court has achieved its aim
by responding to the legal questions engendered by the litigation through analytical
reasoning that is so single-minded at times as to be transparently ill-conceived and
tortuous.
In this setting, Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Mitsubishi was an enlightening
counterpoint to the majority's view of and approach to arbitration. The Stevens
dissent was grounded in persuasive legal reasoning and in a realistic sense of the
dimensions of the arbitral process. It also countered the majority's policy vision
with a set of critical and opposing policy considerations: what are or should be the
demands of international trade and business upon national processes? When should
national interests be considered vital in this setting and how are they to fare in the
elaboration of a policy on international commerce? How can an effective balancing
of priorities be achieved?
Stevens' reference to judicial restraint in McMahon no longer carries with it an
implied understanding of the arbitral process or of its mission in the larger landscape
of dispute resolution and public policy. Nor does it convey a persuasive opposing
view of the policy underpinnings of the specifically legal questions that are ordinarily
raised in the litigation on arbitration. In effect, it sounds a retreat to a refuge of
doctrine that is likely to be inconsequential as a dissenting view.
Given the history of his opinions on arbitration, it may have been unrealistic to
expect that Justice Stevens would become a voice of reasoned opposition to the
Court's arbitration doctrine. Taken as a whole, the opinions contain a number of
marked inconsistencies. Moreover, rather than reflect an elaborated concept of the
systemic or institutional stature of arbitral adjudication, they reveal an assessment
of the alternative process that is subordinated to the traditional legal issues that
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The majority opinion in McMahon makes evident that the Court
wants the recourse to arbitration to go unimpeded in almost all
dominated the particular litigation.
For example, Justice Stevens, as a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
dissented in Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, arguing that the arbitration agreement
should be enforced. See 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973). According to then-Judge
Stevens, although both statutes rendered "void any waiver by a plaintiff of defen-
dant's obligation to comply with the statute," neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934
Act "expressly applies to the plaintiff's waiver of his right to sue in a federal court."
Id. at 618-19 (Stevens, Cir. Judge, dissenting). Wilko was distinguishable from Scherk
on the ground that Wilko involved actions contrary to the purpose of the statute
while Scherk was merely a disguised contract case. "[In a case such as this, ...
I would interpret § 29(a) as meaning no more than it actually says, and respect
what I regard as the stronger policy mandated by § 201 of the Federal Arbitration
Act ..... .Id. at 619.
While the tenor of the opinion appears to announce in an ironic way the type of
reasoning that would eventually characterize the majority opinion in Mitsubishi and
McMahon, Judge Stevens' logic was not adopted by the United States Supreme
Court, which anchored its agreement with the Stevens conclusion in language relating
to international comity and the needs of international commerce. See Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). Justice Stevens later vehemently
dissented against such reasoning in Mitsubishi, criticizing the majority opinion for
subordinating the "national interests in a competitive economy" to "vague notions
of international comity." Mitsubishi, 105 S.Ct. at 3361, 3369 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
According to Stevens, a makeshift "vision of world unity" should not be allowed
to "distort the importance of the selection of a prior forum for resolving this
dispute." Id. at 3374.
Therefore, as a circuit judge, Justice Stevens argued that claims under the 1934
Act should be submitted to arbitration, while in McMahon, as a Supreme Court
Justice, he dissented on the ground that such claims should not be arbitrable.
Moreover, his strong opposition to the arbitrability of antitrust claims expressed in
Mitsubishi is accompanied in McMahon by the silent approval of the submission of
RICO claims to arbitration-even though civil RICO claims can be considered roughly
equivalent to antitrust claims in terms of their importance to the public interest.
The dichotomy between Stevens' reasoning in Scherk and McMahon could be
explained by reference to a belief in judicial restraint. Since and prior to his circuit
court dissent in Scherk, the Wilko bar to 1934 Act claims has been upheld by a
long line of courts. Even if Justice Stevens believes that the application of Wilko
is mistaken, his conservative view on the exercise of judicial authority may have led
him to conclude that the erroneous decisional law should be corrected by legislative,
not judicial, action. Judicial restraint would further require that the Justice's mis-
givings yield to overwhelming case precedent and the Congressional acquiescence to
the non-arbitrability of such claims.
The conflict between the determination of the arbitrability of antitrust and RICO
claims may be explained by Justice Stevens' long association and intimate acquain-
tance with antitrust law. Justice Stevens not only practiced antitrust law, but has
also extensively taught and is an accomplished scholar in that area. Justice Stevens'
affinity to the "Chicago School" of antitrust economics and to its regard for the
consumer protection rationale of antitrust policy may have motivated the Justice's
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circumstances. The most troubling and elusive component of the
opinion is its underlying motivation and the need to have such an
absolute and unrestricted policy on arbitrability specifically and on
arbitration generally. The "new trilogy" in domestic law could be
understood in terms of the need to articulate a policy on arbitration
of truly national dimension. If state courts applying state law in
commercial cases could undermine the basic purpose of the FAA,
the congressional objective of legitimating arbitration might receive
only episodic implementation. Moreover, in diversity cases, federal
courts obligated to apply state law might also be compelled to undo
the gravamen of the FAA. Accordingly, in matters of interstate
commerce where Congress has the power to legislate, the goals of
the FAA should receive uniform and systematic application by all
judicial tribunals.
view in Mitsubishi that "the public interest in free competitive markets" is too close
to fundamental values and core regulatory interests to be implemented through
private arbitral resolution. The anti-competitive restrictions allegedly imposed by
Mitsubishi are the very type of actions that the antitrust laws were intended to guard
against and prosecute.
According to Justice Stevens, RICO claims raise a very different set of consid-
erations. Few RICO claims actually involve allegations of criminal conduct by
mobsters. Civil RICO violations, like those allegedly involved in McMahon, are not
essential claims in that they do not arise from organized crime's encroachment upon
legitimate business. They are not, according to the Stevens thinking, part of the
primary concerns of the statutory framework. Moreover, there is no express statutory
language evidencing a Congressional intent to render such claims inarbitrable. Finally,
there is no body of decisional law supporting the inarbitrability of civil RICO claims.
Therefore, while the alleged violations in Mitsubishi were exactly the type of mis-
conduct that the antitrust statutes were meant to prevent, the RICO violations alleged
in McMahon cannot, realistically or analytically, be equated with the social evil that
the RICO statute was intended to extinguish.
Taken in the context of the entirety of his opinions on arbitration, the Stevens
dissent in Mitsubishi does not so much reflect an insightful understanding of the
institution of arbitral adjudication as such, but rather a studied concern for the role
and integrity of antitrust regulation. As a whole, while the majority view in arbitration
litigation focused upon the politics of judicial administration, Justice Stevens was
preoccupied with either substantive juridical concerns or policies relating to the
exercise of judicial authority. On either side of the equation, the court appears to
have only a minimal regard for the integrity of arbitration itself.
For a discussion of Justice Stevens' judicial career and philosophy, see generally
R. KAY, R. KHAYAT, J. ZIRKLE, A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT 329
(S. Elliott ed. 1986); 5 L. ORLAND, John Paul Stevens, in THE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 149 (L. Friedman ed. 1978); Tribute to
Justice John Paul Stevens, 56 CHI. KENT L. REv. 1 (1980); Riggs, Justice Stevens
and the Law of Antitrust, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 649 (1982). The author is indebted
to Mr. Craig E. Frosch for his research assistance in the writing of this footnote.
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The determinations in Scherk and Mitsubishi were also sustainable
by reference to a comprehensible policy objective. Simply stated,
the needs of international commerce and trade are sui generis and
differ from their domestic analogue. Because of its provision of
neutrality and expertise, arbitration has become the principal dispute
resolution mechanism in that area of activity. If it is problematic
to have one party to a transnational commercial venture subject to
the laws and judicial procedure of a foreign country, it is untenable
to have the national law of one of the contracting parties frustrate
the agreed-upon recourse to arbitration. Domestic restrictions on
arbitrability, therefore, should not be integrated into the context of
international transactions because such parochial action would even-
tually undermine the effectiveness and stability generated by the
availability of the arbitral process. While statutory rights available
to American parties in the form of securities or antitrust legislation
will probably be compromised under this internationalist doctrine,
the interest in fostering the development of international commerce
by freeing it of local juridical constrictions outweighs the policy of
affording nationals-versed in the commercial climate-extraterri-
torial protection.
McMahon, however, escapes the normal reach of policy justifi-
cations. The opinion effectively collapses the astute and creative
distinction between matters of international arbitration and those
pertaining to domestic arbitration. Scherk and Mitsubishi are no
longer to be understood as creating special rules for international
commercial litigation, but rather as producing propositions that
generally apply to the arbitrability of all disputes. It is one thing
to decide that domestic restrictions are unsuitable for application
in an international context; it is quite another matter to decide that,
because the domestic restriction is inapplicable in transnational mat-
ters, it has lost its governing effect in the domestic process as well.
The rulings in Scherk and Mitsubishi were premised on the specialty
of international commercial litigation, as exceptions to a usually
controlling rule in the domestic legal order. Rather than simply
ignore that aspect of the cases, the Court should have recognized
the consequences of its reasoning and provided some justification
for its ricochet integration of the international exception into the
domestic legal order. After all, different legal regimes and policy
interests are involved in these separable areas of activity. The un-
reasoned alignment of the international and domestic cases on ar-
bitration, then, is both unfortunate and confusing. It robs both
groups of cases of their specialty and particular policy directives,
1988]
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and allows the Court to elaborate a policy on arbitration that is
abstracted from the meaningful restrictions of varying circumstances.
The only protection that the Court proffers against the potential
compromise of rights and arbitral abuse is judicial review of awards
at the enforcement stage. When applied under existing rules and
procedures for review, such protection is likely to be ineffective.
Although awards of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
usually constitute an exception to this practice, arbitral awards
generally do not contain reasons, and scrutiny is usually given only
to basic procedural matters. If a more stringent review standard is
applied-one, for example, applying to the merits or which requires
arbitrators to conform strictly to legal due process requirements-
it is likely to do substantial damage to the autonomy of the arbitral
process. A policy meant to give absolute free reign to arbitration
could result in the gradual defacement of the process through an
increase of judicial supervision.
The Court suggests in McMahon that its ruling is quite simply
mandated by the congressional intent underlying the FAA. 265 Given
the radical transformation of the American law of arbitration that
McMahon achieved, however, that suggestion is unconvincing. A
more likely explanation appears to reside in the Court's desire to
take as much dispute resolution as possible out of judicial fora and
to promote efficient judicial administration by reducing court dock-
ets. But, if the American juridical culture is in crisis because of the
predominance of the adversarial ethic and litigious dispositions, the
answer to that problem, although it may reside in alternative ap-
proaches to dispute resolution, does not lie in simply shifting the
maximum possible adjudicatory burden to arbitration. Arbitral ad-
judication works well for some disputes, especially those that are
commercial and international in character, but it is not a panacea-
it is not a remedial structure of universal application. There are
some disputes that truly implicate core public concerns or involve
parties whose bargaining position and knowledge are fundamentally
unequal. In such cases, arbitration is inappropriate. Moreover, it
is inappropriate to respond to a situation in which access to justice
is a problem by making such access completely impossible. Although
the volume of claims is thereby reduced, such barriers do not improve
the quality of justice that is dispensed.
263 107 S.Ct. at 2337, 2343.
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The imbalance in the Court's analysis illustrates a willingness to
compromise fundamental rights and values, not for rational reasons,
but out of a sense of desperation arising from the volume of liti-
gation. Unfortunately, the Court's desperation may also lead it to
compromise the effectiveness of arbitration itself and the integrity
of the case law that advanced the favorable policy underlying the
FAA. The dire prophecy of the Douglas dissent in Scherk appears
to be materializing and influencing all aspects of the American law
of arbitration. Rather than creating a sound and structured juridical
pathway for the exercise of contractual discretion in dispute reso-
lution, the Court appears to have abdicated its function of providing
necessary guidelines and balance to the institution of a cooperative
relationship between the judicial and alternative processes. 266 The
The Court's ruling generated a number of reactions. In response to the McMahon
decision, the American Arbitration Association enacted a new set of rules to deal
specifically with matters of security arbitration. See American Arbitration Assoc.,
Securities Rules (effective Sept. 1, 1987). In some respects, the variegated content
of these rules demonstrates the difficulty of providing for recourse to arbitration in
this setting. In general, however, the procedures established attempt to accommodate
as appropriately as possible the disparity of position between the parties and the
potential public law aspect of the claims. (Information obtained in telephone inter-
views on Dec. 6, 1988 with Mr. Richard Lerner, American Arbitration Assoc., New
York City Office, and Mr. David Tick, American Arbitration Assoc., San Francisco
Regional Office).
The stock market collapse on October 19, 1987 put the McMahon decision and
the administrative powers of the SEC to the test. While the Commission contemplated
asking Congress to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration clauses in securities agreements,
it ultimately decided to request a study and is in the process of reviewing that study.
The current status of securities arbitration and the relative inaction of the Commission
belies the confidence the McMahon Court placed in the process and in the SEC's
supervisory functions. See Arbitration backlog keeps investors waiting for relief,
Christian Science Mon., Oct. 21, 1988, Business section, at 13.
Also, Massachusetts enacted legislation that prohibits mandatory arbitration pro-
visions in investor-broker contracts. Under the regulation, brokers must advise clients
of their legal right to pursue judicial relief and cannot refuse to do business with
clients who do not agree to arbitration. The Massachusetts provision conflicts with
federal law as established by the McMahon opinion and also may represent the
initial development of a trend against arbitration. See Massachusetts Says Brokers
Can't Insist on Arbitration, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1988, at 39, cols. 5 and 6. The
Massachusetts law was struck down at the federal district court level on constitutional
grounds. See Securities Ind. Assoc. v. Michael J. Connolly, Sec. of State, C.A. 88-
2153 - W.D. Mass. [U.S. DIST. LEXIS 14587, decided Dec. 19, 19881. Appeal is
envisaged.
Finally, the Court recently agreed to review (57 U.S.L.W. 3347 [Nov. 14, 1988])
a decision in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that claims arising under
the 1933 Securities Act can be submitted to arbitration. In its opinion, the lower
court simply extended the McMahon Court's evaluation of the Wilko v. Swan
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unqualified recourse to the principle of freedom of contract is as
dangerous as it is unintelligent. It transforms the invocation of that
principle into undiscriminating sloganeering.
precedent to its logical conclusion, holding that the latter opinion in effect had been
reversed. If upheld on appeal, the decision would effectively eliminate the significance
of the inarbitrability defense, further compromise the position of individual investors
in the securities markets, and continue to undermine the integrity of the arbitral
process. See Rodriquez De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296
(5th Cir. 1988) ("We thus follow the reasoning of the Supreme Court in McMahon
and our own decision in Noble [v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849,
850 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987)] which lead directly to the obsolescence of Wilko and the
arbitrability of Securities Act § 12(2) claims." 845 F.2d at 1299).
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